APPENDIX.

NOTE A.

Translation of the 5th Chapter of Aristotle's Metaphysics.

(The various disputes respecting the doctrines of the Pythagoreans we can scarcely hope to have settled; but that the reader may have the benefit of the greatest authority, and the greatest intellect, on this subject, we translate, here, such portions of the fifth chapter of Aristotle as relate to Pythagoras.)

"IN the age of these philosophers (the Eleats and Atomists), and even before them, lived those called Pythagoreans, who at first applied themselves to mathematics, a science they improved; and, penetrated with it, they fancied that the principles of mathematics were the principles of all things.

"Since Numbers are, by nature, prior to all things, in Numbers they thought they perceived greater analogies with that which exists and that which is produced (ὁμοιώματα πολλὰ Toïs ovcı xaì yıyvoμévois) than in fire, earth, or water. So that a certain combination of Numbers was justice; and a certain other combination of Numbers was the soul and intelligence; and a certain other combination of Numbers was opportunity (xaigos); and so of the rest.

"Moreover, they saw in Numbers the combinations of harmony. Since, therefore, all things seemed formed similarly to Numbers, and Numbers being by nature anterior to things, they concluded that the elements (rosa) of Numbers are the elements of things; and that the whole heaven is an harmony and a Number. Having indicated the great analogies between Numbers, and the phenomena of heaven and its parts, and with the phenomena of the whole world (ràv öλn›

diandounow), they formed a system; and, if anything was defective in their system, they endeavoured to rectify it. Thus, since Ten appeared to them a perfect number, and potentially contains all numbers, they declared that the moving celestial bodies (τὰ φερόμενα κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν) were ten in number; but because only nine are visible, they imagined (or) a tenth, the Anticthone.

"We have treated of all these things more in detail elsewhere. If we again speak of them, it is for the sake of establishing what they held to be the Principles of things, and how those Principles were confounded with Causes.

"They maintained that Number was the Beginning (Principle, dexǹ) of things, the cause of their material existence, and of their modifications and different states. The elements (Toysia) of Number are Odd and Even. The Odd is finite, the Even infinite. Unity, the One, partakes of both of these, and is both Odd and Even. All number is derived from the One. The heavens, as we said before, are composed of numbers. Other Pythagoreans say there are ten principia, which they thus arrange:

The finite and the infinite.

The odd and the even.

The one and the many.

The right and the left.
The male and the female.
The quiescent and the moving.

The right line and the curve.
Light and darkness.

Good and evil.

The square and the oblong.

All the Pythagoreans considered the elements as material; for the elements are in all things, and constitute the world..

The finite, the infinite, and the One, they maintained to be not separate existences, such as are fire, water, &c.; but the Infinite per se and the One per se are the substances of all things-the essence-the prima materia of all things (aurò rò ἄπειρον, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν, οὐσίαν εἶναι τούπον). They began by attending only to the Form (Quality, giro Tí. Aristotle uses To for forma substantialis, causa formalis, as synonymous with τὸ τί ἐστὶ, or τὸ τόδε τί, or even εἶδος and μορφή), and began to define it; but on this subject they were very imperfect. They define superficially; and that which suited their

definition they declared to be the essence (causa materialis) of the thing defined; as if one should maintain that the double and the number two are the same thing, because the double is first found in the two. But two and the double are not equal (in essence), or, if so, then the one would be many: a consequence which follows from their (the Pythagorean) doctrine."

(We add also a passage from the 7th Chapter.)

"The Pythagoreans employ the Principia and Elements more strangely than even the Physiologists; the cause of which is that they do not take them from sensible_things (auràs oux i airentwv). However, all their researches are physical; all their systems are physical. They explain the production of heaven, and observe that which takes place in its various parts, and its revolutions; and thus they employ their Principles and Causes, as if they agreed with the Physiologists, that whatever is, is material (aiobnτóv), and is that which contains what we call heaven.

"But their Causes and Principles we should pronounce sufficient (ixavàs) to raise them up to the conception of Intelligible things of things above sense (ἐπαναβῆναι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνωτέρω τῶν ὄντων); and would accord with such a conception much better than with that of physical things."

This criticism of Aristotle's is a perfect refutation of those who see in Pythagoras the traces of symbolical doctrine. Aristotle sees how much more rational the doctrine would have been had it been symbolical; but his very remark proves that it was not so.

NOTE B.

THIS Note being intended for the critical reader, we give the original of the verses in our text:

Ως γὰρ ἕκαστος ἔχει κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυκάμπτων,
Τῶς νέος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν. Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ
Ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονεέι μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισι.
Καὶ πᾶσιν, καὶ παντί· τὸ γάρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.

The last sentence Ritter translates :

"For thought is the fulness."

Objecting to Hegel's version of rè λov, "the most," and to that of Brandis, "the mightier," Ritter says the meaning is "the full." But we shall then want an interpretation of "the full." What is it? He elsewhere slightly alters the phrase thus:-

"The fulness of all being is thought."

We speak with submission, but it appears to us that Ritter's assertion respecting rò λív meaning "the full," or "the fulness," is unwarrantable. The ordinary meaning is certainly "the more," or "the most," and hence used occasionally to signify perfection, as in Theocritus:

καὶ τᾶς βωκολικᾶς ἐπι τὸ πλέον ἵκεο μώσα;.-Idy. i. 20. When Parmenides, therefore, uses the phrase rò æλíov icrì vonua, he seems to us to have the ordinary meaning in view; he speaks of τὸ πλέον as a necessary consequence of the πολυ záμs. Man has many-jointed limbs, ergo, many sensations; if he had more limbs he would have more sensations; the highest degree of organization gives the highest degree of thought. This explanation is in conformity with what Aristotle says on introducing the passage; is in conformity with the line immediately preceding :

ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φυσις ἀνθρώποισι;

is in conformity with the explanation of the scholiast Asclepias, τὸ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα, προσγίγνεται ἐκ τῆς πλέονος αἰσθήσεως nai dzgißiorigus ; and, finally, is in conformity with the opinion attributed to Parmenides by Plutarch, that "sentir et penser ne lui paraissaient choses distinctes, ni entre elles ni de l'organisation."*

It is on this account we reject the reading of πολυπλάγκτων ́ far-wandering,' in place of woλundμxsw many-jointed,' suggested by Karsten. The change is arbitrary and for the worse; πολυπλάγκτων having reference only to the feet ; whereas the simile in Parmenides is meant to apply to the whole man.

The meaning of the verses is, therefore, that the intelligence of man is formed according to his many-jointed frame, i.e., dependent on his organization.

Ch. Renouvier 'Manuel de la Philos. Ancienne,' i. p. 152 who cites 'Plutarch, Opin. des Philos.' iv. 5.

NOTE C.

The original of this disputed passage is this:-'Ayağayóças δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος τῇ μὲν ἡλικιά πρότερος ὤν τούτου, τοῖς δ ̓ ἔργοις Borgos-which is rendered by MM. Pieron and Zévort: Anaxagore de Clazoméne, l'ainé d'Empodocle, n'était pas arrive à un système aussi plausible."-La Métaphysique d'Aristote, i. p. 233.

This agrees with our version. We confess, however, that on a first glance M. Cousin's version better preserves the force of the antithesis τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος τοῖς δ ̓ ἔργοις orgos. But the reasons alleged in our text prevent a concurrence in his interpretation, and we must look closer. MM. Pierron and Zévort, in their note on the passage, remark: "Mais les mots py, gyas, dans une opposition, ont ordinairement une signification vague, comme re, revera, chez les Latins, et, chez nous, en fait, en réalité." The force of the objection does not strike us. If Anaxagoras was in fact, in reality, posterior to Empedocles, we can only understand this in the sense M. Cousin has understood Aristotle; and, moreover, MM. Pierron and Zévort here. contradict their translation, which says that, in point of fact, the system of Anaxagoras was not so plausible as that of Empedocles.

More weight must be laid on the meaning of origos, which certainly cannot be exclusively taken to mean posterior in point of time. In the 11th chapter of Aristotle's 5th book, he treats of all the significations of πρότερος and ὕστερος. One of these significations is superiority and inferiority. In the sense of superiority repos is often used by the poets. Thus Sophocles :

Ω μικρὸν ἦθος, καὶ γυναικὸς ὕστερον.

"O shameful character, below a woman!"

"Inferior" is the primitive meaning; thus, also, we say, "second to none" for "inferior to none.'

This meaning of irregos, namely, of inferiority, is the one always understood by the commentators on the passage in question; none of them understood a chronological posteriority. πρότερος indicates priority in point of time; ὕστερος inferiority in point of merit. Thus Philopon: "prior quidem tempore, sed posterior et manens secundum opinionem," fol. 2 a; and the anonymous scholiast of the Vatican MS.: πρότερος γοῦν τῷ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ ̓ ὕστερος καὶ ἐλλείπων κατὰ τὴν δόξαν :