to have continued the war until its fortune should be entirely changed. Adroitness or firmness in negotiation might possibly have made a difference of an island more or less, but when the powers of the continent could not, or would not, exert themselves, it was not in our power to protect their interests or govern their relations.

Heeren is decidedly wrong in supposing that the peace of Amiens was not, on our part, intended to last: there is no doubt of the sincerity of the administration by which the peace was made. There is, perhaps, somewhat more of justice in the professor's remarks on the renewal of the war. A great fault had been committed in signing the definitive treaty before the arrangement respecting Malta had been completed; and the dispute to which the error gave rise is one of those in which neither party was absolutely in the right, or completely in the wrong; but probably the difficulty might have been surmounted, if the hostile language of Bonaparte had not convinced the English ministers that there could be no cordiality between the two states. For our parts, we own that we considered the peace of Amiens as an acknowledgment that we must give up, for a time, all concern in the continent; it was left, by our own avowal, in a most unsatisfactory state, and an instance of aggrandizement more or less, here and there, ought not to have induced us to renew the war. But these are by-gone matters.

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England commenced this new contest in 1803, without an ally." True, and she concluded it by the most extensive combination of powers that Europe has witnessed! A striking proof that, not the words of treaties, but the force of circumstances, unites states in a common cause, and produces a successful issue. In this war, our colonial as well as maritime successes had an important effect upon the issue. If they tempted Napoleon to "his continental system," they also made it intolerable. They largely contributed, with the disasters of the Russian campaign, and the glories of the Peninsula, to the final triumph of England and her allies.

"Napoleon's continental system," says Heeren, "which was to exclude the English from every port, had eventually the effect of re-opening them all to her. As in the physical," continues Heeren, expressing a sentiment on which we lay great stress, "so in the political world, no unnatural condition can last for ever; and if Napoleon had not hastened the catastrophe by new deeds of violence, it must, in some way or other, however tardily, have come to pass at last....England prides herself, with justice, on being the only power that never bowed her neck during the whole course of that tempestuous period. But England should not forget that she is mainly indebted for this to her insular position.

During that political storm which periodically, as it were, desolated the countries of the continent, she alone could insure to herself the internal tranquillity, without which those peaceful arts, from which alone she derives resources for her great exertions, could not have been continued with such unexampled vigour and prosperity."

After the restoration of the Bourbons, the influence of England on the continent revived, and she "became ranked as one of the five leading powers, who determined the relation of the European states-system." Not only because our author stops here, but because we are desirous of avoiding party politics, we shall not refer (more than may be necessary in our summing up) to the way in which England has performed the new part thus assigned to her. A considerable portion, indeed, of this period we have elsewhere reviewed.*

Having now traced the history of our principal + alliances with continental princes, we come to the conclusion that such engagements have, in very few instances, we might perhaps say in no instance, been productive of advantage to England. The guaranties which we have obtained, have not availed us in the time of need; those which we have given have produced embarrassment; neither have procured for us a true friend. A connexion with one power, while it has obtained for us no useful assistance from him, has generally indisposed to us some other formidable prince. When at war, we have found those on our side whose interest has at the moment induced them to join us, with little or no reference to previous treaties, or even to the friendly relations which previously subsisted.

We lay it down as a rule, to which we can scarcely imagine an exception, that no alliance, even defensive, ought to be made, still less any guaranty given, in time of peace, with the view of securing the friendship, or even averting the hostility, of the ally, in any unforeseen contingency.

Should it be objected that, if we connect ourselves with no one power, all will combine against us, we answer, that such combination is under any circumstances highly improbable; that it is more likely to be provoked by the interposition in the affairs of others which the supposed alliance would in all probability occasion; that no such combination would hold together for a long time, and, if it were really to occur, we should have better oppor

+ We use this word because we have passed over various engagements of this nature, especially with the northern and some of the smaller German princes, which did not materially affect our history.

tunities of detaching its members by engagements made on the occasion; and lastly, that our friend is not the less likely to join such a confederacy, because he has previously allowed us to address him by that name.

Between the system of speculative alliances, which we condemn, and that of an entire unconcern in the affairs of other states, there is a wide interval; to fill this, many questions must be decided :—1st. Whether we are to interfere by good offices, mediation, and, in the last resort, by force, to prevent a disturbance of the balance of power, by the excessive augmentation of the power of any one state? 2d. Whether we ought to interfere in defence of a weaker power against a stronger? 3d. Whether we may not, nevertheless, take special charge of those states whose locality, from their coasts being opposite to ours, or any other cause, renders their occupation by an enemy peculiarly dangerous or injurious to us? 4th. Whether we should interfere, by negociation or force, to prevent the occurrence of war between two or more countries? 5th. Whether we should interfere in like manner to preserve or restore internal tranquillity in any foreign country;to assist an oppressed people against tyranny, or a prince against rebels?

In discussing these questions, we premise, though it can scarcely be necessary, that we admit the right and the necessity, not only of resisting aggression and avenging insult, but of preventing an enemy who is preparing to attack us, or who places himself in a threatening posture. All this we now take for granted; nor shall we discuss the questions on the point of right. We confine ourselves to policy, and to the policy of Insular Britain.

1. It is not easy to apply a summary rule to this case. But the experience of the uncalculated and strange changes and chances of the last two centuries may reasonably create a doubt, whether policy requires us to interfere by force to prevent any union of kingdoms, which may be brought about by the law of succession, or in any peaceful mode. Extension of empire, by the acquisition of new countries, in which the language, and manners, and laws, are different, does not always produce an increase of power. And there are many chances of internal disunion, of new jealousies and collisions amongst the continental states, which diminish our danger. For that danger consists, not in the existence of the enemy's power, but in the probability of its injuring us. And be it remembered, that scarcely any combination of power that can be imagined has not already occurred. Take, for instance, France and Spain; it is doubtful whether a "united kingdom of France and Spain" would be stronger than

France and Spain united by the Bourbon compact. Would the unity of the government operate more largely in one way, than the division of the people in the other?

2. The case is somewhat different when the acquisition is made by conquest, especially if it be the result of a wanton aggression; because then the love of right intervenes, and the maintenance of a character for justice. But in order to maintain this character, we must interfere in all cases of oppression; when we interfere only when we have a near interest in the oppressed state, we may boast of our wisdom, but not of our goodness. Are we prepared to make no difference between Holland and Wallachia? And can we proclaim an intention to succour the oppressed, without regard to the power of the aggressor? Certainly not. And what comes of our chivalry, if we permit the strongest powers to bully as much as they please? Recent cases are not wanting, in which we forbore to interfere, because either we felt unequal to the struggle, or deemed it more onerous than profitable. We judged rightly; but it is best to avow at once that it is by a calculation of our interests, and of our ability to defend them, that each question of interference will be decided.

We have treated this question, and the first also, as a question of interposition by force; because nothing tends more to lower a state in public estimation, than a demand which it is not prepared to enforce by arms. We would not exclude mediation and good offices; but mediation should not be attempted, unless at the request of both parties. Good offices and friendly suggestions may be usefully employed by a judicious and conciliating diplomatist, but the character of such communications should be avowed at once; the intention to use force ought not to be insinuated, unless it be really entertained.

3. Do we then carry our maxim of trusting to the chapter of accidents so far, as that (to go at once to obvious instances) we would not guarantee the integrity or independence of Holland or Portugal? would we not stipulate for the independence or neutrality of the countries through which they might respectively be overrun, (as Holland through the Netherlands)? would we suffer those countries to be occupied by one of the greater powers? As one of the objections to guaranties is that they are useless, we make no exception in favour of Holland; and on the same ground we would reject any stipulation professing to secure the neutrality of the Netherlands in any future war. A stipulation of this sort may be useful when a war actually happens, and it may sometimes be wise to make it (as in 1733*) the condition of our

See p. 163, ante.

own neutrality. The expediency of resisting by force an attack upon Holland by a power with whom we are at peace, must depend upon the circumstances of the time. Assuming that we have a perfect right, for our own security, to oppose the occupation of that neighbouring country by a third power, and that our right against that third power is quite independent of any previous treaty with Holland, the policy of the interference must be decided by the imminence of the danger, and the probability of a successful resistance, by our own strength and that of the enemy, by the disposition and strength of Holland, and of other powers engaged in the war. If we confine our protection to a very few points, and on those evince a determination to make it as effectual as possible, we may very likely avert the attack. But if this be our view, we must confine ourselves to those objects of real importance, and be rigidly neutral in every other part of the globe. It will also be questionable, whether our own security will not be as well provided for by abstaining from interference altogether; and whether there is not too much probability that we shall involve ourselves in a general war, without accomplishing our particular object. Yet, seeing that, with all our care, we can hardly hope to avoid war for ever, admitting that an overweening love of peace may provoke insults and injuries, we are inclined to the opinion, that there are some points, (Holland probably would be one, but we now use it only as an example,) to which it may be politic to apply our protection, though required neither by sovereignty nor alliance.

A second branch of this question is involved in the term, interests. There are those who would resist by force the extension of the territory, or even of the influence, of another power, in a quarter at which it may possibly endanger or diminish our trade. From such we differ altogether. Nothing but actual, we may call it bodily, danger justifies even that sort of interference which we contemplate. Nor can we quit this matter of a neighbour's aggrandizement, without asking those who are for a manful resistance to every measure of power in another, whether they are prepared to admit the right of France or Russia to make objections to our naval force, to our colonial territory, to our Indian empire? We know that sudden armaments, unaccounted for by any obvious danger, have often been the subject of remonstrance. We know

of no case in which they have been simply the cause of war: but we are sure that it is not our interest to provoke or to justify by our example such remonstrances. And, although we make a distinction between Asia and Europe, we cannot well expect others

to observe it.

4. Ought we to interfere to prevent war between strangers?