a service which is needed or grateful. That is the result of its material constitution. The perception of this capacity to render a grateful service excites a regard for that object, an appreciation of what it may do for the observer, it becomes cared for and esteemed, it is valued, and a desire to possess it is kindled, if that be practicable. Utility gives birth first to value and then to desire, and all the three qualities are entirely irrespective, as far as their nature is concerned, of the object being capable of being exchanged or sold.

It is further very important to observe that utility is coextensive with value and desire. Value is the personal feeling of the valuer. When an object is recognised to be capable of furnishing a gratification, and has kindled a desire for its possession, the sentiment of value has been created, and the sole essence of all these feelings is the wish to procure a gratification. Be the useful quality what it may, if it is able to excite the desire to obtain it, though that desire be a whim or a folly of any kind, if it generates a willingness to make a sacrifice in order to obtain possession of the object, or to resist the temptation of parting with it, then that utility has succeeded in giving birth to the feeling of value as truly as the noblest object of admiration and respect could have done. The principle is universal. Every utility recognised by any mind, and calling up a desire for its possession, brings value into existence, whatever may be thought of such a desire in respect of morality or rationality.

The cardinal fact that value is the offspring of utility, and that consequently, as every exchange is the transfer

of two useful things, there are two satisfactions implied in it, shows the absurdity of the widely-spread delusion that one man's gain is another man's loss. Whichever of the two parties to an exchange is considered, his only motive for making the exchange is his belief in gain. The man who sells me a hat does me, in my opinion, a greater service than the sovereign I give him can render. As well might one say that it is a loss to engage a good gardener at liberal wages, as if the flowers and fruits he produces are not, to the rich man's feelings, far more valuable than the money he gives as wages. A seller may make an excellent bargain with a man in imminent danger of starvation, and may reap an excessive profit. Nevertheless life is more valuable to the buyer than his coin, and the food is eagerly preferred to the money which would leave him to perish. Every exchange is manifestly a transaction in which both parties concur in recognising that they realise a gain, whatever be the nature of that gain. Why should either of them buy or sell unless a motive of advantage prompts them? It seems superfluous to dwell on such a truism, yet upon the ignorance of it, that obstinate absurdity, the mercantile theory, is founded. The belief is inveterate that it is good to sell and bad to buy, as if traders and sellers did not come into existence from a desire of buyers to obtain the services of the sellers.

It is obvious that the influences which act on the feeling called value are numberless. They vary with every impulse, every conception, every motive which acts upon human conduct. The man who was wont to live on the daintiest fare would give much money for a rat during the siege of Paris. He preferred the

saving of his life to the money with which he bought it. He valued the rat highly. For the same reason a bad harvest may send up the price of bread threefold. Many is the man who has preferred to sacrifice his all rather than violate a moral principle. He values duty at a higher rate than riches. The martyr sacrifices his life rather than abandon his religion. A nation submits to the suffering of higher taxation for the sake of preserving the national honour. Two feelings, two valuings come into play. The regard for honour is the stronger value. To think one's self rich enough, and to cease accumulating wealth in order to secure leisure and its enjoyments is an every day occurrence. Wealth sinks in the valuer's regard. Fashion changes its mood, and suddenly innumerable articles become almost unsaleable, which a short time previously commanded extravagant prices. The feeling of the mind is altered. Enthusiasm, passion, hope, despair, revolutionise the aspect which the world around wears to human feeling. Its feeling of value estimates every object in a different manner. All the endless circumstances which operate in every market act on value, tell upon the impressions of buyers and sellers as to the worth of commodities at the moment. Great bargains are constantly the result of altered values-not of prices, but of the creators of prices and of market-value-the hopeful or desponding feelings of the dealers. There is not a saleable thing in England which may not be at times. the sport of feeling, that feeling which is expressed by the verb, I value.

It remains to notice a question which has given rise to much discussion. Is there a measure of value? and

if so, what is it? The expression measure of value has two very distinct meanings which must not be confounded. Money is called a measure of value, and truly So. As all things are sold for money, their prices may be compared with one another, and measured as against each other. Thus if a ton of iron sells for four pounds and a hat for one, the market-value, or price of the ton of iron is four times greater'than that of a hat. But this measurement of comparative values by money, by each value being expressed in money, takes place only after each has been severally determined for itself. The value of the iron is settled for itself, and then compared with the value of the gold of which a sovereign is composed. It is the same with the hat and with all other articles, This measurement of value consists solely in taking one value arbitrarily, that of gold, and translating all other values into it, that is by discovering how much gold each article can command. The process is identical in nature with taking a yard and comparing it with all other lengths. These values, thus compared, are market-values, the quantity of gold or other things which they can command. This process tells us nothing as to how the value of each article, by itself alone, is measured.

The explanation has been largely sought from labour. Labour is an abstraction. In this place we must understand by it the use of man's mental and bodily powers for the making of commodities. It is contended that labour measures value, is its universal measure. Now we must carefully bear in mind that we are here speaking of market-value, of price. Labour is thus asserted to be the measure of price. Adam Smith is claimed as

the authority for this assertion. He has pointed out, it is said, the simple and obvious universal measure of value for us to adopt the length of time which a man will labour in order to obtain any given commodity. The description of this measure of value Mr Shadwell finds in these words of Adam Smith: "The real price of everything, what everything really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it." That is to say, interprets Mr Shadwell, that everyone has to acquire commodities by means of labour, and that the greater the labour which a person has to expend on the procuring of an article, the greater must be the value he attaches to it. But Adam Smith here does not say a word about value. He speaks of cost-to the maker. By price he means the effort and sacrifice in toiling which he gave to produce the article. But the question is, What will he sell it for? Mr Shadwell replies: For what it has cost in wages paid for the labour of making it. Hence, he thinks he has obtained a universal measure of value for all ages and countries. A coat sells for £5, a hat for £1. The market value of the coat is five times greater than that of the hat. How were these values determined? By the coat requiring five days, the hat one only to make. Now this statement is open to the objection, that it is labour which is measured, and not value. Value is made to be the effect of labour. Hence it measures labour like the height of the mercury measures the cause which produced it. Mr Shadwell has not found. a measure of a force or cause called value, but of a force called labour which generates the value.

However this objection need not be pressed. Let us