her husband, and in which she lost Calais,-no loss according to Heeren and to us,-proves nothing but the evil of a matrimonial alliance with a sovereign prince.

II.* Elizabeth, 1558-1603.

England under Elizabeth," says Heeren, "raised herself to the first rank among nations. During this reign she first learnt her power and the proper sphere of her action; the old visions of continental conquest vanished away. All the family connections by which England had been united with the continent had been dissolved, and in their place arose relations of a very different character, produced by neither private interest, nor vain projects of aggrandizement. Elizabeth has the merit of having made her private interest subservient to that of her nation, or at least, of having united the two, whilst her predecessors were guided solely by the former; and this, notwithstanding the cunning and deceitfulness sometimes displayed in it, forms the principal feature of her glorious reign."

In some of these positions the German Professor is carried away by enthusiasm, borrowed from the English writers who have sung the glories of Elizabeth, which sentiment, perhaps, none but a female sovereign could inspire; for it cannot fairly be denied, that England stood as high before the wars of the Roses, under Eaward III. and Henry V., as under this celebrated queen. But it is true that those princes had objects of personal aggrandisement, while Elizabeth had no private end, except the gratification of her vanity. Fortunately, her vanity did not seek delight in extensive wars; and her unwillingness to lose either her popularity or her independence, by asking too much of her parliaments, occasioned a parsimony which greatly cramped her foreign politics. It is thus, we believe, in moderating the interference of England in continental affairs, that her interests were identified with those of her people. If England now took a higher rank among nations, it is rather owing to the chivalrous and poetical character of particular heroes, to the bravery and enterprize of her seamen and traders, to internal peace, under a skilful, though arbitrary, domestic administration. These, rather than the arts of diplomacy, were the causes of England's greatness. Professor Heeren regards, as the most splendid proof of the superior practical ability of Elizabeth, the maintenance of peace, or rather the avoiding of open war for nearly thirty years with Philip II. of Spain, with whom (from her refusal of his hand) she had a personal ground of quarrel, as well as that which was afforded by her support of the protestant interest. Protestantism was, as he truly observes, the foundation of her foreign as well as of her domestic policy, and her protection of this

* P. 221.

religion throughout Europe gave, as Mr. Canning said, in 1823,* a distinctive character to the politics of her reign, which renders them unfit for comparison with our times. The question, therefore, whether the half-avowed and scanty succour which Elizabeth gave to the Hollanders, accompanied always by assurances to Philip of her desire to preserve their allegiance to Spain, was really the part of a magnanimous sovereign, is not immediately relevant to our inquiry. Much of the apparent management, which Heeren, in a well-chosen term, ascribes to the practical ability of Elizabeth, certainly arose out of divisions in her council, where some, evidently not the least discreet of her councillors, gave her this advice ;-we wish that they could now repeat it in Downing Street.

"The queen to intermeddle no further in the Netherlandish affairs, but to strengthen and fortify her own kingdom; to engage all her good subjects daily more strictly to her by her bounty and clemency; to restrain the bad; gather money; furnish her navy with all sorts of provision; provide the border towards Scotland with stronger garrisons, and maintain the ancient military discipline in England, (as if the same were of late adulterated and corrupted by the Low-Country war). So would England become impregnable; and she on every side be secure at home, and a terror to her enemies. That this was the best way for those who had two powerful neighbours, to prevent war; for no man would willingly provoke those whom he saw to be provided of money and strength, backed with the love of their subjects, and ready and prepared to take revenge. Great indiscretion therefore it were, to spend money and soldiers, which are, as it were, the vital spirits of war, in a foreign quarrel, in behalf of other princes, or indigent states, (and these subject to another,) who will always be expecting fresh relief, or else out of necessity and ingratitude will at length provide for their own state and security, and neglect their first helpers. Whereof the English had heretofore had experience in France, to their cost, in the quarrel of the Burgundian, and not long since also in the defence of the Protestants there." t

Heeren's notion that Elizabeth gave scanty supplies to the Dutch, because such were best calculated to develop their resources, is a gratuitous refinement. Her conduct, if not sufficiently accounted for by ministerial differences, by constitutional irresolution, and an inherent love of mystification, is also to be ascribed, in part, to an indisposition (of which we shall presently meet with an avowal) to encourage a revolt.

It did not occur, observes Heeren, to Elizabeth, while she fancied that "she was raising up a state which would never be able to act in opposition to British influence," that the infant republic would become a rival to her own kingdom in commercial great

* See our vol. viii. 405.

+ Camden, in Kennet, ii. 508, year 1585.

ness.

She did not foresee, he might have added, that the fleets of that infant state would in less than seventy years be engaged with those of her own country; and be more than once, in after times, combined with those of Spain as well as France, in hostility to England. It does not necessarily follow that, if Elizabeth could have looked into futurity, her conduct ought to have been different; but the facts furnish one among many proofs of the hopelessness of all attempts to establish, any where, a permanent, uniform, and beneficial interest.

After a long course of hesitation, Elizabeth took a decided part, and war with Spain followed. Unquestionably the defeat of the Armada, though brought about by adverse elements as much as by the skill and bravery of our English seamen, was a great event, the consequence of which did not soon pass away. The spirit which Elizabeth displayed upon the threat of invasion was calculated to excite and encourage her people, and to raise the English character in Europe.

But this glorious result is not to be ascribed to the previous policy of Elizabeth; it would have been produced at any period of her reign by an attack from Spain; and, perhaps, if her previous conduct had been more clear and straightforward, the aggression might have been more entirely without justification.

66

Professor Heeren traces to this war with Spain the rise of our commercial greatness. "We sought and encountered," he says, our enemies on distant seas, and thus were sown the seeds of many new branches of commerce, since England now sought to appropriate to herself her own carrying trade." We are not aware of any measure taken with this particular view; but unquestionably our mercantile and our military marine were in those days more closely connected, and voyages made for booty or conquest may have ultimately opened channels of peaceful traffic. Nevertheless, much as we have been accustomed to honour the memory of Sir Francis Drake, we cannot approve of the predatory, if not piratical, warfare, which he carried on against the Spaniards, long before the war broke out, and for which he was rewarded with knighthood by Elizabeth, to whose policy this half-avowed warfare was too exactly conformable.

The political game which Elizabeth played in France surpassed in subtlety, as Heeren tells us, even that which she carried on in the Netherlands. It was a case of coquetry, personal and political, which has never been equalled; and we really know of no one advantage, in profit or honour, which these mystifications produced. However, this is not a case of alliance or guaranty; the interest created by this matrimonial diplomacy was in its nature transient, and has entirely passed away. Of the policy of

"*

assisting the Hugonots, as Elizabeth assisted them against Henry III. without breaking with France, we have much doubt. Elizabeth too, "being a prince herself, was doubtful to give comfort to subjects." But she possessed, at least at one time, the legitimate notion of keeping the neighbouring parts of France out of the hands of the Guises, enemies to her and to the protestant religion. The case is not likely to occur again; no respectable sovereign of France would now permit England to give succour to his revolted subjects, whether religion or any other cause occasioned the revolt. The agreements for combined opposition to Spain, which Elizabeth concluded with Henry IV. after this prince became entitled to the French throne, were attended by the usual consequences. Each party complained of insufficient co-operation; and it is true that the co-operation was neither cordial nor effective. The defensive and offensive alliance concluded in 1596 was followed, so soon as 1598, by the separate peace of Vervins, against which Elizabeth in vain protested.

We have taken no notice of Elizabeth's doings in Scotland, because, happily, that is no longer a foreign country. And this is an important fact, in the consideration of the reign of Elizabeth and of all that preceded it. Until the union of the two crowns, the English government did not administer the affairs of an island. There was at all times a dangerous relation between Scottish politics and those of our continental neighbours; and in the time of Elizabeth this connexion had acquired a peculiar interest, affecting not only her religion, but her throne. All remarks, therefore, on insular policy, are inapplicable to a period prior to the accession of James I., the first of our monarchs who governed the entire island.

III. The Stuarts, 1603-1689.

Professor Heeren, like other writers, contrasts James with his predecessor. The re-action which took place, as he says, on the accession of this prince, he ascribes to the hatred which the king bore to the Puritans, and his almost avowed partiality for Catholicism. To this partiality he traces, with more of protestant zeal than of accuracy, the peace with Spain, and the transactions with

Turner, iv. 141.

* Cabala, p. 143. + Page 231. Heeren says (p. 232), that James in "his very first speech to parliament declared in such plain words that Catholicism, (excepting the doctrine of the papal supremacy, which was detestable to him from its limiting the regal power,) was the religion of his heart, that it could not but destroy once and for ever the confidence of the nation in their king." We have no space for domestic matters; but we must just observe, that we differ widely from Heeren in his estimate of this speech. With the exception of certain passages in which he dwells perhaps a little too much upon his natural and inherent supremacy, the speech is a good speech. What the king says of the Catholics

the Netherlands. peace of 1604."

"No single advantage was gained by the Hume takes a more favourable view of this treaty between Spain and England, he observes very justly, there was really nothing to settle.

But, "the Netherlands were left to their fate." Now, in considering the treaty of 1603 as involving a departure from the policy of Elizabeth, historians forget that the last treaty which Elizabeth made with the States (1598), not only tended to reduce within narrower limits and less favourable terms her succour to the Dutch, but provided for the case of a separate peace with Spain. It is possible, and not improbable, that she would not, five years afterwards, have taken so long a step towards the utter abandonment of the cause of the Dutch, as her successor took when he promised to give no further assistance. But there is really no difference which amounts to a contrast. The plan of James's ministers, avowed to their own agents, was to continue to give assistance, in evasion of the treaty; and it is even said that there was a secret understanding with Spain to this effect; there is surely nothing here to offend an admirer of the mystifying policy of the queen.

Judged by the events which followed, James's policy was good ; in three years a peace was concluded with Spain and the United Provinces. It may be true that, as we are told by Heeren, in the mediation of this truce Henry IV. of France had a greater share than James; and it even may be true-at least it is easily saidthat "Elizabeth would have taken to herself the credit of the negociation." We grant freely that the well-founded opinion prevalent in Europe of James's aversion to war made his negociations inefficient. Our question is, To what good purpose would negociation have been effectual, under the more vigorous administration of Elizabeth?

Heeren passes over, with one well-merited remark on the weakness of James, and so shall we, because it can have no bearing upon any question of principle, the affair of the Spanish match. But he accuses James of "betraying the continental interests of England," in withholding aid from his son-in-law, the Elector Palatine. Now, in so far as James was influenced, upon the question of interfering in Bohemia, by the fear of offending Spain and losing the Infanta, or by his own notions of royalty,

is no more than has been paraphrased in some of the most effective speeches upon the Catholic question. Indeed, if this communication to parliament be compared with those of Elizabeth,,who on one occasion commanded the Commons "that no bills touching matters of state, or reformation of causes ecclesiastical, be exhibited," (Parl. Hist. i. 889,) it will not justify a charge of special arrogance against James.

*See as to this, Parl. Deb. 1819, xl. 1096.