the basis of Mr. Pitt's continental policy prior to the French Revolution. Nootka Sound was an isolated case of injury redressed. Heeren condemns, upon grounds ill explained, the alliance with Prussia. We are really at a loss to understand why he, the advocate of continental alliances, and of eternal opposition to the French power, objects to this alliance with one of the great military powers of Germany, at a time when the other was closely connected with France. "Chatham," he says, " with his principles, would never have concluded the alliance which his son concluded, still less would he have approved the consequences which followed it." It is really not possible to deduce from the speeches or counsels of Lord Chatham, in regard to foreign politics, any principle upon which this proposition of M. Heeren's can be maintained or controverted. The objection appears to consist in the narrowness of the base upon which the alliance rested. "Is was not founded on so extended a community of interests as under Frederic II. The maintenance of the stadtholdership in the Netherlands could not possibly become of sufficient importance to both these powers, to form a permanent bond of union between them." In our opinion, a union for a specific and attainable purpose is the only union likely to last. But it was clearly Mr. Pitt's intention to take advantage of the accidental coincidence of views between England and Prussia, for forming and preserving an alliance with one of the great military powers, at a time when two others, Austria (with whom France was still closely allied), and Russia, now growing into great importance, had combined with views threatening the balance of power and the maritime interests of England. The ambition of the empress Catherine extended not only to Sweden and Poland, but to Turkey and the Mediterranean.* Maria Theresa, and still more Joseph II. entered more and more warmly into these views. The friendship between Russia and Prussia was rapidly declining. This surely was a fit opportunity for an alliance with Prussia, if such alliances can be at any time defended. The influence of France, it may moreover be added, in the United Provinces, though counteracted, was not destroyed; in the opposition which we offered to it, Prussia was now our "natural ally." The first fruits of the alliance, the congress of Reichenbach, where the allies mediated the terms of peace between Austria and the Porte, were confessedly beneficial to Europe. The allies also See, in ch. 3 of the Annual Register for 1788, some account of the projects of Russia in the Mediterranean, and her attempts, defeated by the English government, to obtain the assistance of English pilots and seamen. prevented Denmark from assisting Russia against Sweden; but failed, according to Heeren, when they attempted to dictate to Catherine the terms of peace with the Porte. This is true, but it is true also that the threatened opposition of the British parliament made it impossible for Mr. Pitt to proceed. It is well known that the question of peace between Russia and Turkey turned at last upon the apparently trifling point of Oczakow; and that England and Prussia were prepared to go to war with Russia upon that single point. By this mode of statement, almost every dispute may be made to appear trifling. We insisted upon the restoration of things to the state in which they were before the war; Russia says, "I must have a slice of Turkish territory.” The allies say, No;-and the question is really one of principle, If the interposition of other powers for the protection of the weaker states is justifiable at all, these powers may reasonably say, The aggression shall be in no degree successful. In winding up his remarks upon this eventful period, which he terminates at the French Revolution, Heeren says very truly, that England never claimed to be a dominant power in the federative system of Europe,-that she had to determine her conduct by the internal relations of this system, which she did not govern, and that, therefore, her continental policy seldom proceeded upon solid principles. He makes it a question, which, however, he does not discuss, whether this want of solidity is a matter of reproach. "To settle permanently the reciprocal relations of the continental powers is throughout beyond the capacity of England. It would have been a foolish and vain presumption to attempt it. For this very reason then, she could discern no durable and solid basis for her federative system, in respect of the choice of her allies." All this is true, and our deduction from it is, that England ought not to attempt to regulate the continental system, or in any way to mix herself up in it. Heeren concludes this section with a specific censure of England for the non-performance of engagements. In the three great continental wars in which England took part, the Spanish,* the Austrian war of succession, and the seven years' war, she concluded every time a peace for herself, or only in connexion with Holland, and deserted her principal confederates. We cannot altogether deny the truth of this charge. It is strikingly true of the Peace of Utrecht. But we do not plead guilty to it, in respect of Meaning what we call the war of the Spanish succession, see p. 150, ante. + The Silesian war, or war of the pragmatic sanction, see p. 165. + See p. 168. Aix-la-Chapelle; and have already urged something in defence of the treaty of Paris. VI. French Revolution, 1788-1815. Although this period is the most eventful, and the most interesting of all, to modern readers, it furnishes less of matter for the peculiar doctrines which we now inculcate. There is, however, one great exception, suggested by the very first remark of Heeren's. "Never," he says, "has the truth of the observation with which we commenced this inquiry-that it is a highly advantageous circumstance for the maintenance of the liberty and independence of a states-system, that one of its principal members should be an insular state, and in possession of a naval force,-been more strikingly demonstrated than in this period. If a bridge had been thrown across the Channel, how different might have been the fate of England and of Europe! We certainly do not entertain the slightest doubt that England, even in this case, would have remained unconquered, or that the invasion of a French army would have eventually ended in its destruction; and simply because the warlike energies of the nation would in that case have been more generally roused and concentrated, and more resolutely displayed." He adds, that there might have been a momentary conquest, and that assuredly a very great inconvenience would have resulted even from the occupation of the metropolis. This is beyond a doubt; but there is, happily, no necessity for considering what would happen if there were a bridge from Calais to Dover. Our great consolation is, that the events of this period have demonstrated, we will not say the impossibility, but the extreme improbability, of a successful or even attempted invasion of England, even while France has a leader of the highest military genius, an army almost innumerable and eminently successful, powerful allies, and no avowed enemy on the continent. An insular power, says Heeren, is a useful member of a statessystem; useful, no doubt, to those continental powers to whom it lends its fleets or its money: but we say, an insular power may be independent of the states-system. But we now proceed with the Revolutionary war. Heeren's narrative is introduced by a character of Mr. Pitt. "Several of his contemporaries, his opponents and rivals, might possess more brilliant talents, but none could rie with him in clearness of intellect, in decision of purpose, and in devotion to his country..... The account of his foreign policy must be prefaced by one general observation: His conduct throughout was uniformly in accordance with his own conviction, and this is expressed in every one of his speeches, in a manner not to be mistaken." Comparisons are odious, and we will not say that none could vie with Pitt in clearness of intellect; but we are certain that no man can read attentively Mr. Pitt's speeches, or state-papers, whether in reference to the war, or any other public matters, without being struck with the remarkable precision of his ideas, the plainness and singleness of his purpose. This precision is a much rarer quality than might be supposed. Certainly, the apparent defect is sometimes the result of artifice; but a hostile critic will find it difficult to detect in any speech of Mr. Pitt's a deficiency of clearness, either natural or assumed. Errors he might commit;-blunders never. Heeren takes a correct view of the origin of the Revolutionary war, which he shows to have been not only first declared by France, but to have arisen out of her perpetrated and threatened aggressions. We should be led too far away, if we were to examine the professor's doctrine of interference: he upholds that right, in respect of a neighbouring government, which avows even principles manifestly dangerous to established constitutions. As England did not interfere with the government of France, she seeks no justification in this doctrine.* The war of 1793 gave rise to many treaties of alliance and subsidy, but these were all for the purpose of co-operation in the war, and their stipulations were not intended to be permanent. Some of them were improvident in guaranteeing to the subsidized powers, Sardinia for instance, the integrity of their territory at the termination of the war; an anticipation of success upon which no power is justified in acting. It is remarkable that, when we entered into the war, we had, in union with Holland, a defensive alliance with Prussia; and yet, though Holland was attacked, we did not (so far as is known) call upon Prussia for aid in virtue of this treaty. Whatever might be the reason of this omission, it seems to set forth the inefficacy of such alliances. Nor is it less worthy of remark, that Prussia, our particular friend, whom we had taken so much pains to cultivate, was the first of the powers coalesced against France that withdrew from the coalition. It is observed by Heeren, that England had not the supreme direction of this war, and that the great want was, a statesman and general combined, as William III. or Marlborough. Unquestionably, a commander like one of these would have very For some remarks on Mr. Pitt's view of the war, and a reference to the opinions of Lord Brougham, see our vol. viii. p. 34-36. 42. 55. + See Fox's taunts on this in Parliamentary History, 1793. Possibly the reason was, that Prussia was already at war with France. And we did not hamper her with a specific obligation, while there was a common cause. materially affected the operations of the confederacy, and would perhaps have enabled it to withstand the effects of the new system of internal government, and the unsparing and reckless system of warfare which the French revolution introduced. Success, no doubt, might have tended to keep the confederacy together; but it must be recollected, that it broke to pieces because the other members of it had not, like England, the one plain purpose of resisting France; they had jealousies of each other, and the most powerful of them had objects of aggrandizement in other parts of Europe. We shall not discuss the wisdom of the attempts which, with signal perseverance, Pitt made to excite and maintain the league against France. It is enough to note the magnitude of the exertion. The native troops of England had a less important share in this war than in others of the century. Not only the revolutionary principle by which the immense armies of France were raised, but the numbers of the armies, and the rapidity of their movements, have rendered almost inoperative the comparatively small force which England can employ upon the continent. There are circumstances under which this force can effect great things; when, either from the intervention of the sea, the difficulty of provisioning an army, or of transporting the materiel of war, an overwhelming force cannot be brought to bear upon one point, and the co-operation of the navy can be made effectual, In the war of 1793, Egypt only, in the Eastern hemisphere, afforded this occasion. The glories of our naval and colonial campaigns were more memorable in this than in any former war; and yet, perhaps, they had less of effect upon the fortune of the war. The battle of the Nile, Heeren truly says, did produce a great moral effect; but the result, upon the continent, was a new but successless coalition. France made up her mind to disregard her colonies; and not to purchase them back by the sacrifice of her European objects; the capture of the enemies' colonies had therefore no good effect, except-(but in the sequel this became an exception of immense importance)-as it tended to the supremacy of our navy. So far as the independence of Europe was an object of the war, we were unsuccessful. At the peace of Amiens, we were virtually excluded from the continent. ་ It would be difficult, without deviating into recent and party politics, to observe upon Heeren's opinion, that we ought to have made "" some definitive arrangements in the treaty, respecting the relations of the continent;" and especially to have insisted upon the evacuation of the Batavian republic by the French. Surely, this is equivalent to a declaration, that we ought |