It is true, great misfortunes followed; but they were the effects of particular circumftances. During the time which preceded the reign of the Tudors, the nature and extent of regal authority having never been accurately defined, the exorbitant power of the Princes of that Houfe had no difficulty in introducing prejudices of the most extravagant kind: those prejudices, having had a hundred and fifty years to take root, could not be shaken off but by a kind of general convulfion; the agitation continued after the action, and was carried to excess by the religious quarrels which arofe at that time.

CHAPTER VIII.

T

New Reftrictions.

HE Commons, however, have not intirely relied on the advantages of the great prerogative with which the Conftitution has intrusted them.

Though this prerogative is, in a manner, out of danger of an immediate attack, they have nevertheless fhewn at all times the greatest jealousy on its account. They never fuffer, as we have obferved before, a money-bill to begin any where but with themselves; and any alteration, that may be made in it in the other House, is fure to be rejected. If the Commons had not most strictly reserved to themselves the exercise of this prerogative, on which their very existence depends, the whole might at length have slidden into that Body which they had fuffered to fhare in it equally with them. If any other perfons, befides the Representatives of the People, had had a right to make an offer of the produce of the labour

of the people, the executive power would soon have forgot, that it only exifts for the advantage of the public. (a)

(a) As the Crown has the undisputed prerogative of affenting to, and diffenting from, what bills it thinks proper, as well as of convening, proroguing, and diffolving, the Parliament, whenever it pleases; the latter have no affurance of having a regard paid to their Bills, or even of being allowed to assemble, but what may result from the need the Crown ftands in of their affiftance: the danger, in that respect, is even greater for the Commons than for the Lords, who enjoy a dignity which is hereditary, as well as inherent to their perfons, and form a permanent Body in the State; whereas the Commons compleatly vanish, whenever a diffolution takes place: there is, therefore, no exaggeration in what has been faid above, that their very being depends on their power of granting fubfidies to the Crown.

Moved by these confiderations, and, no doubt, by a fense of their duty towards their Constituents, to whom this right of taxation originally belongs, the Houfe of Commons have at all times been very careful left precedents should be established, which might, in the most diftant manner, tend to weaken that right. Hence the warmth, I might say the refentment, with which they have always rejected even the amendments propofed by the Lords in their Money bills. The Lords however have not given up their pretenfion, to make such amendments; and it is only by the vigilance and conftant predetermination of the Commons to reject all alterations whatever made in their Money bills, without even examining them, that this pretenfion of the Lords is reduced to be an useless, and only dormant, claim. The first instance of a misunderstanding between the two Houses, on that account, was in the year 1671: and the reader may fee at length, in Vol. I. of the Debates of the House of Commons, the reasons that were at that time alledged on both fides.

Befides, though this prerogative has of itself, we may fay, an irrefiftible efficiency, the Parliament has neglected nothing that may ådd to it, or at least to the facility of its exercise; and though they have allowed the prerogatives of the Sovereign to remain undifputed, they have in feveral cafes endeavoured to restrain the afe he might make of them, by entering with him into divers express and folemn conventions for that purpose. (2)

Thus the King is indifputably invested with the exclusive right of affembling Parliaments yet he muft affemble one, at least once in three years; and this obligation on the King, which was, we find, infifted upon by the people in very early times, has been fince confirmed by an Act paffed in the fixteenth year of the reign of Charles the Second.

1

Moreover, as the most fatal confequences might enfue, if laws which might moft

(a) Laws made to bind fuch Powers in a State, as have no fuperior Power by which they may be legally compelled to the execution of them, (for instance, the Crown as cir cumftanced in England) are nothing more than conventions, or treaties, made with the Body of the People.

materially affect public liberty, could be enacted in Parliaments abruptly and imperfectly fummoned, it has been established, that the Writs for affembling a Parliament must be issued forty days at least before the first meeting of it. Upon the fame principle it has also been enacted, that the King cannot abridge the term he has once fixed for a prorogation, except in the two following cafes, viz. of a rebellion; or of imminent danger of a foreign invasion: in both which cafes a fourteen days notice must be given. (4)

Again, the King is the head of the Church; but he can neither alter the established religion, nor call individuals to an account for their religious opinions. (b) He cannot even profefs the religion which the Legislature has particularly forbidden; and the Prince who should profefs it, is declared incapable of

(4) Stat, 39 Geo. II. £. 25.

(b) The Convocation, or assembly of the Clergy, of which the King is the head, can only regulate such affairs as are merely Ecclefiaftical; they cannot touch the Laws, Cuf toms, and Statutes, of the Kingdom.-Stat. 25 Hen. VIII.

6. 19.