tegrating tendency of a policy of free trade with foreign nations, which had finally to be overcome by military force, and the national union, which was formed chiefly to enact a protective tariff on imports, was maintained successfully only through the financial and industrial solidarity imparted by the same tariff. Protection to domestic industry was the vital principle of Kossuth's movement in 1848 for the vindication of Hungarian unity, and which afterwards, under Von Beust, in 1866, found expression in the unity of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The same principle underlay the reconstruction of United Italy through the dash of Garibaldi, the radical penetration of Mazzini, and the clear statesmanship of Count Cavour. In France the national unity is never weak, because the sentiment of protection to home industry is innate. Thus everywhere the two phases, National Unity and Protection to Industry, are seen to be only different names for the same essential truth. On the other hand, the sole tendencies toward disintegration, in that Germany which Napoleon I. found it so easy to convert into the battle-ground of Europe, were identified with a free foreign trade. The tendencies toward German unity which crowned the late William emperor of a revived German empire, in Paris, after the victories of Metz and Sedan, were the fruits of protection. The disintegration of Ireland from England, and the continually proclaimed disloyalty of the former, are a fruit of the "sharp bargain" known as British free trade. Other dependencies of England are only loyal because permitted to be protective.

CHAPTER XVI.

STATE ACTION IN RELATION TO SPECIAL INDUSTRIES.

218. Silk. The efforts, by government aid, to compel the culture of silk in Mexico, the West Indies, and the United States, date from the very settlement of these several parts of the continent, viz. from 1522, under Cortez, in Mexico; from 1610, under King James, at Jamestown, in Virginia, and as early as 1604, in the West Indies. The attempted culture of silk, in these three portions of America, had a long and disappointing history in this period, when only the rudest industries and those most directly connected with food, shelter, and the needed raiment of the producers, could survive. This shows that, however sound the principle of state intervention and stimulus may be, when applied to right cases, it becomes, like private enterprise and industry itself, equally fantastic and mischievous when foolishly applied. The production of silk requires the patient and skilled labor of a peaceful and contented people, not so much for the tending and feeding the worms, and the preservation and hatching of the eggs, as for the reeling of the silk from the cocoon, and the separation from it of all objectionable matter. Yet, from the first, the notion prevailed in England that not only could colonists, thrust into immediate conditions of danger, harassment, and turmoil, carry on this industry favorably, but that it could and should be made a happy means of converting Indian savages to the true faith, by exhibiting to them, in the wonderful operations of the silk-worm, proofs of the existence of a Creator. It was extolled as admirably adapted to the negro, owing to his indolence. It was even calculated, by one philanthropist, that England could save the entire cost of her pauper maintenance, by sending the paupers to Virginia, Carolina, and Georgia, to feed silk-worms. Their presumed shiftlessness was set down as the prime qualification which would assure success in the enterprise. In the 25 years from 1731 to 1755, about 251 pounds of raw silk, in all, were sent from the Carolinas to Great Britain, and about 8,829 pounds were sent from Georgia in the same period. This was under a parlia

mentary bounty of three shillings per pound. In 1766 the bounties were reduced one-half. As late as 1790 raw silk was still produced, in a very small quantity, for export. In 1725 Pennsylvania had sent a small quantity of silk to England. Prior to the war for independence, Franklin and other leaders of thought were greatly interested in introducing the silk-worm and the mulberry tree. From the period of the first war with Great Britain to 1826, there was a scattered and unsuccessful attention given to the subject by individuals.

In 1826 Gideon B. Smith, of Baltimore, and Dr. Felix Pascalis, of New York, brought the Morus Multicalis tree to the attention of the public. Nearly all the States, from Maine to Georgia and Indiana, offered bounties, on the mulberry trees, on the cocoons, and on the reeled silk; counties, fairs, and stock companies interested in silk-growing followed with further offers. The United States granted a farm of 262 acres at Greenbush, N. Y., to one Clark, on condition that he should plant at least 100,000 mulberry trees. National and State silk conventions were held. Stock silk-growing companies were formed. America was under the influence of the speculative fever prevailing in England and France, in connection with the general inflation from 1824 to 1839, and a portion of the financial craze expended itself upon silk culture. The leaders of society, philosophy, industry, and science all wrote treatises on silk culture. The mystery and poetry of it were fascinating. Men had no railway shares to speculate in, and they speculated in multicaulis buds, silkworms, eggs, and mulberry trees. Prices rose to $1, $5 per tree, and profits, of six-fold the investment, were made in a single year, raising trees. In 1839 the bubble burst, and the trees were good only for pea brush. Only slight attempts to manufacture silk were made, though as early as 1837 Massachusetts was making sewing-silk to the value of $150,477, and employing 157 hands. Many, if not most, of the present successful silk houses trace their rise to the humble manufacture of sewing-silk then carried on. In 1840 the total production of American silk is estimated at 40,000 pounds. From this time to the present, the culture of silk in America has formed an inappreciable element in the supply, and the manufacture has been dependent on the imported raw silk. As respects silk culture, therefore, experience has shown that private enterprise is as likely to be injudiciously and wastefully applied as government aid. Both must fail where a vast number of persons allow their imaginations to get the better

FAILURE OF SILK CULTURE.

633

of their judgments, so as to believe that an industry must prove profitable, merely because its processes are fascinating in a scientific point of view, and its product is attractive in an æsthetic sense. Lately, promising efforts have been made to cultivate raw silk in Kansas. It is asserted that the worms thrive as well on the Osage orange leaves as on the mulberry. As the manufacture increases, the culture of silk may, in time, become feasible. In 1850 the silk manufacture in the United States, obtaining its raw silk from Italy and China, employed 1,723 persons; in 1860, 5,435; in 1870, 6,649, and in 1880, 34,521. The value of the products expanded as follows: In 1850, $1,809,476; in 1860, $6,607,771; in 1870, $12,210,662; and in 1880, $34,519,723.

Inasmuch as the culture of raw silk has proved a failure, it may be conceded that whatever duties were collected on raw silk prior to 1846 (since that date it has been free of duty), as well as the bounties paid to promote its production, and the losses incurred in its attempted culture, have netted no other return than the happiness which always attends an enthusiasm, and the wisdom which often follows a defeat. The experimenters sowed for experience, and they gathered in the crop.

The present silk manufacture had its beginnings in a manufacture of sewing-silk, which was not greatly assisted by the attempts at silk culture. It owes its present dimensions largely to that universal emulation after equality with the best, among American women, which causes every such woman in whatever station to desire to possess at least one silk dress. This condition of sentiment among American women was itself produced by the higher average of material comfort accorded to American women, than to those of any other people, through our higher average returns in industry. This created the demand only. That demand would have continued, to this date, to be supplied wholly by foreign manufacturers, had the duty of 30 per cent. imposed for revenue, under the tariff of 1846 to 1861, continued to the present time. It was the raising of this duty, from 30 or 40 to 60 per cent. in 1864 which brought its revenue function into subordination to its protective function, and created the silk manufacture in the United States. The rise in the American manufacture has been attended by a general decline in the selling prices of silk goods in America, compared with the prices which prevailed under the 30 per cent. duty of 1846 to 1872, of about one-third.

The value of the silk manufactures imported in 1880 is almost identical with the value imported in 1853, being slightly upwards

of $33,000,000. During the war of 1861-5, the importation fell to about $11,000,000 worth, but for fifteen years past it has been twice or thrice as great, and it still exceeds the domestic production.

The tariff legislation concerning silk has been as follows: From 1790 to 1832, raw silk was free. In 1832 a duty of 12 per cent. was laid, which in 1841 was raised to 20 per cent., and in 1842 to 50 cents per pound. In 1846 this was reduced to 15 cents per pound, and since 1857 it has been free. Silk manufactures came under a duty of 7 per cent. in 1790, raised to 12 and 15 per cent. in 1804-8-doubled to 30 per cent. in 1812-15. In 1842 the duty was made $2 per pound on silk twist, 25 per cent. on silk for manufacture, $1.50 per pound on pongees and plain white for printing and coloring, and from 1832 to 1836 manufactures from beyond the Cape of Good Hope were charged from 10 to 20 per cent., while those from Europe came in free-a very extraordinary attempt apparently to discriminate against oriental in favor of European silks. From 1861 the duty on manufactured silks became 40 per cent., and from 1864, 60 per cent. The revenue obtained has been from $11,000,000 in 1867 to $15,615,000 in 1882. This effectually refutes the a priori dictum of Mr. Mill that no duty can, at the same time, produce protection and revenue. The heavy protective duties, on actively competing products, seem to affect the national treasury much as a tight roof affects the family cistern. While the inmates of the household are protected from the exterior damps, fogs, rains, sleets, and chills which they would derive from too free an exchange of their vitality for nature's influences, the family cistern withal is filled with good water. For the same dampness which is fatal, when imported "free" through the roof, is a very useful adjunct to the housekeeper, when collected in the cistern.

219. Decline of Silk Manufacture in England.—England left her silk manufactures entirely unprotected in 1860, after having given them a steady, and at times a vigorous, protection, since the reign of James I. The visible decline set in from 1861. The number of her spindles employed in the silk industry fell from 1,338,544 in 1861 to 842,538 in 1878, and the number of persons employed declined from 117,989 in 1861 to 63,577 in 1878.* The imports of raw silk into Great Britain,

* Robert P. Porter found in Coventry in May, 1883, that the wages in the silk-weaving art had so declined that for making one class of goods known as 22-in. "mock gro grains" the weavers could now only earn about 6s. 4d. ($1.56) per week.