that time, whether just or not, depended the maintenance of the political balance of Europe."

From these expressions we collect that Heeren himself is not quite satisfied of the wisdom of these partition treaties, the substance of which (omitting subordinate provisions) may be thus shortly stated*:-By the first, concluded between England, France, and Holland, the two Sicilies, with the ports of Tuscany, and the province of Guipuscoa, were allotted to the Dauphin; Milan to the Archduke Charles; and the rest of the Spanish monarchy to the Electoral Prince of Bavaria. This favoured prince died, and the same parties again took upon themselves the disposal of the vast inheritance of Charles II., and now added the duchy of Lorraine to the allotment of the Dauphin, compensating the duke by the cession of Milan. Spain, with all the rest, was now given to the Archduke Charles. These arrangements were made without the consent or knowledge of the King of Spain, or of the Emperor, to whom the Grand Alliance had assured the whole Spanish monarchy. It appears to have been doubted, whether that stipulation was or was not still in force. We do not remember to have seen it mentioned, -probably, indeed, it was not known at the time to the Tory opposition, who might fairly have used it,-that in the negociation for the Partition Treaties there was a suggestion that England should have Mahon or some other ports in the Mediterranean. William appears not to have insisted upon this; his great point was the Netherlands, and he preferred a French prince at Madrid to a French garrison in Luxemburg.‡

Modern writers generally condemn these treaties, whereby a whole monarchy was parcelled out, without the justification or provocation of war, by strangers having no legal claim to any part of it. Whether, upon the principles of the balancing

* 11th Oct. 1698. Koch, ii. 10.

King William to Pensionary Heinsius, 16th April, 1698. Hardwicke Papers, ii. 343. The breach of the engagement with the Emperor constituted one of the articles of impeachment against Lord Somers for the Partition Treaty. See the first four articles, and the answers of Lord Somers, in which he takes no notice of this particular. Parl. Hist. v. 1266.

Hardwicke Papers, ii. 346, 350.

Mr. Macaulay has lately defended the Partition Treaties in his review of Lord Mahon's History of the Succession War, against the charge of making the partition "without the slightest reference to the states so readily parcelled and allotted." He justifies William by mentioning various treaties from the Pyrenees to Vienna, in which nations have disposed of territory for the supposed general good. Upon this we observe, 1, that one wrong will not justify another; but 2, that most of these treaties were made at the end of a war, in reference to countries conquered by one or other party. But it is further argued, that the object of the treaties was the same with that of the subsequent war, and that the danger which was sufficient to justify the war was sufficient to justify the treaty and certainly, if England and the other powers

system, they are utterly indefensible, it is rather for the advocates of that theory to determine. It is enough for us that these stipulations were utterly useless. Well, indeed, might the plaindealing William be surprised at the liberality displayed by the French in this negociation. It was easy for these unscrupulous diplomatists to consent to an unequal division of the spoil, prepared as they were to defeat the whole scheme by their intrigues; a result which we may always expect when we go beyond that which we have a right to require and are able to maintain. In the present instance the king did not even attempt to stand by his bargain. Unwillingly, no doubt, but from dire necessity, and because England would not go readily to war against speculative dangers, William acknowledged the King of France's grandson as King of Spain, again putting by the house of Austria.

Lord Mahon has celebrated the wise policy of King William in acknowledging Philip V. and "biding his time" for a successful opposition.

It is probable that he would have declared war without loss of time, if he had found his Parliament willing to support him ;t but he made a wise use of the experience which the failure of the first Grand Alliance and of the Partition Treaties had furnished, in moderating the views of his continental allies, or in limiting, at least, his own participation in them. In the new treaty which William and the States General made with the Emperor, there was no longer mention of the whole Spanish monarchy; they stipulated only to unite their efforts for procuring for the Emperor a full satisfaction for his rights, and with this view to attempt the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, Milan, the Sicilies, and the Tuscan ports. The security of Great Britain and of Holland was the other main object of the alliance,‡ and it was agreed that

were justified in fighting to prevent the addition of the Spanish monarchy to the possessions of the house of Bourbon, they were justified in negotiating with the same view. But this remark does not justify the conclusion of the treaty, otherwise than upon a full communication with all parties concerned, still less does it justify the desertion of our ally. In fact, moreover, England did not go to war for the balance of power; she had a sufficient cause of war in her own wrongs. Mr. Macaulay condemus the provisions of the Partition Treaties, because there was no chance of their being executed.-Edin. Rev. Ivi. 499.

* War of Succession, p. 41.

The king made no direct application to Parliament which was refused; both houses gave general promises of support, and the Commons addressed the king specifically to negociate with the States General and other potentates for the mutual safety of their kingdom, and of the States General, and the general security of Europe; and they partially requested him to preserve the treaty of the 3rd of March, 1677-8, which was a defensive alliance with the States. But they condemned the Partition Treaties, and impeached their supposed authors, and they did not vote the means of a

war.

+ Koch, ii. 28.

neither party should make peace without common consent, after having secured satisfaction for the Emperor and the safety of the Dutch, and provided that the crowns of France and Spain should not be united.

These terms did not go beyond the necessity of the case, if we admit two things (which at least we shall not dispute here), namely; first, that we were bound by interest, or by treaty, or by both, to take care of the safety of the United Provinces; and, secondly, that their safety could not be ensured while the Spanish Netherlands were in the hands of France. The satisfaction of the Emperor was a necessary stipulation, and moreover little burthensome, inasmuch as to assign to him the Low Countries was precisely the arrangement best suited to the purposes of the alliance.

We do not know how king William contrived, after having in September, 1701, concluded this treaty with the Emperor, who was at war with France, to keep it in abeyance until he should find an opportunity of rousing the spirit of his people.

Though not immediately put into execution, this treaty is not liable to the objections which we make to speculative or prospective engagements. The circumstances to which it was applicable existed, the necessity of applying it was felt by all the parties, and an early application of it was desired and intended.

The haughtiness and treachery of Louis XIV. soon furnished the opportunity desired, in various petty injuries, and in the great wrong of acknowledging the Pretender. King William appealed to his people in a speech, the last which he delivered, which was printed with decorations in English, Dutch, and French; and hung up in almost every house in England and Holland, as his majesty's last legacy to his own and all Protestant people. This appeal was followed by the most glorious and successful of our wars.

If this second Grand Alliance be tried by the result, it will be fully justified. In the fifth year of the war (1706) the allies had in their hands a treaty, whereby all the objects of the alliance were accomplished. Spain and the Indies, the Netherlands and the Milanese, would have been ceded by the house of Bourbon. The allies then, and again at a later period, refused to make peace upon these terms, and they finally obtained none so good. The conduct of the English ministers in rejecting the terms of the Hague and Gertruydenberg, and of their successors in making the peace of Utrecht,* is not precisely within the scope

*Mr. Macaulay, in the article already referred to, gives an opinion in favour of the peace of Utrecht."

of our present investigation, nor can it be discussed without a consideration of domestic politics, for which we have no place here.*

The success of the allied armies in the earlier years of the war, unquestionably induced the English people, as well as the ministers, to take a higher ground than that which the prudence of William had selected. In 1707, both houses of Parliament laid before the Queen their unanimous opinion, "That no peace can be beneficial for your majesty or your allies, if Spain, the West Indies, or any part of the Spanish monarchy, be suffered to remain under the power of the house of Bourbon." It is difficult, even for a strenuous upholder of the balancing theory, to refuse assent to Bolingbroke's opinion, "That the war was wise and just before the change," effected by this vote and the corresponding conduct of ministers, " because necessary to maintain that equality among the powers of Europe on which the public peace and common prosperity depend; and that it was unwise and unjust after this change, because unnecessary to this end, and directed to other and contrary ends."+

The modifications occasioned by the Succession war in the British continental policy, "encreased," according to Heeren," its strength and its sphere of action. 1st. The old connections, especially that with Austria, were greatly strengthened.

It is true that the alliance fell to pieces towards the end of the war, but still it is an example without parallel that it should have lasted so long; and even that the dissolution was but temporary, and the tie was renewed as soon as circumstances demanded it." Surely, the history of our relations with Austria illustrates the instability more than the continuousness of the connexion. The tie was renewed! and how soon was it again broken? In the course of the next half century we shall find alliances innumerable, some with and some against Austria, a fierce war to support, and another to restrain her!

2nd. Our connection with Portugal was cemented by the Methuen treaty. This is true, and it has undoubtedly been the most continuous of our foreign relations. Whether the Methuen

The principal stipulations of Utrecht were these:-The recognition of the Hanover succession; the recantation by Philip V. of his eventual claim to the throne of France, and the eternal separation of the two crowns; the fortifications of Dunkirk to be demolished; Hudson's Bay, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, ceded by France to England. The Spanish Netherlands given to Austria, with a barrier for the Dutch. England to retain Gibraltar, and to have Minorca from Spain, and the Assiento or contract for negroes for thirty years. The Duke of Savoy to have the kingdom of Sicily. The Emperor to have Naples and Milan.

+ Parliamentary History, vi. p. 609, Bolingbroke's Works, vol. iv, p. 87.

Her

treaty (now dissolved) was as advantageous as Heeren deems it, we greatly doubt. Nor are we of opinion that much good has resulted from the political connexion. From the position of Portugal it is desirable that she should not be our enemy. shores may make an inconvenient addition to the line of possibly hostile coast which France, Holland, and Spain may present to us. True; but these questions nevertheless arise:~Whether her connexion with England does not attract the enmity of our enemies? Whether the necessity of defending Portugal has been at any time burthensome to us? Whether she has been our friend in any war with Spain or France, in which she would not have been so equally without the ancient alliance?

3rd. Subsidies were first granted by England. Of these hereafter.

4th. "The Spanish Netherlands now became the property of Austria, which thus became the natural ally of England; and when the Italian possessions of Spain were given up, partly to Austria, partly to Sardinia, new points of connexion arose between these states and England, who had already, by the possession of Gibraltar and Minorca, gained a firm footing in the Mediterranean." Austria became our natural ally, as interposed between France and Holland, and interested in preventing the encroachments of France on the north-eastern frontier. We shall see her the ally of France! Our affairs in the Mediterranean have been little affected by the transfer of territory in Italy. Some of our eminent statesmen have thought Gibraltar of little value; we cannot so consider a defensible naval station in any part of the world.

It is truly added that the Assiento treaty and the acquisition of Nova Scotia, scattered the seeds of future wars.

The professor invites us to conclude from the foregoing history, that when the house of Hanover ascended the throne "the continental interests of England were in their leading features already fixed. ... The rivalry with France was the foundation on which those relations were built." Unquestionably the wars and treaties which produced these new relations grew out of our jealousy of the French power; but neither was that jealousy (a term more appropriate than rivalry), specially apparent in the new arrangements, nor was the new state of Europe particularly calculated to excite it.

It is true that the friendly connexion with France, which immediately followed the peace of Utrecht, was only the consequence of a family dispute of the Bourbons, and with the dispute itself it ceased. What occurred during the temporary suspension of this jealousy may, perhaps, enable us to judge,