The defect, then, was that they allowed no involuntary affections. Now what is the argument of the reviewer? He is contending for certain "innocent" "involuntary" states of the affections. We deny them in respect to the sanctified man, and say that Wesley denied them. He replies that Wesley referred to only "voluntary" affections, but admitted his "involuntary" ones, and this because Wesley concurred with the metaphysicians of his day in the above position, that is, he admitted "involuntary" affections, because he denied them. We submit this remarkable case to the reader without further comment than to remark, that Wesley nowhere, to our knowledge, affirms this philosophical opinion, though he speaks of it as common. He was familiar with, and highly approved, Locke's Essay, which refuted it.

2. The reviewer's argument conflicts with Wesley's express declarations. His argument, as above seen, is, that Wesley condemns "pride," "anger," "love of the world," as sinful, only because they are "voluntary." But Wesley represents these passions as of the nature of sin" in the justified state, even "when by the Spirit we mortify the deeds of the body, and resist and conquer inward and outward sin." But not so in sanctification, for in the same paragraph he says, "When it pleases our Lord to speak to our hearts again, [that is, in sanctification,] to speak a second time, Be clean, then only the leprosy is cleansed; then only the evil root, the carnal mind, is destroyed; and inbred sin subsists no more. But if there be no such second change, then we must be content to remain full of sin till death." And, by referring to our former article, the reader will find abundant quotations showing that, in a justified man, sin may "exist," though not "allowed," and though "he is fighting against all sin," that "the lust of the flesh, having no more dominion over" the will, is still "the corruption of nature," enmity with God," "sin."

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3. We alledge that the reviewer's view of Wesley's language is contrary to the authorized construction of language. Wesley uses these terms alike in popular and scientific works, without any such qualification. Popular experience could never discriminate such a qualification. Christians, with the common knowledge of theology, would understand these passions and appetites as wrong without reference to the will, intrinsically unholy, though "resisted and conquered." How could they apply the process of discrimination if it is as subtil as the reviewer demands? His qualification, inserted in Wesley's outline of temptation, (p. 23,) would strike us as ludicrous. When Wesley says, "I feel no lust at all,

Sermon on Repentance in Believers.

of which I am as sure as that my hand is cold or hot," he should have added, "Yet I feel some lust, that is, 'involuntary' lust;" "I feel no anger at all; of which I am as sure, as that anger is not love," "yet I feel some anger, that is, 'involuntary' anger." Remember, too, that if this lust or anger goes the smallest conceivable degree beyond its "incipient" state it becomes voluntary and sinful, and yet the Christian can be " as sure" that it does not pass over this subtil line "as that his hand is cold or hot!"

Our conclusion is, then, that we have rightly interpreted Wesley. Here we are compelled to submit the question to the public without remaining space or disposition to retaliate the concluding allusions of our friend, but tendering to him all the courtesies due from a fellow-student of the truth and a fellow-Christian. Boston, 1843.

S.

ART. III.-A Review of Edwards' "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will." Containing, 1. Statement of Edwards' System; 2. The legitimate Consequences of this System; 3. An Examination of the Arguments against a self-determining Will. By HENRY PHILIP TAPPAN. 12mo., pp. 300. New-York: John S. Taylor. 1839.

THE will of man has been the crux philosophorum in all ages. Far back as we can trace the history of philosophy, we find the same problems presented and the same variety of solutions offered. We discover them in the mysterious remains of Oriental speculation which have come down to us as the earliest efforts of human thought from the depths of that primeval world we hear the voice of man calling for an explanation of his origin and his destiny. We can gather, too, that among the mighty people who bordered the river of Egypt with palaces, and temples, and sepulchres, and who looked down upon the ancient Greeks as children, these same perplexing questions arose. Among the Greeks themselves, of course, there was no lack of dispute in regard to the great problems of God, man, and the world; and then, as now, there were fatalists, who bound all the universe in the iron chain of necessity; pantheists, who represented it as one sole, imperishable being; atheists, who left it without Author or Ruler; and skeptics, who denied that man could believe aught concerning it. At a later period, among the fathers of the Christian church, there were a few who considered man merely as the tool of God; while

others declared that man's own agency makes his acts moral or immoral. In the schools of Arabia we find the same opposing parties. The vexed question found its place among the problems of the schoolmen, and has since retained it among the topics of the metaphysicians.

Must not such a spectacle convince us of the inutility of philosophical inquiries, and justify us in condemning them as barren and unprofitable? By no means; for, after all, there is a science of mind, and men should strive to master it. Or, if there be not, and we must either be Spinozists or skeptics; if metaphysics be impossible, we should labor on until the limit of our capacity is known; until we learn the precise position of that wall of adamant which bounds our human' reason. We are inclined, indeed, to believe, with Jouffroy, that "if the same questions have made their appearance at every epoch, it is because they contain, under its different aspects, the problem of life, and because man can be interested only in things that concern him. If the same solutions have always been reproduced, it is because they are the genuine elements of the complete solution, and because human intelligence cannot depart from the circle of reality. If these solutions have always been contradicted, it is because all, having different elements of truth, have recommended themselves on the same grounds to common sense, and because, as no one represents the entire truth, no one could be accepted in its place." With regard, then, simply, to the progress of human thought, we regard all attempts at philosophy with pleasure.

But the particular question of the freedom of the will is intimately connected with practical life and with theology. Would it not be better to let the abstract question rest; to rely upon the revealed will of God, and obey the dictates of conscience, without these constant efforts to probe our consciousness to the bottom, perplexing us continually with metaphysical difficulties? So far as the practice of life is concerned, perhaps we might; for here, in general, whatever speculative notions men may entertain, they act as if they were free. In ordinary matters, Hobbes was as little of a necessitarian as Cudworth, and Jonathan Edwards as Samuel Clarke. Perhaps the mass of mankind never feel the pressure of this question, or, if they do, are forced by the wants of daily life to shut it out, and be satisfied. But there are others who cannot rest so; for whom these are the questions of life, and they must investigate them. Perhaps, too, we have gone too far in saying that "so far as the practice of life is concerned," these questions might be laid aside. If they had never arisen, it might be so; but

the history of mankind will show that any philosophical theory in regard to them, that attains general prevalence, must have its influence even upon the lives of the mass. Who can doubt, but that, as Cudworth says, "the fatal necessity of all actions and events, upon whatsoever grounds or principles maintained, will serve the design of atheism, and undermine Christianity and all religion, as taking away all guilt and blame, and plainly rendering a day of judgment ridiculous?" Were not the Antinomian excesses of the Independents the natural result of that doctrine of necessity which they held as strongly as the most licentious followers of Hobbes in the court of Charles II.? And is not the degradation of the modern Mohammedans sufficiently explained by their thorough belief in predestination, and their consistent action upon its principles, so far as human nature can act upon them?

The relation of philosophy to theology, also, has been the subject of much dispute. Many utterly oppose the blending of philosophy with religion in any way. And we agree in this opposition, so far as it is directed against the attempt to place philosophy above religion, and to make the doctrines of Christianity conform to any preconceived metaphysical theory. We hold fully, with Lord Bacon, that "out of the contemplation of nature or ground of human knowledge, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith is not safe-which the heathens themselves concluded in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: 'That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven.'" But yet, we are inclined to believe that the most vehement denunciations of philosophizing in religion, and the most positive assertions of reliance upon the ipsissima verba of Scripture, are made, in these latter days, by a class of theologians who first adopt a metaphysical system at variance with the doctrines of the Bible, and then, finding the chasm between them to be bridgeless, would fain have them kept as far apart as possible. So far, indeed, as interpretation goes, we have little need of metaphysics in studying the Bible. But we cannot believe that it is of no moment what a man's metaphysics may be in regard to his theology. The one will affect the other, whether he will or no. Dr. Marsh says strongly, and we believe truly, that it is impossible to find, since the age of the apostles, "a single system of theology, a single volume on the Christian religion, in which the author's views are not modified by the metaphysical opinions of the age or of the individual." As it can hardly be doubted that the earliest

heresies in the Christian church arose from the unconscious operation, in the minds of theologians, of the philosophical opinions of preceding ages, so we can hardly fail to trace, in the theological systems of the present day, the various forms which the philosophy of the mind has assumed in latter times. In the nature of things it cannot be otherwise.

But, on the other hand, the theology will react upon the philosophy. If it part with something, it will not be satisfied without a return. In proportion to the accordance of the theology with the pure word of God, will be its power in purifying and elevating the metaphysics. And although one age may not suffice for any great results of such reaction to be developed, it will show itself in the course of time. In individual cases, there will arise restlessness under the pressure of the false system, and a disposition to question its authority. Here and there, after awhile, one will rise above the system, or, at least, modify it. The leaven will work silently among other minds, less vigorous and less daring, until finally it will pervade the mass. Some such process as this, we think, has been going on for years past among a certain class of divines in this country. The doctrine of philosophical necessity, as taught by Jonathan Edwards, was once universally received among them. "The time was" (we quote from a Calvinistic writer in a contemporary journal*) "when an inquisition existed in theological philosophy, and Edwards' book on the freedom of the will was put at the head of it. Every man's opinions must be imprisoned, or he himself must be branded as a heretic, whose mind did not come to the same conclusions with that great, good, and powerful thinker." But although this Procrustes' bed still retains its place in some of the Calvinistic schools of theology, the time has passed, we hope for ever, when every man's theological reputation must be guaged by it. The day of this intellectual bondage we hope is over. The free doctrines of the Bible have had room to work in many honest hearts, and the fruit of their reaction is before us, in the efforts of many honest Calvinists to rid themselves of the despotic authority of Edwards.

In a former number of this journal,† we remarked, that "Edwards' metaphysics are the basis of the theology of Calvinism. The man who attacks the former is an assailant of the latter; and he who embraces the doctrine of a free-will, not half-heartedly, or by way of manœuvre; not admitting and nullifying it within the compass of the same volume, as Professor Upham has done in his "Treatise on the Will;' but honestly, thoroughly, and with all his American Biblical Repository. † April, 1840, p. 214.