It thus appears doubtful whether, in the opinion of this great war minister, our English objects in the war were furthered by our connexion with the continent; but Prussia, no doubt, would have been ready and willing to accept our co-operation, if we chose to offer it, and even if the Elector of Hanover had not joined that alliance, (which he probably would,) it is at least a question, whether we should not have gained more by the absence of concern for Hanover, than we should have lost by the want of Hanoverian troops. If his master had been only King of England, the Duke of Cumberland might have been a more efficient auxiliary to Frederick II. in the days of his distress, and would not have been driven to the convention of Closter-Seven.

At all events, be it remembered, that the Prussian alliance was not the result of systematic diplomacy: it was rather a departure from the political system which had been supposed to be determinate and lasting!

But a

Heeren's remarks upon Pitt, and the conduct of the sevenyears' war, would lead us too far into domestic history. remark upon subsidies deserves notice. "He afforded them to those who, under the existing relations, were the most natural allies of Great Britain, and with whom she had in general a community of interests, not to every one who asked for them." Heeren is right. In our time, we have heard ministers censured for "paying our allies for fighting their own battles." Now, if the battle is not his own, an ally will not fight it well. Subsidies ought to be given to those only, who, of all the motives and means of war, want none but money.

The alliance between France and Austria, in delivering the Low Countries from the fear of French invasion, had an important influence upon the condition of England's old ally, the United Provinces. They kept out of the war and of danger. To our other western ally, Portugal, we had an opportunity of rendering useful assistance. When threatened by the combined force of France and Spain, now united by the family compact, the King of Portugal replied, that "he would rather see the last tile of his palace fall," than depart from his neutrality. England rewarded his fidelity with effectual support.

After Pitt resigned, on not being permitted to anticipate the hostility of Spain, the ministry discontinued the Prussian subsidy, and took less interest in the continental war. Before the subsidy was withdrawn, the peace with Russia and Sweden had rendered it less necessary to Frederick, and there were charges of unfriendly reserve and clandestine negociation, which palliated, if

* Ann. Reg. 1762, p. 212.

they did not justify, the desertion of our ally. The occurrence affords a striking instance of the inconvenience produced by these alliances, even though made, as this with Prussia was, at the time when it was wanted, and not in contemplation of future dangers. Though it is true that England and Prussia had a common enemy, their respective objects in the war were totally different. And the insular power was in a condition to obtain reasonable and even advantageous terms of peace, at a time when it was the interest, or at least the desire, of continental Prussia to carry on the war. The two kings were bound to each other, to make war upon France, in order to compel her to take such terms of peace as they might dictate; to do nothing without mutual consultation; and not to make any private and separate accommodation with France.* But was each power bound by this stipulation to continue at war for an indefinite period, putting the question of peace or war altogether into the hands of his ally? Had one party the unqualified right of obliging the other to continue at war? These engagements, construed with entire strictness, would lead to manifest impossibilities. One question in the present case is, in what degree the advantages obtained by England were owing to the co-operation of Prussia?-a question more easily stated than resolved. There is on such occasions a real difficulty in reconciling good faith and policy; and even if your own conscience is clear, you will seldom satisfy your ally. Frederick II. never forgave England what he deemed a base desertion.

The seven-years' war was on the part of England glorious and successful; but, like the glorious war of Queen Anne, it was terminated by a treaty which disappointed the hopes of those whose counsels had contributed most to its success. Yet the terms, by which Minorca was recovered, and Canada and Grenada acquired, were really quite sufficient for the honour and interest of England.

This war left England without powerful allies, and Heeren observes that, after what he calls, in language somewhat exaggerated, the prostration of France, she had no immediate cause for seeking new connexions. In truth, the decline of the Hanoverian influence upon British counsels was the principal cause of the cessation of that propensity to treaty-making, which had distinguished the reigns of George I. and II. The United Provinces and Portugal remained the only allies of England; they were rather to be deemed (especially Portugal) protected states. The American war is a topic foreign to our inquiry. The

* Koch, vol. iii. p. 32.

participation of France and Spain in it was an instance of wanton aggression for the gratification of rivalry and revenge.

It is to be observed of this American war, that we had at the time no continental ally, nor was there any war in Europe. Will it be said that any different state of our continental relations would have turned the fate of the war between England and her colonies? Certainly he must be a more sanguine admirer of alliances than we are, who imagines that the most stringent treaty that we could have previously made, would have induced any one power in Europe to come to our assistance, either in suppressing the revolt, or in attacking France when she took part with the rebels. It is even very doubtful, whether, if we could by diplomatic management have excited a war in Europe by way of diversion, so as to prevent France from sending troops to America (in which it might have failed), we should have been altogether better off. We might possibly have prolonged the struggle, but we must ultimately have given way, and should have come out of the war with finances even in a worse condition.

Heeren himself takes no notice of the American war, as connected with continental politics, but we may observe, that we did not on this occasion owe much to that rivalry with France which he deems necessary for the greatness of England. In the American war, the United Provinces, instead of coming to our assistance in virtue of former treaties,* when a most unquestionable casus fœderis occurred in the French aggression, gave such assistance to our enemies as led to a rupture and to their junction with France and the American States against us. This conduct, on the part of Holland, may perhaps serve as a justification of Great Britain against the remark of Heeren's upon our retention of Negapatnam at the peace of 1783, when England, he says, instead of attaching the Republic to her by forbearance," showed a disposition to colonial aggrandizement at the expense of her ancient ally, and lost his confidence for ever." Certainly, the policy which compensates one great belligerent for cessions made to another, or for the want of acquisition from another, by territory exacted from one of the weaker parties to the war, is not magnanimous or creditable. But it may be questioned, whether the want of generosity is not rather in the powerful ally, who suffers the indemnification to be thus made. England might fairly treat those who were allied against her as one party; and leave them to settle their cessions among themselves. Probably, if France had not required Tobago from England, England would not have

*See p. 154, ante.

demanded Negapatnam from the Dutch. But it is not probable that Negapatnam would have altered the state of parties in Holland, nor could any state of parties make Holland an efficient ally. Whatever treaties may exist, it is really in vain to expect that a small commercial state, like Holland, will provoke, for the sake of England, the hostility of such a neighbour as France.

It is strange that Heeren, who dwells so much upon the rivalry between England and France, takes no notice of a step which the younger Pitt now took towards placing the two countries upon a more friendly footing. This was the commercial treaty of 1786, intended to produce an interchange of commodities upon fair and equal terms. On this occasion Pitt adverted* to "the too frequently advanced doctrine, that France was, and must be, the unalterable enemy of Great Britain; his mind revolted from this position, as monstrous and impossible." And he set forth, by just and statesmanlike arguments, the tendency of the treaty to preserve peace, without rendering us less prepared for war. Fox, on the other hand, argued that " France was the natural political enemy of Great Britain." This enmity he traced to "her invariable and ardent desire to hold the sway of Europe," and contended, that "she wished by entering into a commercial treaty with us to tie our hands, and prevent us from engaging in alliances with other powers." We can scarcely imagine a Foxite now so bigoted, as to deny to Mr. Pitt the superiority in this debate; which we earnestly recommend to perusal. No term is more mistaken than that of natural enemy, and the mistake as to the origin of the expression produces an erroneous deduction from the fact which it expresses. France, from her locality, perhaps also from her disposition, is among the continental powers the most likely to become the enemy of England. It is not that she ought to be our enemy, or that it is desirable that she should be so, but that she probably will be so. There are clashing interests and habitual jealousies, from which hostilities naturally, that is, according to the ordinary course of events, will arise. Now these are undeniable reasons for not augmenting, by any measure of our own, the power of France to annoy us; but they are none for encouraging the tendency to a quarrel. Quite the contrary. They should induce us to seek all means of counteracting it, and if possible to convert France into a friend. Reason and experience concur in proving, that no political friendship tends more to the peace of England, and of Europe generally, than the friendship between England and France.

Mr. Fox's apprehension, that our commercial treaty would stand in the way of our political alliances was speedily dissipated. Circumstances soon occurred (to which Heeren only adverts as the well-known events of 1787) which revived the connexion of England with the House of Orange and the Dutch Republic. This is the first case which we have had to notice of interference in the internal affairs of another state. The object was to exclude the influence of France, by throwing our weight, together with that of Russia, into the scale of that party which was opposed to France. On the part of the King of Prussia, whose sister, the Princess of Orange, had been arrested by the Republicans of Holland, there was the actual intervention of an armed force: England interposed only by mediation and advice; except that when France declared her intention of taking part in the internal dissensions, and made some addition to her forces by sea and land, England also armed, and declared that she would not be an indifferent spectator of the interference of France. After the Stadtholder was restored to power, by the aid of Prussia, France and England disarmed by mutual agreement.

Heeren thinks that England took the wrong side; she ought to have supported the republican party, representing, as he conceives, "the nation." He is aware of her motive, the counteraction of French influence, but says that the peace would have been a more favourable period for this attempt. Surely, it would have been difficult to establish any English interest in Holland, under the exasperation of the recent war. But the neglect of a former opportunity does not alter the wisdom of the present interference; and, if we interfered at all, with the view of counteracting France, we must doubtless have sided with the party which she did not favour. England did not interfere, until France had prepared, or threatened, a direct and apparently armed intervention. The conduct of England, independently of the connexion with the Orange family, may rest upon the principle more than once avowed by Queen Elizabeth, of not permitting the forces of a third power to occupy, without opposition, the territory of a neighbour. Apparently, the English government of 1787, and certainly its opponent, Fox, carried much further the right of interference. Pitt maintained that we were justified in restoring the government of the Prince of Orange, with the view of securing a valuable ally, instead of seeing Holland irrevocably attached to a rival; and Fox justified our interference, as consonant to the principles of "the balance of power" which he professed, although he doubted whether France had in fact threatened to interfere by force.

Out of this joint interference with Prussia in Holland arose that triple alliance between those states and England, which was