they might be deterred from venturing to sea, he kept out of sight of land, desired Collingwood to fire no salute, and hoist no colors; and wrote to Gibraltar, to request that the force of the fleet might not be inserted there in the Gazette. His reception in the Mediterranean fleet was as gratifying as the farewell of his countrymen at Portsmouth: the officers, who came on board to welcome him, forgot his rank as commander, in their joy at seeing him again. On the day of his arrival, Villeneuve received orders to put to sea2 the first opportunity. Villeneuve, however, hesitated, when he heard that Nelson had resumed the command. He called a council of war; and their determination was, that it would not be expedient to leave Cadiz, unless they had reason to believe themselves stronger by one-third than the British force. In the public measures of this country, secrecy is seldom practicable, and seldomer attempted: here, however, by the precautions of Nelson, and the wise measures of the Admiralty, the enemy were for once kept in ignorance; for, as the ships appointed to reinforce the Mediterranean fleet were despatched singly, each as soon as it was ready, their collected number was not stated in the newspapers, and their arrival was not known to the enemy. But the enemy knew that Admiral Louis, with six sail, had been detached for stores and water to Gibraltar. Accident also contributed to make the French Admiral doubt whether Nelson himself had actually taken the command. An American, lately arrived from England,

1. Joy at seeing him again. The warmth of their welcome may have been increased by relief from the iron discipline of Collingwood, who is described as a capable and conscientious officer, but strict, uncommunicative, and tactless in handling his subordinates.

2. Orders to put to sea. Villeneuve was under instructions from Napoleon to return to the Mediterranean. With his disorganized forces and trained crews, however, he had little hope of escaping defeat, and delayed sailing until he heard that he was to be superseded in command and that his successor was already on the way to Cadiz.

maintained that it was impossible-for he had seen him only a few days before in London; and, at that time, there was no rumor of his going again to sea.

The station which Nelson had chosen was some fifty or sixty miles to the west of Cadiz, near Cape St. Mary's. At this distance he hoped to decoy the enemy out, while he guarded against the danger of being caught with a westerly wind near Cadiz, and driven within the Straits. The blockade of the port was rigorously enforced, in hopes that the combined fleet might be forced to sea by want. The Danish vessels, therefore, which were carrying provisions from the French ports in the bay,1 under the name of Danish property, to all the little ports from Ayamonte to Algésiras, from whence they were conveyed in coasting boats to Cadiz, were seized. Without this proper exertion of power, the blockade would have been rendered nugatory, by the advantage thus taken of the neutral flag. The supplies from France were thus effectually cut off. There was now every indication that the enemy would speedily venture out: officers and men were in the highest spirits at the prospect of giving them a decisive blow; such, indeed, as would put an end to all further contest upon the seas. Theatrical amusements were performed every evening in most of the ships: and God Save the King was the hymn with which the sports concluded. "I verily believe," said Nelson (writing on the 6th of October), "that the country will soon be put to some expense on my account; either a monument, or a new pension and honors; for I have not the smallest doubt but that a very few days, almost hours, will put us in battle. The success no man can insure; but for the fighting them, if they can be got at, I pledge myself.The sooner the better! I don't like to have these things upon my mind.”

1. Bay. The Bay of Biscay.

At this time he was not without some cause of anxiety: he was in want of frigates,-the eyes of the fleet, as he always called them:-to the want of which the enemy before were indebted for their escape, and Bonaparte for his arrival in Egypt. He had only twenty-three ships,— others were on the way,-but they might come too late; and, though Nelson never doubted of victory, mere victory was not what he looked to, he wanted to annihilate the enemy's fleet. The Carthagena squadron1 might effect a junction with this fleet on the one side; and, on the other, it was to be expected that a similar attempt would be made by the French from Brest; in either case a formidable contingency to be apprehended by the blockading force. The Rochefort squadron did push out, and had nearly caught the Agamemnon and l'Aimable in their way to reinforce the British Admiral. Yet Nelson at this time weakened his own fleet. He had the unpleasant task to perform of sending home Sir Robert Calder, whose conduct was to be made the subject of a court-martial, in consequence of the general dissatisfaction which had been felt and expressed at his imperfect victory. Sir Robert Calder, and Sir John Orde, Nelson believed to be the only two enemies? whom he had ever had in his profession; and, from that sensitive delicacy which distinguished him, this made him the more scrupulously anxious to show every possible mark of respect and kindness to Sir Robert. He wished to detain him till after the expected action; when the services which he might perform, and the triumphant joy which would be excited, would leave nothing to be apprehended from an

1. Carthagena squadron. It consisted of six Spanish ships-of-the

line.

2. Two enemies. Calder had criticized Nelson's conduct at St. Vincent (see p. 134), and Orde had objected to Nelson's appointment to command the Mediterranean fleet before the Battle of the Nile (see

inquiry into the previous engagement. Sir Robert, however, whose situation was very painful, did not choose to delay a trial, from the result of which he confidently expected a complete justification: and Nelson, instead of sending him home in a frigate, insisted on his returning in his own ninety-gun ship; ill as such a ship could at that time be spared. Nothing could be more honorable than the feeling by which Nelson was influenced; but, at such a crisis, it ought not to have been indulged.

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On the 9th, Nelson sent Collingwood what he called, in his diary, the Nelson touch. "I send you," said he, "my plan of attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy may be found in but it is to place you perfectly at ease respecting my intentions, and to give full scope to your judgment for carrying them into effect. We can, my dear Coll, have no little jealousies. We have only one great object in view, that of annihilating our enemies, and getting a glorious peace for our country. No man has more confidence in another than I have in you; and no man will render your services more justice than your very

1. The Nelson touch. This phrase, which appears also in letters to Lady Hamilton, refers to the Memorandum of October 9th, intended at first for Collingwood only, but afterward sent to all the captains of the fleet. It provided plans for attack from either the windward (see diagram, p. 349) or the leeward, assuming the relative strength to be 40 British ships against 46 of the enemy. In either case, Collingwood's division was to attack the enemy's rear, while Nelson fell upon the center (presumably containing the French flagship) and cut it off from the ships in the van. With slight changes, notably uniting the small advanced (in reality a reserve) squadron with Nelson's so as to bring all forces into action at once, the plan for attack from the windward was carried out in the battle. Its advantages may be said to lie (1) in the division of forces and freedom of action granted to the second in command, thus avoiding the difficulty of controlling so large a fleet as a unit; (2) in the concentration on rear and center, thus breaking up the enemy's line and neutralizing its numerical superiority; and (3) in its adaptability to modification under the exigencies of actual conflict. It may be regarded as the product of Nelson's ripest experience and genius.

old friend Nelson and Bronte." The order of sailing was to be the order of battle; the fleet in two lines, with an advance squadron of eight of the fastest sailing twodeckers. The second in command, having the entire direction of his line, was to break through the enemy, about the twelfth ship from their rear: he1 would lead through the center, and the advanced squadron was to cut off three or four ahead of the center. This plan was to be adapted to the strength of the enemy, so that they should always be one-fourth superior to those whom they cut off. Nelson said, "That his admirals and captains, knowing his precise object to be that of a close and decisive action, would supply any deficiency of signals, and act accordingly. In case signals cannot be seen or clearly understood, no captain can do wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy." One of the last orders of this admirable man was, that the name and family of every officer, seaman, and marine, who might be killed or wounded in action, should be, as soon as possible, returned to him, in order to be transmitted to the Chairman of the Patriotic Fund, that the case might be taken into consideration, for the benefit of the sufferer or his family.

About half-past nine in the morning of the 19th, the Mars, being the nearest to the fleet of ships which formed the line of communication with the frigates in shore, repeated the signal, that the enemy were coming out of port. The wind was at this time very light, with partial breezes, mostly from the S. S. W. Nelson ordered the signal to be made for a chase in the southeast quarter. About two, the repeating ships announced that the enemy were at sea. All night the British fleet continued under all sail, steering to the southeast. At daybreak they were in the entrance of the Straits, but the enemy were not in sight. 1. He. Nelson, with the main or windward division.