SEXTUS EMPIRICUS: Hypotyposes, et Adversos Mathematicos. Folio, Paris 1621.

(This is not a critical edition; but it is the only one I possess. It is the first of the Greek text.)

KARSTEN: Philosophorum Græcorum Operum Reliquia. Pars Prima. Xenophanes. Brussels, 1830. (An excellent work.)

PLATO: Ed. Bekker. Berlin, 1828.

(Also four dialogues: Protagoras, Gorgias, Phædrus, and the Apology, which were analysed in a masterly manner in the Monthly Repository from March 1834 to February 1835. From these all extracts which occur in my work have been taken.)

XENOPHON: Memorabilia. Ed. Edwards, Oxon.,

1785.

HORNIUS: Historia Philosophica. Batav., 1756. BRUCKER: History of Philosophy. Abridged by Enfield. London, 1819.

BRUCKER:

Leipsig, 1767.

Historia Critica Philosophia.

RITTER: History of Ancient Philosophy. 3 vols. English Trans. Oxford, 1838-9.

HEGEL: Geschichte der Philosophie. 3 Bände. Ed. Michelet. Berlin, 1833.

(This is rather the Philosophy of History than the History of Philosophy. I have found it suggestive.) ZELLER: Die Philosophie der Griechen: ihrer Charakter, Gang, Hauptmomente und Entwicklung. Erster Theil. Vorsokratische Philosophie. Tübingen, 1844.

(Useful. Rather a criticism on other historians than a history.)

TENNEMANN: Manuel de l'Histoire de la Philosophie. Par Victor Cousin. 2 vols. Paris, 1830. (A good abridgement of an able work.)

RENOUVIER: Manuel de la Philosophie AnParis, 1844.

cienne.

2 vols.

(A work of learning and acuteness.)

JULES SIMON: Histoire de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie. 1st vol. Paris, 1844.

VICTOR COUSIN: Cours de Philosophie. 3 vols. Bruxelles, 1840.

V. COUSIN: Nouveaux Fragmens Philosophiques. 1 vol. Bruxelles, 1840.

Encyclopædia Metropolitana,-article, Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy.

BAYLE: Dictionnaire Historique.

WIGGERS: Life of Socrates. English Trans., 1840.

DE GERANDO: Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie. Paris, 1822.

(This work enjoys considerable reputation, and deserves it. Clear, discriminating, and well written.) VAN HEUSDE: Initia Platonica. Trajecti ad Rhenam, 1827.

(One of the most elegant and delightful works on the subject; written in very pleasant Latin, with great enthusiasm and abundant knowledge. A valuable introduction to the study of Plato.)

INTRODUCTION.

THIS work is intended as a contribution to the History of Humanity. Let us, therefore, at once define the nature and limits of this contribution, lest its object be mistaken. The History of Philosophy is a vague title, and should, properly speaking, include the rise and progress of all the sciences. As usually employed, the title is understood to refer only to one science, viz., the science called metaphysics. Though disapproving of this restrictive sense of the word philosophy, we use it in compliance with general usage. As all the earliest philosophy was essentially metaphysical, there is no great impropriety in designating Greek metaphysics by the name of Philosophy; but when Philosophy enlarged its bounds, and included all the physical sciences as its lawful subjects, then indeed the earlier and restricted use of the word occasioned great confusion. To remedy this confusion slight but ineffectual attempts have been made. The term metaphysics, and sometimes the expressive but uncouth term ontology,* have been brought forward to distinguish à priori speculations not within the scope of physical science. In order to prevent confusion, and at the same time to avoid the introduction of words so distasteful as metaphysics and

*The science of Being.

ontology, we shall throughout speak of Philosophy in its earlier and more restricted sense; and shall designate by the term Positive Science that field of speculation commonly known as Inductive, or Baconian, Philosophy. It is the object of the present work to show how and by what steps Philosophy became Positive Science; in other words, by what Methods the Human Mind was enabled to conquer for itself, in the long struggle of centuries, its present modicum of certain knowledge. All those who have any conviction in the steady development of humanity, and believe in a direct filiation of ideas, will at once admit, that the curious but erroneous speculations of the Greeks were necessary to the production of modern science. It is our belief, that there is a direct parentage between the various epochs; a direct parentage between the ideas of the ancient thinkers and the ideas of moderns. In Philosophy the evidences of this filiation are so numerous and incontestible, that we cannot greatly err in signalizing them.

Having to trace the history of the mind in one region of its activity, it is incumbent on us to mark out the countries and epochs which we deem it requisite to notice. Are we to follow Brucker, and include the Antediluvian period? Are we to trace the speculations of the Scythians, Persians, and Egyptians? Are we to lose ourselves in that vast wilderness the East? It is obvious that we must draw the line somewhere: we cannot write the history of every nation's thoughts. We confine ourselves, therefore, to Greece and modern Europe. We omit Rome. The Romans, confessedly, had no philosophy of their own; and did but feebly imitate that of the Greeks. Their influence on

modern Europe has therefore been only indirect; their labors count as nothing in the history of Philosophy. We also omit the East. It is very questionable whether the East had any Philosophy distinct from its Religion; and still more questionable whether Greece was materially influenced by it. True it is, that the Greeks themselves supposed their early teachers to have imbibed wisdom at the Eastern fount. True it is, that modern oriental scholars, on first becoming acquainted with some of the strange doctrines of the Eastern sages, have recognised in them strong resemblances to the doctrines of the Greeks. But neither of these reasons are valid. The former is attributable to a very natural prejudice, which will be explained hereafter. The latter is attributable to the coincidences frequent in all speculation, and inevitable in so vague and vast a subject as Philosophy. Coincidences prove nothing but the similarity of all spontaneous tendencies of thought. Something more is needed to prove direct filiation.

A coincidence is the historian's will-o'-the-wisp, leading him into deep and distant bogs. He has studied the history of Philosophy to little purpose who has not learned to estimate the value of such resemblances; who has not so familiarized himself with the nature of speculation as to be aware of their necessary frequency. Pantheism, for example, under some of its shapes, seems to have been a doctrine entertained by most speculative nations; yet it seems to have been mostly spontaneous. Again, the physical speculations of the Greeks often coincide in expression with many of the greatest scientific discoveries of modern times; does this prove that the Greeks anticipated the moderns? M. Du