other workmen to join them. No trains were allowed to pass; a blockade of freight was created and maintained. The strike spread quickly over the line; by midnight the strikers were in control of a large part of the railroad and the strike had become a riot. The governor called out the whole military force of the State, which consisted of three volunteer companies, but they were unable to cope with the situation, so that on the 18th he called upon the President (Hayes) for aid. The President responded by the usual proclamation and at once sent 250 regulars to Martinsburg. The rioters dispersed, and order was restored, but this by no means opened up the line. Trains that might pass through Martinsburg under guard were stopped elsewhere, and there were not soldiers enough to look after every point of contact between the laborers and the railroad. Moreover, it was difficult to obtain men to operate the trains even when they were promised protection. Serious trouble broke out at Cumberland, a station farther west on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in the adjoining State of Maryland, and the railroad company called upon the governor of Maryland for military aid. On July 20 he issued a proclamation, placed the two regiments of militia in Baltimore under orders, directing the Fifth to proceed to Cumberland and the Sixth to remain on duty at the armory. The tocsin, which at about 6 o'clock in the evening summoned the dilatory soldiers, drew forth at the same time a mob of the unemployed, of strikers, outcasts, and "plug-uglies," determined that troops should not be sent to Cumberland to put down the strike. The Fifth Regiment, numbering 250, reached Camden station by an unlooked-for détour, without serious molestation, but there they were attacked with stones and pistol-shots by the rioters, who were in possession of the lower part of the station, and who had already threatened with death the engineer and fireman of the train there in readiness, if they made an attempt to pull out toward Cumberland. Meanwhile, on account of the menacing attitude of the mob, the mayor of Baltimore suggested to the governor the inadvisability of sending any of the militia away from Baltimore, and the governor at once revoked his former order. The Fifth Regiment was indeed in no condition to take the offensive, but, on the oth

er hand, was in danger of being overpowered by the mob; three companies of the Sixth were therefore ordered to the rescue. These left their armory at about 8 o'clock in the evening, and had no sooner emerged from the building than they were set upon by an angry mob, assailing them with bricks and cobble-stones, and firing at them with pistols. These companies, composed mainly of youths between eighteen and twenty-five, were not well disciplined; still they marched on with a fair degree of order, but, numbering only 120 men, were in danger of being overwhelmed by the mob of 3,000 or 4,000. They did what untrained militia generally do in such a situation-opened fire without orders; and as they went down the street they continued firing. Nine rioters were killed, 3 died later from their wounds, and 14 were wounded. The firing did not disperse the mob, but the shedding of blood exasperated them. Wild with rage they pursued the soldiers, until these companies of the Sixth, far from being in a position to relieve their beleaguered comrades, were badly in need of help themselves. No one in that uniform was safe from the fury of the mob. Many of the soldiers sought safety in houses along the route, changed their clothes to civilian dress, and so escaped. Only a small remnant reached the station and remained at the post of duty.

The mob surrounded the Camden station and began setting fire to the company's property. At first they prevented the firemen from putting out the flames, but in the end, better counsels prevailing, they desisted, with the result that the destruction of property was not large. The entire police force of the city was at the station, on duty all night; they repeatedly charged the mob and made arrests, but it was not deemed prudent to employ further the militia. Nor, even if the State soldiers had been well disciplined, had the governor a sufficient force at his command. Hard times had reduced the appropriations so that the militia of Maryland numbered in all but 725 men. On this same night (July 20) the governor called upon President Hayes for assistance. Next day the President issued the usual proclamation, and ordered an adequate force of regulars to Baltimore, under the command of General Hancock, who, with the troops stationed at New York City, arrived there in

the early morning of July 22. After consultation with the governor he disposed his soldiers at the threatened points, and their presence brought the rioting to an end. Order was restored, but at the time that the conditions of my narrative divert our attention to Pennsylvania, the freight blockade on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was not raised.

On July 19 the trouble in Pennsylvania began at Pittsburg. Since the panic of 1873 the Pennsylvania Railroad had made two reductions in wages, one in 1873 of ten per cent and another of like amount which went into effect on June 1, 1877. Both of these were accepted by the men, but before their acquiescence in the second reduction, a committee of engineers paid a visit to Thomas A. Scott, the president, canvassed with him the proposed cutting down of their wages, and were apparently convinced that it was inevitable, receiving at the same time the promise that their pay should be restored as soon as conditions permitted. The other trainmen, however, grumbled at this reduction, and were already in a discontented mood when the order was issued to run double-headers on all freight trains on the Pittsburg-Altoona division. A double-header meant two locomotives on one train of thirty-four cars where the steep grades rendered additional power necessary, instead of running the train in two sections and making the junction at the top of the pass or at Altoona, whence one locomotive could haul it to Philadelphia. This plan saved the wages of a freight conductor, a flagman, and the brakeman hitherto needed for the second section, an economy forced upon the company, so A. J. Cassatt, the third vicepresident, testified, from the low freight rates rather than from the decreased tonnage. This order, which was to take effect on July 19, gave general dissatisfaction, but no active protest was expected by the officials; and the general superintendent of that division left Pittsburg that morning on his vacation. Indeed, a number of the early trains went out double-headers without any trouble, but the two brakemen and the flagman of the 8.40 A. M. refused to go out on their train, and as no other trainmen would take their places, the despatcher got together a crew from the yardmen, who were, however, prevented from making up

the train by the strikers assaulting them with coupling-pins. Twenty to twenty-five men were engaged in this disturbance. They took possession of the switches, refused to permit any trains to pass out of the yard, and persuaded the various freight crews that came in from time to time, both from the East and the West, to join forces with them. This incident, together with the trouble at Martinsburg, inaugurated the most alarming strike and riot in the history of the United States.

Whenever there is a great strike, the outside public looks on; its sympathy may be with the workmen or it may be with their employers, but it is always a factor to be reckoned with. At the outset public sentiment in Pittsburg was with the strikers, partly because it was believed that the last reduction of wages was unfair and partly because the Pennsylvania Railroad was thoroughly hated in this town. From the large manufacturer and merchant to the small shopkeeper the belief was general that the company discriminated against Pittsburg in its freight tariff. It was alleged that the railroad carried goods from Chicago to Philadelphia for less than from Chicago to Pittsburg; that Pittsburg manufacturers could ship their merchandise to San Francisco via Boston at a lower rate than from Pittsburg to San Francisco direct and that no manufacturer could live without drawbacks and rebates. When complaint was made to Scott he was ready with his reply: the discrimination was due to the war of rates, through freight being carried at a less rate per mile than local freight, and while this was, to a certain extent, a true explanation, every business man could add that Pittsburg suffered because it had no competing line and was at the mercy of the Pennsylvania Railroad. In fact, ruin stared many manufacturers in the face because they were unable to compete with the manufacturers of towns more fortunately situated. The sentiment of the business men and the natural sympathy of the laborers and mechanics in every factory were reflected in the newspapers, which almost unanimously supported the strike.

Begun unexpectedly and on the spur of the moment, the strike grew so rapidly that soon the Pennsylvania Railroad at Pittsburg was in the hands of the striking workmen, who would not move the trains them

selves nor permit other men to take their places. It is generally the theory of the employer in such cases that a large number of competent workmen can be had if furnished adequate protection, and while in 1877 persuasion and threats had not been erected into the system since built up by the trade-unions, yet on this July 19 persuasion was employed, and when it failed threats were ready. For on account of the enormous number of the unemployed, steady men were everywhere seeking jobs, and intimidation was probably necessary to keep the vacant places unsupplied. Thus a freight blockade was established, although passenger trains were permitted to run.

Before noon of the 19th the actingsuperintendent went to the City Hall and asked the protection of 10 policemen and the mayor's presence at the yard. The mayor must have been either weak and timid or else in sympathy with the strikers, for he said he had no men to send. Owing to the hard times the force had been reduced to 120, only 9 of whom were on duty during the day. But the acting superintendent found 10 of the discharged policemen who were willing to serve when assured of their pay by the railroad, and, as the mayor absolutely refused to go to the scene of trouble, the superintendent took this small force with him to the railroad yard. While in the act of opening a switch he was struck in the eye by a striker, and, as the rioters numbered a hundred, he decided not to attempt moving the trains at once, but appealed to the mayor for additional protection, which was not furnished. During the next four days the mayor and police practically disappear from the history of the riot.

Between 11 o'clock and midnight of the 19th the acting superintendent saw the sheriff of the county and demanded protection. The result of the interview was that these two, together with General Pearson, the commander of the Sixth Division of the Pennsylvania militia, with headquarters at Pittsburg, went out to Twentyeighth Street, which was the scene of the trouble, and addressed a crowd of two hundred. The sheriff advised them to disperse and was thus answered: "Go home! We are not going to allow any freight trains to leave until the difficulty between us and the railroad company is settled. The mayor

and policemen are on our side, and prominent citizens have offered to assist us in provisions and money to carry on the strike." This reply satisfied the sheriff that there was a riot which he could not quell with a posse of citizens, and he thereupon telegraphed to the governor for military aid. But the governor was beyond the limits of the State and travelling toward the Pacific coast, and the adjutant-general, Latta, was exercising his authority as commander-in-chief of the State militia. He had been thoroughly informed about the doings in Pittsburg by the railroad officials in Philadelphia, and was ready to take action. He accordingly authorized General Pearson to call out his troops and to take command. Pearson, who had seen three years service during the Civil War, rising to the command of a brigade, ordered out three regiments and a battery. The Eighteenth, responding at noon of Friday, July 20, with about 225 men, was sent to the stock-yards east of Pittsburg, and acquitted themselves with credit during the whole trouble. But the members of the other two regiments assembled slowly, and when they came to the rendezvous it was evident that they sympathized with the strike. At 6.35 on the evening of the 20th, Pearson telegraphed Latta that he had only been able to collect 230 men (meaning in addition to the Eighteenth Regiment), while he needed 2,000, as the mob had grown to 4,000 or 5,000, and he suggested that troops be sent from Philadelphia. Latta ordered to Pittsburg the First Division of the National Guard, composed almost entirely of Philadelphia men. On this day, the 20th, a proclamation was issued by the secretary of state in the governor's name, and with the State seal, ordering the mob to disperse. This produced no effect whatever. The rioters knew that the governor was out of the State; they believed, or pretended to believe, that the railroad people had issued the proclamation and that the troops had been illegally ordered out without authority from the governor. The trainmen held a meeting and sent their demands to the superintendent, two of which were that there should be no double-headers except on the coal trains, and that the wages existing before June 1 should be restored.

The situation was taking on the aspect of war, and Pearson knew that if an affray

should take place, the Twenty-eighth Street crossing, which was a mile east of the Union Station, would be the scene of it. On the morning of the 21st, aware that the Philadelphia division was on the way, he ordered his two available regiments and the battery to take possession of the crossing and hold it. These troops were under the immediate command of a brigade commander who failed to carry out his orders, and, dressed in citizen's clothes, encouraged his men to fraternize with the mob. By 3 o'clock of Saturday afternoon, July 21, 650 Philadelphia soldiers, under the command of Brinton, a Civil War veteran, arrived at the Union Station. They were a brave body of men; many had seen service in the Civil War and some of the companies were composed of the élite of their city. But they had little relish for the fight before them for they were hungry. Owing to bad management they had been on short rations although their journey lay entirely within the populous and fertile State of Pennsylvania. Leaving Philadelphia at about two in the morning, they had once had coffee and sandwiches on the way, and the same again on their arrival at the Union Station, but nothing else.

Saturday afternoon was a bad time to tackle a mob in Pittsburg. It was a general half-holiday and the crowd was swelled by the mill and factory hands and the miners in the neighborhood, who, as well as the train men, were exasperated by the news of bloodshed in Baltimore and doubted the legality of the presence of State troops. Tramps abounded, and these together with outcasts and criminals gave a lawless complexion to the mob they reinforced. It is said that Cassatt was asked to defer the offensive movement until Monday, but he insisted that the State should restore to the railroad its property. Latta and Pearson met the Philadelphia troops at the Union Station, and Brinton acted under the command of his superior officers. Before setting out on the march to Twenty-eighth Street he gave instructions to his two brigadiers and to his regimental commanders to the effect that he did not want a shot fired, but that if personal violence was attempted the men should defend themselves. The Philadelphia troops then marched to the Twenty-eighth Street crossing where they found the Pittsburg militia fraternizing with

a mob of many thousands, in which the vicious element was large. They partly cleared the tracks, but as the rioters pressed between their ranks they were forced to the defensive and formed a hollow square. A bayonet charge wounded a number and exasperated the rest. The rioters threw stones and lumps of coal at the soldiers, and followed up these missiles with pistol-shots. Emboldened by the lack of resistance, those in front seized the muskets and attempted to wrest them from the troops. Some few were disarmed when at about 5 o'clock a scattering fire began along the line, which increased to a volley, but, as the officers did their best to stop it, lasted less than a minute. But at least sixteen of the rioters were instantly killed and many were wounded. The occurrence was extremely unfortunate, and although the firing was done without precise orders, and the only warrant for it was Brinton's general instructions, it had become necessary in order to avoid broken ranks and a general disarming of the troops. Moral support should have been forthcoming for these brave militiamen who had been precipitately ordered forward to attempt an impossible task; but the Pittsburg public generally regarded their act as murderous. Some of the newspapers were rabid. One headed its account with: "Blood or bread. The worthy strikers arm themselves and assemble thousands strong to compel their rights." Another: "Seventeen citizens shot down in cold blood by the roughs of Philadelphia. The Lexington of the labor conflict at hand. Threats that the Philadelphia soldiers will not be allowed to go home alive."

The firing temporarily dispersed the mob. and the troops were masters of the situation, but were not in sufficient force to remain so, and reinforcements that were expected did not arrive. The railroad officials could not get engineers and crews to take charge of trains, so no trains went out. About dusk Brinton withdrew his troops for rest and food to the lower round-house at Twenty-sixth Street, supposing that the upper round-house at Twenty-eighth Street would be occupied by the Pittsburg militia. But this was not to be. The Pittsburg troops had throughout fraternized with the mob, some of them quitting the service; and, after the firing, the number of sympathetic, desertions increased. Those remaining were

intimidated, as was also their brigade commander, who, as the mob grew more excited and angry, dismissed his troops lest, as he afterward defended this act, they should exasperate the rioters to further violence. So the affair had simmered down to a contest between the mob and the Philadelphia soldiers. The exasperation at the bloodshed of the afternoon was increased by the report, which may have been true, that some of the killed were innocent spectators; for the neighboring hill had been covered with people and the firing had been high. A report that women and children were among the killed aggravated the wrath of the people, and when the mob reassembled at the Twenty-eighth Street crossing on the tracks in the railroad yard, they were bent on revenge, took the offensive, and laid siege to the Philadelphia troops in the round-house. These were without food. Provisions were sent to them from the Union Station a mile away in express wagons, which, being unguarded, were intercepted by the rioters. Possessed of firearms from having broken into a number of gun-shops, the rioters, with some attempt at military order, marched to the roundhouse and poured volley after volley into the windows, eliciting no response from the Philadelphia soldiers, who were under orders not to fire unless absolutely necessary for self-protection. But after proper warning, they did fire at men attempting to use a field-piece captured from a Pittsburg battery, and killed perhaps two or three. Failing to overpower their enemy by assault the rioters tried fire. They applied the torch to the upper round-house and the neighboring buildings. Breaking in the heads of barrels of oil taken from the detained freight, they saturated cars of coke with it, ignited them, and pushed the cars toward the lower round-house in the attempt to roast out the beleaguered soldiers, who by means of the fire apparatus managed for a while to stay the fire. It was a terrible ordeal they were passing through. "Tired, hungry, worn out, surrounded by a mob of infuriated men yelling like demons, fire on nearly all sides of them, suffocated and blinded by smoke, with no chance to rest and little knowledge of what efforts were being made for their relief, with orders not to fire on the mob unless in necessary self-defence, the wonder

is that they were not totally demoralized; but the evidence of all the officers is that the men behaved like veterans."

It is probable that the original railroad strikers had little or no part in this attack; they certainly had none in the arson and pillage which followed. They had invoked a spirit with which they were not in sympathy. The controlling force now was the tramps, communists, criminals, and outcasts-the dregs of society, and these could work their will unrestrained. As I have said before, the mayor and police counted for nothing toward the preservation of order. The sheriff with some deputies went to the Twenty-eighth Street crossing with the first advance of the Philadelphia troops, but effected nothing; after the firing threats were made to murder him, and he disappeared, going first to his home and then, apparently for greater security, to his office. His ultimate safety may have been due to the newspapers incorrectly reporting that he had been shot by the mob. The mob set fire to the remaining railroad buildings in the yard, to the laden freight cars and locomotives. Barrels of spirits taken from the freight cars were opened and drunk; another goad to the men was supplied by women, who abused the troops and pillaged with ardor; thus the work of destruction and plunder of the goods in transit went on with renewed fury. The firemen responded to the fire-alarm, but were not allowed to play upon the burning railroad property; after some parley, however, they got permission to put out the flames which had spread to private buildings. That Saturday night Pittsburg witnessed a reign of terror.

At last the lower round-house took fire and the Philadelphia troops were forced to abandon it and retreat. Unable as they were to cope with the mob, their only thought was self-preservation. At about 8 o'clock on Sunday morning, July 22, they marched out in good order. Their progress was not opposed, but after passing, they were fired upon from street corners, alleyways, windows, and house-tops. Shots were fired at them from a street-car and from the sidewalk in front of a policestation, where a number of policemen were standing. The troops turned and used with some effect their rifles and a Gatling-gun

appointed to investigate the railroad riots of 1877.

*Report of the committee of the Pennsylvania legislature