idea of ours, the inconsistency wholly results." Flatt, in his work de Deitate Christi, reduces this doctrine to the Algebraic universal proposition, which admits of no dispute: "Subjecta A et B (et D) ita ad se invicem referuntur, ut commune quidem idem numero C habeant, sed charactere quodam X inter se differant [The relation of the subjects A, B, (and D) to each other is such, that they are numerically the same, in regard to a certain something termed C; but they differ from one another, in a certain property called X].

"As for the doctrine of the Trinity, the impossibility of giving a positive definition of the distinction between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is no sufficient reason for denying the distinction itself, of which the Bible assures us. For, reason when left to herself, sets before us objects, concerning which we indeed know that they exist [to or]; but concerning whose nature, we have no positive knowledge. We can only distinguish between them and some false representations, or determine what they are not; but of their intrinsic nature, how they are [To nos], we have not the slightest knowledge.”

1 See the work of Dr. Storr, on the Object of the Gospel and epistles of John, p. 475 &c.

2 § XIV.

3 Dissert. on "Kant's Philosophische Religionslehre,” p. 7. On the idea of the Trinity advanced in Daub's Theologumenis, Heidelberg, 1805, the reader may consult Gabler's Journal for select theological literature, Vol. V. p. 523 &c. 531 &c.

APPENDIX

BY THE TRANSLATOR.

ON THE RELATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY TO

REASON.

On the important subject of the relation of the doctrine of the Trinity to reason, the translator begs leave to subjoin a few remarks. All that can well be known on this subject from reason, may perhaps, when reduced to its elementary principles, be embraced in the following propositions; which, it is also humbly conceived, contain satisfactory solutions of the difficulties connected with this view of the subject.

PROP. 1. A divine revelation cannot contain any thing which is contrary to the plain and indisputable dictates of reason. By "plain indisputable dictates of reason," we mean those propositions in all the various departments of truth-mathematical, moral, &c., the evidence of which is such, that when fairly presented to our view, the constitution of our mind compels us to believe them. Such are all the selfevident truths, (sometimes called intuitive truths, or first truths, or constitutional judgments,) and all truths derived from them, the evidence of which is so strong that we are compelled to yield our assent. Such are the derived moral truths embraced in natural religion, that God is extremely powerful and intelligent (but not that he is omnipotent or omniscient). Now, as these propositions are the natural and legitimate product of the structure of our mental nature, they must be regarded as the instructions of the Creator, from whom our peculiar mental constitution is derived. Hence, if they were contradicted by his instructions in revelation, the Creator would contradict in revelation what he teaches in nature, that is, would contradict himself; which is absurd: therefore a divine revelation cannot contain any thing which is contrary to the plain indisputable dictates of reason. In connexion with this principle, there is no dispute, unless it be alleged that we teach the ex

istence of three Gods, and that the unity of God is a plain, incontrovertible dictate of reason, which would be contradicted by tritheism. To this we reply, First: Even if we did teach the existence of three Gods, there would be no dispute relative to this principle; for, the unity of God, can by no means be made indisputably evident from reason. Unity of design may be rendered in a very high degree evident, but unity of person (in the popular sense) cannot. But, Secondly: It is not the case, that Trinitarians believe in three Gods, as may be seen by a reference to their respective creeds, in all of which the belief in one God is as explicitly stated as it possibly could be. If it be still alleged, that though Trinitarians do not profess tritheism, yet their doctrine inevitably leads to the belief of three gods; then this objection is answered under the following propositions. PROP. 2. A divine revelation cannot contain any proposition which demonstrably involves self-contradiction.

It will be admitted that truth is always harmonious, and that no two truths of any kind are contradictory, i. e. subversive, of each other; neither are the relations of truth. A contradictory proposition is that, one idea of which is manifestly subversive of the other, and the ideas of which, the constitution of our minds compels us to believe cannot both be true: such a proposition is this, "a triangle is a square." But the Creator has so formed us, that of two propositions which are contradictory, if the first be clearly proved to be true, we are compelled by the constitution of our mental nature to believe the second false. For, as they are subversive of each other, if we suppose the second also true, it would destroy the first; so that the first would have to be (true) and not to be (true) at the same time; which is contrary to an intuitive or self-evident truth. Therefore, as God is the Author of our mental nature, it is God who compels us to disbelieve one of two contradictory propositions; and hence, if his revelation contained any such propositions, he would himself compel us to disbelieve part of his own revelation. But God's object in giving a revelation is, that it should be believed therefore he would not give a revelation and insert propositions in it which he compels us to disbelieve, that is, contradictory propositions: therefore a revelation coming from God, cannot contain propositions which demonstrably involve self-contradiction. In reference to this proposition, it has been alledged by some, that the doctrine of the Trinity involves such

a contradiction. They reason thus: The idea of one and the idea of three are contradictory and subversive of one another, so that the same thing cannot be one and three at the same time. But Trinitarians affirm that God is one and three at the same time; therefore they affirm what cannot be true, i. e. a contradictory proposition. But the major proposition is stated in a loose and indefinite manner, and is not true in every instance; for a triangle is one and three at the same time, when considered as one among many figures, and in reference to its sides. In order to be true, that is, admissible, the major proposition must run thus: "It is impossible for the same thing to be 1 and 3 in the same respect at the same time." To this we assent; but in this form, the doctrine of the Trintiry is by no means embraced under it; for it need not be told to the intelligent reader, that Trinitarians unanimously deny that God is one and three in the same respect. They expressly teach, that God is one in one respect, and three in another respect. The first respect they denominate by the term essence, and the second by the term persons. Therefore, as the Trinitarian proposition is not embraced in the major, the conclusion of course is not applicable to it.

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But it has been objected, that some of the phraseology of Trinitarians, expressive of the reciprocal relation between the persons of the Godhead, involves contradiction. Those, who advance the objection, reason thus: The one God is said to be threefold in his persons; but each person is the one God; therefore each person is threefold. But the major is not clearly stated. The idea intended is this, "God who is one (i. e. God in the respect in which unity is affirmed of him, namely, in essence) is three in person (i. e. in another respect, called son); but each person (i. e. God, in each of the respects called persons) is the one God (i. e. is God, in the respect in which unity is affirmed of him, namely, in essence): - But this minor is not true; therefore the conclusion is a non sequitur." In order to cover the conclusion, the syllogism must stand thus: "God in (essence) the sense in which he is one, is also three (in the same sense, essence); but each of these three (persons) is God in the sense in which he is one (in essence); therefore each of these three (persons) is three in the sense (in essence) in which God is one." But it need scarce be mentioned that we deny the major and minor, as strenuously as any other persons can : for we deny that he is one and three in the same sense. If it be

alleged, that explanations of the distinction in the Supreme Being have sometimes been attempted, and from these and the language of Trinitarians in general, it is evident that they understand the terms essence and person, in a manner which necessarily involves self-contradiction; it must be admitted, that this has unfortunately sometimes been the case. But this will not

be surprising when we recollect the inexplicability of the divine nature, and the high degree of mental discipline which is requisite, before men can clearly discern the proper limits of the human understanding. Nor are the divines of the present day responsible for any phraseology but their own; and we believe they uniformly disavow the terms and ideas objected to. They believe that God is one in one respect, and three in another respect. To the respect in which he is one, they give the name essence; the other respect, in which he is three, they designate by the term person. But in so doing they do not intend to convey any positive ideas of the several respects to which they are applied. They are to be considered as equivalent to the Algebraic letters X and Y, which stand for unknown quantities or properties; as if it had been said, "in X respect God is one, and in Y respect he is three :" and thus the propositions are no more contradictory than if we were to say, "a triangle in X respect (i. e. considered as a figure) is one, and in Y respect (in reference to its sides) it is three;" or, that "man in X respect (in reference to his soul and body) is two fold, and in Y respect (considered as an individual of our race) is one." We do not forget that the triunity of the triangle results from its material properties, inasmuch as, like all matter, it consists of parts; and that God is without parts [ens simplicissimum]: but we do not adduce these examples to prove from analogy either the truth or the possibility of the Trinitarian doctrine; its truth must rest on the divine record, and if that is established its possibility necessarily follows. We only state these as several unconnected propositions, but similarly constructed and of course equally void of contradiction. Moreover, as we do not define the distinction in the Deity at all, it cannot be urged that we define it to be such as depends on parts; hence, the absence of parts in God, cannot be alleged as an argument against the distinction which is negatively proposed. For, it is impossible that there should be contradiction between terms the ideas of which are all strictly negative, and do not imply, by inference either more or less remote, any idea of a positive nature.