in advance of us. And in most subjects, the utmost knowledge that any man can attain to, is but "a little learning" in comparison of what he remains ignorant of. The view resembles that of an American forest, in which, the more trees a man cuts down, the greater is the expanse of wood he sees around him.

But supposing you define the "much" aud the "little" with reference to the existing state of knowledge in the present age and country, would any one seriously advise that those who are not proficients in astronomy should remain ignorant whether the earth moves or the sun ?-that unless you are complete master of agriculture, as far as it is at present understood, there is no good in your knowing wheat from barley ?—that unless you are such a Grecian as Porson, you had better not learn to construe the Greek Testament?

The other recommendation of the poet, "taste not "-that is to say, have no learning is equally impossible. The truth is, every body has, and every body ought to have, a slight and superficial knowledge—a “smattering," if you will— of more subjects than it is possible for the most diligent student to acquire thoroughly. It is very possible, and also very useful, to have that slight smattering of chemistry which will enable one to distinguish from the salts used in medicine, the oxalic acid, with which, through mistake, several persons have been poisoned. Again, without being an eminent botanist, a person may know-what it is most important to know-the difference between cherries and the berries of the deadly nightshade; the want of which knowledge has cost many lives.

Again, there is no one, even of those who are not profound politicians, who is not aware that we have Rulers; and is it not proper that he should understand that government is necessary to preserve our lives and property? Is he likely to be a worse subject for knowing that? That depends very much on the kind of government you wish to establish. If you wish to establish an unjust and despotic government-or, if you wish to set up a false religion-then it would be advisable to avoid the danger of enlightening the people. But if you wish to maintain a good government, the more the people understand the advantages of such a government, the more they will respect it; and the more they know of true religion, the more they will value it.

There is nothing more general among uneducated people than a disposition to socialism, and yet nothing more injurious to their own welfare. An equalization of wages would be most injurious to themselves, for it would, at once, destroy all emulation. All motives for the acquisition of skill, and for superior industry, would be removed. Now, it is but a little knowledge of political economy that is needed for the removal of this error; but that little is highly useful.

Again, every one knows, no matter how ignorant of medicine, that there is such a thing as disease. But as an instance of the impossibility of the " taste not" recommendation of the poet, a fact may be mentioned, which perhaps is known to most. When the cholera broke out in Poland, the peasantry of that country took it into their heads that the nobles were poisoning them in order to clear the country of them; they believed the rich to be the authors of that terrible disease; and the consequence was that the peasantry rose in masses, broke into the houses of the nobility, and finding some chloride of lime, which had been

state of gross ignorance,-yet believed that the Deity aid impart special to certain men; and that belief, coupled with excessive stupidity, led them an insane fanatic for a prophet. In this case, this "little learning" a caused an insurrection in his favor, in order to make him king, priest and p of the British empire; and many lives were sacrificed before this insane ins tion was put down. If a "little learning" is a "dangerous thing," you wi to keep people in a perfect state of idiotcy in order to avoid that dang would, therefore, say that both the recommendations of the poet are im cable.

The question arises, what are we to do? Simply to impress upon our and upon all people the importance of laboring in that much neglected t of human knowledge—the knowledge of our own ignorance;—and of reme ing that it is by a confession of real ignorance that real knowledge must be g But even when that further knowledge is not attained, still even the know of the ignorance is a great thing in itself; so great, it seems, as to cou Socrates the wisest of his time.

Some of the chief sources of unknown ignorance may be worth noticing They are to be found in our not being aware: 1. How inadequate a mediu guage is for conveying thought. 2. How inadequate our very minds are f comprehension of many things. 3. How little we need understand a word may yet be familiar to us, and which we may use in reasoning. This piece norance is closely connected with the two foregoing. (Hence, frequently will accept as an explanation of a phenomenon, a mere statement of the diff in other words.) 4. How utterly ignorant we are of efficient causes; and the philosopher who refers to the law of gravitation the falling of a stone earth, no further explains the phenomenon than the peasant, who would sa the nature of it. The philosopher knows that the stone obeys the same la which all other bodies are subject, and to which, for convenience, he give name of gravitation. His knowledge is only more general than the peas: which, however, is a vast advantage. 5. How many words there are that ex not the nature of the thing they are applied to, but the manner in which affect us; and which, therefore, give about as correct a notion of those thin the word "crooked" would, if applied to a stick half immersed in water. is the word Chance, with all its family.) 6. How many causes may, and us do, conduce to the same effect. 7. How liable the faculties, even of the a are to occasional failure; so that they shall overlook mistakes (and those ofte most at variance with their own established notions) which, when once exp seem quite gross even to inferior men. 8. How much all are biassed, in all moral reasonings, by self-love, or perhaps, rather, partially to human nature other passions. 9. Dugald Stewart would add very justly, How little we of matter; no more indeed than of mind; though all are prone to attemp plaining the phenomena of mind by those of matter: for, what is familiar generally consider as well known, though the fact is oftener otherwise.

The errors arising from these causes, and from not calculating on them,is, in short, from ignorance of our own ignorance, have probably impeded p ophy more than all other obstacles put together.

Certain it is, that only by this ignorance of our ignorance can "a little learn

become "a dangerous thing." The dangers of knowledge are not to be compared with the dangers of ignorance. A man is more likely to miss his way in darkness than in twilight: in twilight than in full sun. And those contemners of studies who say (with Mandeville, in his Treatise against Charity-schools) “If a horse knew as much as a man, I should not like to be his rider," ought to add, “If a man knew as little as a horse, I should not like to trust him to ride." It is indeed possible to educate the children of the poor so as to disqualify them for an humble and laborious station in life; but this mistake does not so much consist in the amount of the knowledge imparted, as in the kind and the manner of education. Habits early engrafted on children, of regular attention,--of steady application to what they are about,-of prompt obedience to the directions they receive,―of cleanliness, order, and decent and modest behavior, can not but be of advantage to them in after life, whatever their station may be. And certainly, their familiar acquaintance with the precepts and example of Him who, when all stations of life were at his command, chose to be the reputed son of a poor mechanic, and to live with peasants and fishermen; or, again, of his apostle Paul, whose own hands "ministered to his necessities," and to those of his companions:-such studies, I say, can surely never tend to unfit any one for a life of humble and contented industry.

What, then, is the "smattering "-the imperfect and superficial knowledgethat really does deserve contempt? A slight and superficial knowledge is justly condemned, when it is put in the place of more full and exact knowledge. Such an acquaintance with chemistry and anatomy, e. g. as would be creditable, and not useless, to a lawyer, would be contemptible for a physician; and such an acquaintance with law as would be desirable for him, would be a most discreditable smattering for a lawyer.

It is to be observed that the word smattering is applied to two different kinds of scanty knowledge—the rudimentary and the superficial; though it seems the more strictly to belong to the latter. Now, as it is evident that no one can learn all things perfectly, it seems best for a man to make some pursuit his main object, according to, first, his calling; secondly, his natural bent; or thirdly, his opportunities: then, let him get a slight knowledge of what else is worth it, regulated in his choice by the same three circumstances; which should also determine, in great measure, where an elementary and where a superficial knowledge is desirable. Such as are of the most dignified and philosophical nature are most proper for elementary study; and such as we are the most likely to be called upon to practice for ourselves, the most proper for superficial; e. g., it would be to most men of no practical use, and, consequently, not worth while, to learn by heart the meaning of some of the Chinese characters; but it might be very well worth while to study the principles on which that most singular language is constructed; contra, there is nothing very curious or interesting in the structure of the Portuguese language; but if one were going to travel in Portugal, it would be worth while to pick up some words and phrases. If both circumstances conspire, then, both kinds of information are to be sought for; and such things should be learned a little at both ends; that is, to understand the elementary and fundamental prin

mediate course of scientific demonstration.

Grammar, logic, rhetoric, and metaphysics, [or the philosophy of mind manifestly studies of an elementary nature, being concerned about the Iments which we employ in effecting our purposes; and ethics, which is, i a branch of metaphysics, may be called the elements of conduct. Such edge is far from showy. Elements do not much come into sight; they a that part of a bridge which is under water, and is therefore least admired, t it is not the work of least art and difficulty. On this ground it is suita females, as least leading to that pedantry which learned ladies must ever culiarly liable to, as well as least exciting that jealousy to which they mus be exposed, while learning in them continues to be a distinction. A v might, in this way, be very learned without any one's finding it out.

"Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for grante to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider. Some books ar tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digest It would have been well if Bacon had added some hints as to the m study: how books are to be chewed, and swallowed, and digested. For, t inattentive readers, who measure their proficiency by the pages they have over, it is quite possible, and not uncommon, to read most laboriously, even to get by heart the words of a book, without really studying it at all; t without employing the thoughts on the subject.

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In particular, there is, in reference to Scripture,' a habit cherished by persons, of reading-assiduously, indeed-but without any attentive reflecti studious endeavor to ascertain the real sense of what they read-concludin whatever impression is found to be left on the mind after a bare perusal words, must be what the sacred writers designed. They use, in short, li none of that care which is employed on any other subject in which we are interested, to read through each treatise consecutively as a whole,-to co one passage with others that may throw light on it, and to consider what w general drift of the author, and what were the occasions, and the persons in view.

"In fact, the real students of Scripture, properly so called, are, I fear, than is commonly supposed. The theological student is often a student chi some human system of divinity, fortified by references to Scripture, intro from time to time as there is occasion. He proceeds-often unconscious setting himself to ascertain, not what is the information or instruction to rived from a certain narrative or discourse of one of the sacred writers, but aid can be derived from them towards establishing or refuting this or that of dogmatic theology. Such a mode of study surely ought at least not exclusively pursued. At any rate, it can not properly be called a stu Scripture.

"There is, in fact, a danger of its proving a great hindrance to the pro study of Scripture; for so strong an association is apt to be established mind between certain expressions, and the technical sense to which they been confined in some theological system, that when the student meets with

1 See Essays on the Difficulties of St. Paul's Epistles. Essay X. page 233.

in Scripture, he at once understands them in that sense, in passages where perhaps an unbiassed examination of the context would plainly show that such was not the author's meaning. And such a student one may often find expressing the most unfeigned wonder at the blindness of those who can not find in Scripture such and such doctrines, which appear to him to be as clearly set forth there as words can express; which perhaps they are, on the (often gratuitous) supposition that those words are everywhere to be understood exactly in the sense which he has previously derived from some human system,-a system through which, as through a discolored medium, he views Scripture. But this is not to take Scripture for one's guide, but rather to make one's self a guide to Scripture.

"Others, again, there are, who are habitual readers of the Bible, and perhaps of little else, but who yet can not properly be said to study anything at all on the subject of religion, because, as was observed just above, they do not even attempt to exercise their mind on the subject, but trust to be sufficiently enlightened and guided by the mere act of perusal, while their minds remain in a passive state. And some, I believe, proceed thus on principle, considering that they are the better recipients of revealed truth the less they exercise their own reason.

"But this is to proceed on a totally mistaken view of the real province of reason. It would, indeed, be a great error to attempt substituting for revelation conjectures framed in our own mind, or to speculate on matters concerning which we have an "imperfect knowledge imparted to us by revelation, and could have had, without it, none at all. But this would be, not to use, but to abuse, our rational faculties. By the use of our senses, which are as much the gift of the Creator as anything else we enjoy,—and by employing our reason on the objects around us, we can obtain a certain amount of valuable knowledge. And beyond this, there are certain other points of knowledge unattainable by these faculties, and which God has thought fit to impart to us by his inspired messengers. But both the volumes—that of Nature and that of Revelation—which He has thought good to lay before us, are to be carefully studied. On both of them we must diligently employ the faculties with which He, the Author of both, has endued us, if we would derive full benefit from his gifts.

"The telescope, we know, brings within the sphere of our own vision much that would be undiscernible by the naked eye; but we must not the less employ our eyes in making use of it; and we must watch and calculate the motions, and reason on the appearances, of the heavenly bodies, which are visible only through the telescope, with the same care we employ in respect of those seen by the naked eye.

"And an analogous procedure is requisite if we would derive the intended benefit from the pages of inspiration, which were designed not to save us the trouble of inquiring and reflecting, but to enable us, on some points, to inquire and reflect to better purpose,-not to supersede the use of our reason, but to supply its deficiencies."

Although, however, it is quite right, and most important, that the thoughts should be exercised on the subject of what you are reading, there is one mode of exercising the thoughts that is very hurtful; which is, that of substituting con jectures for attention to what the author says. Preliminary reflection on the subject is, as has been above said, very useful in many cases: though hy the