of music; that the love of property is produced late, and is consequently an ulterior and derived sentiment.

Finally, Mr. Bain has taken no account of hereditary transmission, which, nevertheless, creates such great differences between savage and civilized races.1

To these criticisms we venture to add a final one: Mr. Bain considers the number of simple emotions to be nine. Must we believe that they are absolutely irreducible? Is there not some fundamental inclination which is their source, and which explains them? Cannot all the affective phenomena be reduced to a final law, as the intellectual phenomena may be reduced to a particular mode of association? Spinoza, as we know, explained all our passions by desire, joy, and pain, which he referred to the fundamental inclination of every being to be and to persevere in his being.' Jouffroy arrived at the same conclusion in another form, and in another manner. All the simple or compound emotions had the love of self for their first source. The positivists divided them into two sections-egotistical affections, affections for others. It seems to us regrettable that Mr. Bain should not have also tried a reduction, or at least that he should not have given us his mind upon the current doctrines.

II.

'Feeling,' he says, 'comprehends all our pleasures and pains, and certain modes of excitement of a neutral character, which shall be defined later.' Feeling comprehends at once diverse sensations previously examined, and the emotions.a The former

1 Mr. Bain has replied in a note to the last edition of The Emotions and the Will, p. 601. He points out that the point of view of Mr. Spencer, that of the doctrine of evolution, must have brought with it a difference of plan. He believes, in addition, that the disagreements are more apparent than real, and thus concludes the discussion: 'It appears, therefore, that I have given a classification as nearly agreeing with Mr. Spencer's, as two independent minds can be expected to agree in so vast a subject; the scheme whereby he proposes to reorganize, on an advanced idea, the psychology of the feelings, differing from mine only in form and appearance.'-Bain's Emotions and the Will, p. 605.

2 Emotions and Will, chap. iv.

are the primitive feelings, the latter the secondary, derivative, complex feelings.

'The most general principle that we are able to lay down respecting the concomitance of mind and body may be called the law of diffusion. It is expressed thus: "When an impression is accompanied with feeling, or any kind of consciousness, the aroused currents diffuse themselves freely over the brain, leading to a general agitation of the moving organs, as well as affecting the viscera."'1

The reflex action, on the contrary, which is not felt, is restrained in its influence to a very narrow nervous circuit.

This law of diffusion causes motions to be transmitted by waves to the heart, stomach, and viscera, and manifests itself by the features of the countenance, etc. 'It constitutes a considerable support to the doctrine of the unity of consciousness. Several nervous excitements may co-exist, but they can only affect consciousness successively, each one in its turn.'

It is upon these exterior manifestations of the emotions, upon their results, and their subjective characteristics, that their classification is founded. The author acknowledges the eleven following classes :—

1. We will begin with the LAW OF HARMONY and CONFLICT. The principle that HARMONY is connected with PLEASURE, and CONFLICT With PAIN, is probably an offshoot of the LAW OF SELFCONSERVATION.

2. There are certain emotions essentially depending on the LAW OF RELATIVITY. Such are NOVELTY, WONDER, and the FEELING OF LIBERTY. These are all purely relative to certain other states that go before; NOVELTY and WONDER presuppose the ordinary or the common; LIBERTY implies foregone restraint. The emotion of POWER also subsists upon comparison with some allied state of impotence.

3. The emotion of TERROR is a wide-spread influence in human life. The revulsion from suffering implied in our volitional nature, instead of producing always the simple effect of inspiring actions for relieving the pain, not unfrequently excites a convul

1 Bain, ibid. p. 3.

sive trepidation of the whole system, accompanied with a new state of suffering, and with other important consequences. This special outgoing belongs to certain modes of pain rather than to others; and all sentient beings are subject to the condition, although in very unequal degrees. As a general rule, the susceptibility to terror is a weakness and an evil, and the consideration of the means of avoiding or subduing it is of great practical

moment.

4. The extensive group of feelings implied under the title of the TENDER AFFECTIONS constitutes a well-marked order or genus of emotion. Being principally manifested towards living beings, their first development in the child comes with the recognition of personality. When they are once made to flow freely, human attachments begin to be formed; and a considerable portion of the pleasure of life springs from this fountain-head. If it were permitted to writers on the human mind to advert specifically to the feelings of the sexual relations, these would find an appropriate place anterior to the present division.

5. When a human being recognises or imagines in himself the qualities that draw forth admiration, love, reverence, esteem, when seen in others, he is affected by a peculiar kind of emotion, which passes current under such names as SELF-COMPLACENCY, SELF-GRATULATION, SELF-ESTEEM. I am disposed to think that there is here only a special offshoot or diversion of the tender sensibility. [A still further emotional effect is produced by being the subject of the admiration or esteem of our fellows, which is commonly denominated APPROBATION, PRAISE, GLORY, REPUTATION, and the like.]

6. The elation of superior POWER is a very marked and widely ramifying sentiment of our constitution: implying, as its correlative, the depression of IMPOTENCE, inferiority, and insignificance.

7. The IRASCIBLE EMOTION is a notable attribute of our humanity, the peculiar characteristic of which is the pleasure arising from malevolent action and sentiment.

8. Under ACTION there are certain distinct modes of feeling to be mentioned, as contributing largely to the interest of life. Besides the pleasures and pains of exercise, and the gratification of, succeeding in an end, with the opposite mortification of miss

ing what is laboured for, there is in the attitude of pursuit a peculiar state of mind, so far agreeable in itself that factitious occupations are instituted to bring it into play. When I use the term PLOT-INTEREST, the character of the situation alluded to will be suggested with tolerable distinctness.

9. The exercise of the INTELLECT gives birth to certain species of emotions which it is interesting to study. The routine operations sustained by mere contiguity evolve no feeling; the more perfect the intellectual habits, the less consciousness is associated with them. A practised accountant approaches to a calculating machine. But in the operation of the Law of Similarity, where new identifications are struck out, there is an emotion of agreeable surprise accompanying the flash. Hence, although routine is unconscious, originality is intensely stimulating. Part of the pleasure of works of genius proceeds from this effect, and we shall see in it one of the rewards of intellectual pursuit. [Under the same head is to be reckoned the very characteristic pain produced by Inconsistency, in the susceptibility to which temperaments differ greatly. The genuine love of Truth is greatly fostered by the desire of escaping from contradictions.1]

While the sentiments ranged under the nine preceding titles are simple and irreducible, the æsthetic and the moral emotions which form the two last groups are compound. The author has studied them in detail, and we must now pause to consider them.

III.

Two entire chapters (the thirteenth and fourteenth) on sympathy, imitation, and ideal emotion, that is to say, the emotion which is caused by pure ideas, and not by realities, precede the aesthetic explanation.

'We understand by sympathy and imitation, the tendency of an individual to agree with the active or emotional conditions of others; these conditions being revealed by certain means of expression.' Sympathy and imitation have an identical foundation; but the one expression is used for feelings, and the other for action. Two laws regulate sympathy. The first is the tendency

1 Bain, Emotions and the Will, 2d edition, 1865, p. 36.

to take a condition, attitude, or corporeal movement, when we see another person producing it. The second is the tendency to take a state of consciousness by means of the corporeal conditions which accompany it. These two laws explain contagious emotions, the propagation of yawning or laughing. A great nervous weakness predisposes to sensations of sympathy, and to the strange facts produced by magnetic sleep.

It would be inexact to say that Mr. Bain has given us in his work a system of æsthetics, or of morals; we do, however, find them sketched there. His experimental method, which is very good when applied to simple psychical phenomena, does not appear to us so happy, when it consists less of facts than of an ideal, -less of what is, than of what ought to be. The relation between the good and the beautiful is so intimate that some, for instance Goethe, have thought that morals are only æsthetics applied to life,an idea to which Plato was not a stranger. Virtue then appears like another form of beauty. And no doubt, when we think of it, we must consider these researches, whose object is to fix the essence of the beautiful and the good, as somewhat vain. Here precision is only awkwardness and want of skill; these things are so delicate, that all scholastic stiffness endangers or breaks them. We must renounce the idea of grasping the unfathomable, and of translating the ideal by the imperfect formulæ of science, whose apparent exactitude is on the surface only.

Only one single truly serious method is to be found in æsthetics, one method which can not lead to illusion, while we believe that it tends to truth. It is that which proceeds subjectively, which does not seek out the beautiful, which does not try to add a new definition, equally, though otherwise insufficient, to those already given, which limits itself to the study of internal phenomena; that is to say, the effects which the beautiful produces upon us. There are a certain number of sentiments or emotions which we call æsthetic; what is their nature, what are their characteristics? Thus the whole task of æsthetics is to state phenomena, to analyse them, and to describe them. Jouffroy has given an example in his Cours d'esthétique, unhappily unfinished. Esthetics, thus understood, is a necessary accompaniment of psychology; it forms