Add to all this, that, besides the civil list, the immense revenue of almost seven millions sterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of the public, or carried to the sinking *fund, is first deposited in the royal exchequer, and thence [ *337 ] issued out to the respective offices of payment. This revenue the people can never refuse to raise because it is made perpetual by act of parliament: which also, when well considered, will appear to be a trust of great delicacy and high impor tance. nue. Upon the whole, therefore, I think it is clear, that whatever Conclusion. may have become of the nominal, the real power of the crown has not been too far weakened by any transactions in the last century (87). Much is indeed given up; but much is also required. The stern commands of prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence: the slavish and exploded doctrine of non-resistance has given way to a military establishment by law; and to the disuse of parliaments has succeeded a parliamentary trust of an immense perpetual reveWhen, indeed, by the free operation of the sinking fund, our national debts shall be lessened; when the posture of foreign affairs, and the universal introduction of a wellplanned and national militia, will suffer our formidable army to be thinned and regulated; and when, in consequence of all, our taxes shall be gradually reduced, this adventitious power of the crown will slowly and imperceptibly diminish, as it slowly and imperceptibly rose. But till that shall happen, it will be our especial duty, as good subjects and good Englishmen, to reverence the crown, and yet guard against corrupt and servile influence from those who are entrusted with its authority; to be loyal, yet free; obedient, and yet independent; and, above every thing, to hope that we may long, very long, continue to be governed by a sovereign who, (87) See the references given, ante, p. 335, n. 84. The reader may, perhaps, suspect that Blackstone sometimes confounds the power of the crown with the power of the aristocracy. The power of the last named body has, by the reform in the representation of the commons, been very greatly cut down; and the : power of the people as materially in- in all those public acts that have personally proceeded from himself, hath manifested the highest veneration for the free constitution of Britain; hath already, in more than one instance, remarkably strengthened its outworks (88); and will, therefore, never harbour a thought, or adopt a persuasion, in any the remotest degree detrimental to public liberty. (88) In the reign of William IV. the defences of the constitution, on the po pular side, have been rendered perfectly impregnable. See the preceding note. CHAPTER IX. OF SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATES. IN a former chapter of these Commentaries (a) we distin- of subordinate guished magistrates into two kinds: supreme, or those in magistrates. whom the sovereign power of the state resides; and subordinate, or those who act in an inferior secondary sphere. We have hitherto considered the former kind only; namely, the supreme legislative power or parliament, and the supreme executive power, which is the king: and are now to proceed to inquire into the rights and duties of the principal subordinate magistrates. And herein we are not to investigate the powers and duties of his majesty's great officers of state, the lord treasurer, lord chamberlain, the principal secretaries, or the like; because I do not know that they are in that capacity in any considerable degree the objects of our laws, or have any very important share of magistracy conferred upon them: except that the secretaries of state are allowed the power of commitment, in order to bring offenders to trial (b). Neither shall I here treat of the office and authority of the lord chancellor, or the other judges of the superior courts of justice; because they will find a more proper place in the third part of these Commentaries. Nor shall I enter into any minute disquisitions, with regard to the rights and dignities of mayors and *alder- [ *339 ] men, or other magistrates of particular corporations; because these are mere private and strictly municipal rights, depending entirely upon the domestic constitution of their respective franchises. But the magistrates and officers, whose rights and duties it will be proper in this chapter to consider, are such as are generally in use, and have a jurisdiction and au (a) Ch. ii. p. 146. (b) 1 Leon. 70; 2 Leon. 175; Comb. 143; 5 Mod. 84; Salk. 347; Carth. I. Sheriffs. Formerly chosen by the inhabitants of the several counties. thority dispersedly throughout the kingdom: which are principally, sheriffs; coroners; justices of the peace; constables; surveyors of highways; and overseers of the poor. In treating of all which I shall inquire into, first, their antiquity and original; next, the manner in which they are appointed and may be removed; and, lastly, their rights and duties. And first, of sheriffs: I. The sheriff is an officer of very great antiquity in this kingdom, his name being derived from two Saxon words, reine zenera, the reeve, bailiff, or officer of the shire (1). He is called in Latin vice-comes, as being the deputy of the earl or comes; to whom the custody of the shire is said to have been committed at the first division of this kingdom into counties. But the earls, in process of time, by reason of their high employments and attendance on the king's person, not being able to transact the business of the county, were delivered of that burden (c); reserving to themselves the honour, but the labour was laid on the sheriff. So that now the sheriff does all the king's business in the though he be still called vice-comes, yet he is entirely independent of, and not subject to the earl; the king by his letters patent committing custodiam comitatus to the sheriff, and him alone. county; and Sheriffs were formerly chosen by the inhabitants of the several counties. In confirmation of which it was ordained by statute 28 Edw. I. c. 8, that the people should have election of sheriffs in every shire, where the shrievalty is not of inheritance. For antiently in some counties the sheriffs were hereditary; as I apprehend they were in Scotland till the statute 20 Geo. II. c. 43; and still continue in the county [ *340 ] of *Westmoreland to this day (2): the city of London having also the inheritance of the shrievalty of Middlesex vested in their body by charter (d) (3). The reason of these popular (c) Dalton of Sheriffs, c. 1. (d) 3 Rep. 72. (1) See ante, p. 116. (2) The earl of Thanet is hereditary sheriff of Westmoreland. This office may descend to, and be executed by a female; for "Ann, countess of Pembroke, had the office of hereditary sheriff of Westmoreland, and exercised it in person. At the assizes at Appleby, she sat with the judges on the bench." (Harg. Co. Litt. 326).— CH. (3) The election of the sheriffs of London and Middlesex was granted to elections is assigned in the same statute, c. 13, "that the commons might chuse such as would not be a burthen to them." And herein appears plainly a strong trace of the democratical part of our constitution: in which form of government it is an indispensable requisite, that the people should chuse their own magistrates (e). This election was in all probability not absolutely vested in the commons, but required the royal approbation. For, in the Gothic constitution, the judges of the county courts (which office is executed by our sheriff) were elected by the people, but confirmed by the king; and the form of their election was thus managed the people, or incolæ territorii, chose twelve electors, and they nominated three persons, ex quibus rex unum confirmabat (ƒ). But with us in England these popular elections, growing tumultuous, were put an end to by the statute 9 Edw. II. st. 2 (4), which enacted, that the sheriffs should from thenceforth be assigned by the chancellor, treasurer, and the judges; as being persons in whom the same trust might with confidence be reposed. By statutes 14 Edw. III. c. 7, 23 Hen. VI. c. 8, and 21 Hen. VIII. c. 20 (5), the chancellor, treasurer, president of the king's council, chief justices, and chief baron, are to make this election; and that on the morrow of All Souls in the exchequer. And the king's letters patent, appointing the new sheriffs, used commonly to (e) Montesq. Sp. L. b. 2, c. 2. (f) Stiernh. de jure Goth. 1. 1, c. 3. (4) the citizens of London for ever in very (4) The example thus set in the reign of Edward II. of depriving the (5) This last statute, as is observed |