Exclusive Territorial Franchises--1975: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session ... April 9, 10, and 11, 1975U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975 - 252 стор. |
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advertising agreements antitrust laws BARNES basis bills bottling industry chain stores Chairman Coke Committee companies compete competitors concentration consumer Consumers Union cost customers DEERLIN distribution distributors economic efficient elimination exclusive territorial arrangements exclusive territorial franchising exemption fact Federal Trade Commission franchise system franchisor going grocery HALVERSON hearings IGA retailers increase interbrand intrabrand competition KINZLER large bottlers legislation licensee manufacturers MCCOLLISTER ment monopoly national brand NIFDA nonreturnable operation outlets package Pepsi Pepsi-Cola percent plants presumptive illegality price fixing private label food private label products profits protection question RAINWATER restraints restrictive arrangements returnable bottles Roscoe rule of reason Safeway Schwinn sell serve Seven-Up Sherman Act SILBERGELD sirup situation small bottlers small business soft drink bottling soft drink industry soft drink products statement STUCKEY subcommittee substantial supermarket supplier Supreme Court syrup talking territorial allocations territorial restrictions testimony tion Topco Associates Topco decision trademark warehouse wholesale
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Сторінка 124 - The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
Сторінка 95 - The question is whether this is a reasonable restraint of trade. And we do not see how a better test can be applied to the question, whether reasonable or not, than by considering whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public.
Сторінка 240 - Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other.
Сторінка 231 - The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow.
Сторінка 44 - I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to present the views of the Department of Justice on the various proposed bills concerning exclusive territorial arrangements as they relate to the antitrust laws.
Сторінка 9 - ... (3) Nothing contained in this Act or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render unlawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right or right of action created by any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, which in substance provides that...
Сторінка 200 - Commission initiated the action after finding that it had reason to believe that such acquisition would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Сторінка 110 - Expenses of occasional public service efforts may be met, in part, by nonrestrictive, noncommercial grants and fees. In addition to reports on Consumers Union's own product testing, Consumer Reports...
Сторінка 98 - The plain fact is, as we expect to be able to show to the satisfaction of the Court at a trial of this case on the merits, that the outlawing of exclusive distributorships and dealerships in specified territories would reduce competition in the sale of motor trucks and not foster such competition.
Сторінка 31 - Report prepared by the Bureau of the Census for the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Part 1, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1962, Table 2; "Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing Industry, 1963...