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and sacrificed his public duty to his personal feelings, he was weak and even culpable; but it does not follow that his policy was hurtful. It is not shown how the interests of England were concerned in the establishment of the Elector Palatine on the throne of Bohemia. The truth is, Heeren is affected with much of the feeling which actuated James's parliament, and would approve of a war for the general advancement of the protestant interest.

It should be added, that King James did, at one time, send out a force to the support of the protestant princes of Germany. Is the contrast with Elizabeth found in the scantiness of this auxiliary force? It is true that the power of England, as wielded by James, "sank into so much insignificance as almost to become the ridicule of Europe." But Heeren has not shown, that this power, under his predecessor, had turned the scales in the political balance of Europe. This is really a style too loose for a grave professor, instructing persons less learned than himself. Whose fates, we ask, were balanced? To what side was the balance inclining? What weight, and with what effect, did Elizabeth throw in?

We dispute Heeren's conclusion, that the History of England under James shows "that a neglect of her continental interests is with her the signal of decline." Decline of what? Commerce flourished; the navy (as Heeren admits) was not neglected. And when did Englishmen exhibit more of a hardy vigour than in the period which immediately succeeded James? No-James made himself ridiculous; but he left England great and bold. The real contrast is, not between the measures of the two monarchs, but between their personal qualities.

The reign of Charles I. affords to Heeren little matter for observation. The king found himself involved in a war with Spain, which, though it "arose from the failure of the scheme of marriage," was the immediate result of advice given to his father by parliament, and accompanied by a promise of ample supplies.*

The treaties of 1624 and 1625 with the United Provinces may be traced to the same origin; and the whole transaction illustrates the danger of founding political engagements upon a vote of parliament. But this and the inducements of the new parliament to withhold supplies from Charles I. are domestic considerations to which we shall no further advert.

The war with France began for no sufficient or intelligent reason, though the support of the Protestants was made a preEven Heeren disapproves of this new instance of con

text.

1621, Parl. Hist. I. 1398.

nexions with the continent. Nor does he even mention the permission given by Charles to the Marquis of Hamilton to join Gustavus Adolphus with 6000 men.

Cromwell's war with the Dutch arose out of commercial and colonial rivalry, and the pretensions of England, which Cromwell knew well how to assert, to maritime pre-eminence. The war with Spain had a similar origin, and perhaps not a perfect justification: both these wars are in great part to be ascribed (we here agree with the professor) to Cromwell's personal ambition and policy, and the energy of his warlike character. Under him the British navy, which had not been neglected under the Stuart kings, acquired fresh laurels. On the whole, however, M. Heeren says much less than is usual in celebration of the energetic foreign policy of the Protector; he ascribes to him great and unaccomplished projects, not only for the extension of commerce and acquisition of colonies, but for the renewal of "conquests on the continent." Without going further into details, we may observe that Cromwell unquestionably restored the English character in Europe; and this because it was well known that he could and would fight, and fight hard, for the honour or interests of England; and that no Englishman would, under his government, sustain an unredressed injury from a foreign state.

We look in vain, it is truly said, for fixed principles under the remaining Stuarts; whose foreign policy was made subservient to their personal interest and plans of domestic ambition. The case of English kings bribed by France is one which we no longer consider of possible occurrence; on this account we do not examine the transactions of Charles II. with France and with the States General, although they furnish pregnant instances of unstable diplomacy and broken faith.

To one treaty, unnoticed by Heeren, we advert for an illustration of the great change of relations which even twenty years produce. England made, in 1669, during a lucid interval of the French mania, a treaty of alliance and general guaranty with Spain, for the particular purpose of securing Holland from

attack.

IV. William III. and Anne, 1689-1714.

"The merit of having laid the foundations of those continental interests, which have lasted to our time, belongs undoubtedly to William." Rivalry with France, a principle which, according to our professor, was then established for ever, now succeeded Protestantism as "the soul of British policy." This

* P. 243.

rivalry has occasioned and prolonged wars in all parts of the world, yet" it is undoubtedly a false estimate which would assert that the evils thence resulting, undeniable as they are, outweigh the advantages which have sprung from the same source." This position the professor supports by examples from ancient and modern history, in the tone which he probably uses in addressing the young men on the advantages of emulation. This line of argument is pursued at some length and greatly overcharged. Military strength, no doubt, is augmented by use; mercantile enterprize, and even social improvement, excited by competition: but surely, what we are now to quote is fanciful :

"It was this which drew out the noblest qualities of both nations,— it was this which preserved that love of freedom and independence which is founded on patriotism,-it was this which kept alive the most lofty feelings of the human race,-it was this which not only brought to perfection the civilization of these nations, but also planted the seeds of European refinement in the most distant parts of the globe; and thus, what in the eyes of short-sighted mortals was frequently considered the source of misery and calamity became in the hands of Providence the means of producing and diffusing the perfection of our race."

The love of freedom in England did not arise from her rivalry with France, nor did it flourish most abundantly while we were engaged in war. No one of the lofty feelings which characterize either nation has been kept alive by their rivalry, unless it be the passion for military glory. Rivalry among nations always will exist, as amongst individuals; it is useless, therefore, to controvert an opinion which Heeren appears to entertain, that a nation ought to seek a rival for the sake of the benefit to be derived from the rivalry. This opinion, especially if applied to rivalry in war, we condemn upon the clearest principles of right and wrong.

At the accession of William, the rivalry between France and England was at a height sufficient for the theory of Professor Heeren. Even during the reign of Charles II., while the government was in the French interest, and indeed for that very reason, the people were opposed to France. To the ancient causes of jealousy had been added the connection between the French. alliance and the Stuart projects for establishing the Roman Catholic religion and an arbitrary government. William's feelings, as a Protestant, a Dutchman, and a Prince of the German empire, interested in resisting the encroachments of Louis XIV., especially on the side of Flanders, were, in regard to France, quite in unison with those of the English who opposed the Stuarts before the Revolution, and now of nearly the whole

VOL. XIX. NO. XXXVII.

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English nation; for few, even among the Jacobites, had any kindly disposition towards France.

Heeren observes in this place, that the colonial system of this country was now much extended, and hence resulted that unfortunate confusion of the colonies (that is, in geographical position), from which differences and wars have arisen. The remark is just, but misplaced; no such cause operated at this time to produce rivalry between France and England. The declaration of war set forth some commercial grievances, but none arising from the contiguity of colonies. On the contrary, colonial matters were rather more likely to occasion jealousies between the two countries now momentarily united under William.

It is however, on the whole, justly observed by Heeren, that "the interests of religion, of independence, and of commerce, were now involved in an extraordinary manner with the interests of the sovereigns themselves." Independence, religion, and William's own interests together, constituted the cause of England at this period. But it is remarkable that Heeren does not mention the maintenance of the Revolution, and the new settlement of the crown of England, among the causes and objects of the war of 1689. The support which Louis gave to the deposed James was quite sufficient to cause and justify war, independently of the reasons arising from the encroachments of the French king on the continent. William would unquestionably have been glad enough to bring England into the league of Augsburg, and perhaps Louis's warning against Holland would have been a sufficient inducement to the English parliament to concur with him; but the more immediate, unquestionable, and English cause of that war was, the assistance given by the King of France to the late King James.

In this view it was strictly a defensive war; but the accession of England to the first Grand Alliance, while it included a league with Austria, Spain, and Holland, for the maintenance of Westphalia and the Pyrenees, and an engagement to use all their forces to obtain the Spanish monarchy for the Emperor, characterize a war for the maintenance of the balance of power. The Grand Alliance, as Heeren says, " gave to the politics of Western Europe the character by which they were afterwards peculiarly distinguished. From this time, too, the maintenance of the Belgian provinces was one of the leading maxims of the continental policy of England." "In her subsequent policy, England merely continued to build upon the foundations which were here laid.'

The extensive engagements into which England now entered gave her unquestionably a great advantage in her own battle with

France; a battle which her internal divisions respecting the crown and government rendered her certainly less capable of fighting single-handed. It is not impossible that, if England had refused to enter into this anti-gallican league, and to become a party to the arrangements for the security of the German empire and the maintenance of the house of Austria, she would have derived no assistance from the allies in those points which more peculiarly affected her. Holland, a state which she was bound to defend, and which was now the country of her sovereign, might have been sacrificed, and her own powers of resisting invasion, at this time peculiarly dangerous, much diminished.

Moreover, it might have been difficult to qualify the cooperation. If England had said, "We are with you upon the question of the Netherlands, and we will oppose the aggrandizement of France upon the Rhine or in Germany; but we are not prepared to fight for the whole Spanish monarchy;" not only would the Emperor, a most important person in the alliance, have been discontented and affronted, but all Europe would have believed that William had some continental scheme of his own, or his English ministers some project of colonial aggrandize

ment.

These were forcible reasons for the accession of England to this great confederacy. What we are anxious to mark is, that they were peculiar reasons. It is therefore that we do not examine them more critically; they have no reference to a period in which the whole strength of England could be united against a foreign invader.

Yet of these extensive objects for which England engaged herself in 1689, the peace of Ryswick accomplished few. It made no provision for the Spanish succession, nor did it secure (with a single exception) any one of the more English objects. It provided no additional security for Holland or the Netherlands, and settled not one of the commercial questions which were enumerated among its original causes. It provided assuredly for the acknowledgment of King William's title to the throne of England, an acknowledgment forgotten almost as soon as made. Soon after the incomplete arrangement of Ryswick, King William began to supply so much of the deficiency as regarded the Spanish inheritance. Of these negociations M. Heeren says truly, that

"England became deeply involved in continental politics, and even if Louis XIV. had not forced her to war by recognizing the Pretender, contrary to the provisions of the treaty of Ryswick, she would scarcely have been able to preserve her neutrality. A contest was pending, upon the result of which, according to the principles of the policy of

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