TH

HE bonds which connect Canada with the mother-country sit, in these days, so loosely and easily, that their tension has almost grown to be imperceptible, yet it is certain that our young nationality would be | speedily coerced into annexation, were the protecting ægis of England withdrawn. To the Canadian, therefore, who desires the preservation of his national autonomy, the armaments, in virtue of whose power the protection of England is a solid reality, and without which that autonomy would be but a short lived experiment, cannot but present points of considerable interest; the more so, at this particular moment, owing to the threatening aspect of affairs in the East. Yet the details are but little known or understood. Most ordinary readers of newspapers have probably a general idea that England has an army of about 120,000 regular troops, backed by reserves in the shape of militia and volunteers, and that those regular troops, so far as they go, are among the finest in the world, They have further, perhaps, an indistinct notion that it is not by reason of this force, which, in comparison with the gigantic armies of many other countries, is extremely small, that England, despite an almost universal jealousy, distrust, and dislike, yet exercises so controlling a power in the councils of the world. They know, in fact, in a vague sort of way, that her supremacy and her intangibility reside in her naval power, but they have but little idea what mighty proportions that power bears to that of other countries. The navy of France is the only one which approaches it in number and quality; that of the United States is the only one which approaches it in the quality of her seamen. Neither country can lavish on her maritime force the wealth which England freely disburses for the maintenance of the institution on which, her instinct tells her, her supremacy, her independence, nay, her very safety, exclusively depend. Supreme in wealth, secure in insularity, and unequalled in sea manship, her supremacy at sea is and has ever been unquestionable. For the two periods at which her maritime glory seemed

to suffer a momentary eclipse were not only exceptional, but absolutely due to causes which present themselves to the most superficial enquirer as merely temporary.

When the mad reaction which naturally followed the excesses of Puritan cant had brought England to that point of degradation at which her king had become a pensioner of the French monarch, it was little additional wonder that she should be insulted by a brave nation whose maritime propensities had been fostered by every natural difficulty. But a few evanescent gleams of success had no power to affect the inevitable result.

Again, in the American War of 1812-14, the circumstances were altogether adventi tious. Lulled into a false security by the series of naval triumphs which culminated in Trafalgar, and which had left her the perfect mistress of the European seas, England abandoned herself, as to nautical matters, to a carelessness resembling that which emasculated the military power of France previous to 1870. In the three frigate and four or five sloop actions which resulted to the credit of the United States, the success which attended the Americans was due to the foresight which led to the construction of vessels of superior size, build, and weight of metal in each class. English and American vessels encountered each other with such general equality of skill and valour, that those conditions may be assumed to have been equal, and where there was no striking disparity of force, the merest accident turned the fortune of the day. Thus, in the singular action of the Bonhomme Richard and the Serapis, the very fact which seemed to involve disadvantage to the former, that of her being an old Indiaman, gained her the victory by the simple reason of her superior height out of water, which enabled her to sweep the upper deck of the Serapis. On the gun-deck the Serapis had it all her own way, and the victor was actually sinking when the British flag went down.

But it has never suited the policy of the United States to maintain a navy commensurate with her importance, or even on a

scale to compare with that of France. Thus, during the war of 1812-14, despite her isolated single ship victories, she was made to feel, in the blockade of her coasts and harbours, and the humiliation of her capital, the weight of the power with which England swept and commanded the seas.

The United States, perhaps wisely, relies on the rapidity with which, in the event of war, her vast resources and the quick-witted energy of her great people enable her to improvise armaments; and, against any power but England, such armaments may be effective. It may be said that they have proved efficient even against her, and the American naval successes on the Lakes could be cited in evidence. But the conditions of another war would show points of difference which it is not our present purpose to discuss. Even were it otherwise, no impromptu navy would suffice to clear the American coasts of blockading forces, and American statesmen well know that if two or three confederate privateers sufficed to sweep the seas of American commerce, and to inflict on it a blow from which, after twelve years, it has not fully revived, its chances would be small indeed, when every ocean and sea should swarm with British cruizers. And it is not to be supposed that England would refrain, as against America, from issuing letters of marque.

It is therefore evident that it is to the naval power and prestige of Great Britain that Canada owes her independence, and we purpose to afford our readers some insight into the details and magnitude of the force on which so much depends. A few preliminary explanatory remarks will tend to a better understanding of the subject.

It is an evidence of the absolutely transitional state of the navy, that, while there remains on the list but a few representatives of the line-of-battle ship of twenty-five years ago, the rating of ships, as shown in the Navy List, has undergone no alteration. As the List stands, however, it affords a basis on which an understanding of present conditions can be afforded. As such we will briefly epitomize it.

First Rate (three-deckers).—110 guns and upwards; complement 1000 men or

more.

Second Rates.-One of H.M. yachts, and ships (two-deckers) of 80 to 110 guns; complement not less than 800 men.

Third Rates (practically, in late years, two deckers).-60 to 70 guns; complement not less than 600 men.

Fourth Rates.- Frigates; complement not less that 410 men; practically what were called "fifties" and "forty-fours." Fifth Rates.-Frigates of not less than 300 men; practically "thirty-sixes."

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Sixth Rates.-"All other ships bearing a captain"; de facto twenty-six gun frigates. Sloops. All vessels commanded by a commander, and carrying their principal armament on one deck." It may be best to explain here at once, that the carrying an armament on one deck is now extended to the highest class ships in the Navy, and that the term "corvette," originally almost synonymous with "sloop," is now applied to one-decked vessels equalling the old three-deckers in tonnage.

By a three-decker is or was meant a ship having three clear gun-decks below the upper-deck, and, according to the paint formerly in vogue, showing those decks by white belts along the ship's side, on which the black-painted ports stood out in strong relief; the ports through which the upper-deck guns protruded were not set out in relief by any white line. In like manner a two-decker had two gun-decks below her upper-deck, and frigates one. Corvettes and sloops were sometimes painted all black; sometimes the gun (upper) deck was traced with the white belt; and the writer of this article remem bers more than one dashing corvette of his days afloat, which might have realized Fenimore Cooper's description of the "Red Rover."

There are many amongst us sufficiently travelled, and sufficiently cognizant de omnibus rebus to know the appearance and capacity of 1,000 or 1,400 ton merchantmen

Green's, for instance; or of the great clippers of 1,600 to 2,000 tons which have made the Australian voyage since 1851.* Το such, a reference to tonnage will suffice. To others, again, we may postulate the length, beam (breadth), and depth of a certain class of vessel. For instance, the Queen, 100 guns, was in 1840 50 the largest ship in the Navy. Her length was 220 feet, her beam

*To others it will be an illustration to say that the large steamers of the Cunard and Allan lines are about the capacity of the latest three-deckers, but take out their size in great length.

amidships 60 (an unparalleled breadth at that date), her draught of water about 28 feet, her tonnage 3,099. But she gained her capacity from her enormous beam. She was a three-decker. The Albion, carrying 90 guns on two decks, was several feet longer, and if we remember rightly, 58 feet beam only; but she came, according to the measurement of that day, within five tons of the Queen. The old three-deckers of the war-time were the famous old ninety-eights. They ran barely 2,000 tons. The Victory used to be called 1,958; she is now set down as 2,164.

Early in the present century a class of one-hundred-and-fours made its appearance. These were of about 2,400 tons, and were thought a great advance upon previous vessels. Two or three of them yet exist. The Impregnable and the Camperdown were in 1840-44, flag-ships respectively at Devonport and Sheerness. They were terrible "haystacks," of enormous strength and scantling, but helpless drifters to leeward.

Of

About 1820-30 a large class of threedeckers was built, carrying 120 guns, the tonnage of which ranged about 2,700. this class were the Britannia, Caledonia, Hibernia, St. Vincent, Howe, Victoria, Waterloo, Neptune, St. George, and others.

Then came the Queen, built in 1839, and subsequently the last and greatest generation of the grand-looking old craft, built just previous to the Crimean war. These first advanced to 3,700 tons and carried 131 guns. Of them the Duke of Wellington was the best known, as a Crimean flag-ship. She is still flag-ship at Portsmouth. But there were yet to suceed three or four, in which, before its extinction, the magnificence of the old line-of-battle ship was to attain its fullest development. These were the Victoria, 4,127 tons, 1,000 horse-power; the new Howe, 4,225 tons, 1,000 horse-power; the Windsor Castle, and, if we remember rightly, a new Royal Albert. Of these the Howe and the Victoria still remain on the active list. It will be remembered that, by this time, all the line-of-battle ships intended to be sea-going had been built with, or converted for, screw steam-power.

The two-deckers ranged from 72 to 92 guns. The seventy-twos in commission from 1840 and afterwards were unknown to the old war time. The old seventy-fours, in one

or two of which the writer of this article was "hulked ". -a term applied to a sailor's existence while fitting out, before his ship is ready for him-were of a build which astonished youngsters of thirty or forty years ago. And the old forty-four gun frigates of the war time had the same characteristics. These were, extreme lowness between decks, and extreme closeness of " quarters," which means that the guns were too close together to afford fair room for working them. Many tall officers of the old school contracted a permanent stoop from the want of height between decks. Add to these characteristics, that, long after French ships were coppered, ours sailed the seas with a thick coating of barnacles always rapidly accumulating on their unmetalled bottoms, and that no English genius whatever had displayed itself in the matter of a ship's lines, before Trafal gar, and some faint idea may be formed of the disadvantages under which our glorious seamen achieved their astonishing successes. For, although it may scarcely seem credible. it is a fact that, had we gone to war at any period previous to 1850, the strength of England's line of-battle would have consisted of ships built after the old Canopus, and in every respect almost exact reproductions of her. The Canopus was an 84, on two decks; French, pure and simple. She was about 2,400 tons (three-deckers of that date did not attain those dimensions, and were low between decks and desperately crowded at quarters). She was seven feet high between her gun decks, and almost eight in her orlops (decks half below the water line). stowage, a matter not always corresponding to tonnage, was splendid; her sailing qualities were excellent for a ship of her date and size; and her armanent heavy enough to be a match for a three-decker of her time. As to her time it will be sufficient to say that she was captured at the Nile, the date of which redoubtable action will be found by any one who will take the trouble to turn it up, to come within the last century. She there rejoiced in the name of Le Franklin, in honor of "Poor Richard," popular in those days in French reminiscence. British genius so failed to improve on her that, until Sir William Symonds, about 1830, introduced a build, the advantages of which were, after all, only questionable, we went on building in servile imitation of our prize until after that date. And, sooth to say, a noble class of

Her

"liners" they were. Old naval men will remember them well. Many of them were "country-built," i. e., built in India, and of teak-everlasting, and bore names of Eastern association. There were the Asia, Ganges, Calcutta, Bombay, and many others of similar nomenclature, besides the Monarch, Formidable, Thunderer, and a host of miscellaneous names, and grander looking or more efficient ships never floated. We well remember, when at Jamaica in 1846 or 1847, seeing the noble old prototype herself sail into Port Royal harbour, looking every inch a queen of the seas. She was only "trooping," and had her lower-deck guns out, but her noble spars were not reduced, and the peculiarity of the old ships, especially as represented in French naval prints, which far exceed ours in life, vigour, and vraisemblance, was very striking, the great steve of her bowsprit carrying her flying-jib-boom end as high as her fore-tops. She was then commanded by Capt. (now Sir Fairfax) Moresby.

It was then we went over the old Canopus, and those of us who thought at all about such things, stood astonished at the fearful odds against which our predecessors had fought and won. The British seventyfour of that day scarcely averaged 1,700 tons. Indeed, we are speaking over the mark when we name that figure, which is nearly that attained by the newer representatives of the class built after the great war was over. Their sailing qualities were very different.

In later days a fine class of fifty-gun frigates was procured by cutting down some of those seventy-fours which succeeded the older class of the war time. These frigates ranged about 1,750 tons, and many of them were found to sail much better when relieved of their former upper decks than they had done as twodeckers. Of this class were the famous old Barham and Warspite, the Vindictive, once the flag-ship on this station, the Eagle, and many others. Then, about 1837, came the Vernon, now a torpedo school-ship at Portsmouth. Sir W. Symonds, then surveyor of the navy, considered her at that time his chef d'œuvre. Like the Queen, she was too short for her size and beam, Sir William having a crochet of moulding all his ships, no matter how large, on the model of a Greek brig, the consequence of which was that the Queen herself, enormous as she was, was, as to the lines of her lower hull, nothing but an

overgrown cutter-yacht, and, as might have been expected, snapped off her foretopgallant-masts in a heavy sea accordingly. But notwithstanding her shortness- -a defect which she shared with the Spartan, an equally beautiful frigate on a smaller scale (26)—the Vernon was a splendid ship. She measured over 2,000 tons. Later, Sir William Symonds built the Constance, a frigate still larger ; and, following her, came the whole new class of fifties, whose tonnage equalled that of the three-deckers of twenty years before them. The old 18 gun ships and barque sloops, of about 400 tons, began about 1840 to give place to brigs of the same tonnage, and corvettes of 700 or 800 tons. It may here be remarked that, in Admiralty parlance, a "sloop" means anything commanded by a commander. The word has no reference to rig.

One word as to armament, before we proceed to dissect the navy of the present day. The old sloops and brigs scarcely ever had a long gun, but were armed with carronades, a species of very short ordnance, mounted on sliding carriages without trucks (wheels). Carronades stood high from the deck, with little base, and were peculiarly liable to overthrow from any chance shot or other accident. "Gunnades" were improved carronade, being about eight feet long, while the carronade was only about four, and the gunnade carriage stood upon a firmer base. In the older class of three-deckers, the upperdeck carried 32-pounder carronades, the main-deck 32-pounder gunnades. The middle and lower decks were armed with long thirty-twos and sixty-eights, not more than twelve to twenty of the latter on both decks. The "long thirty-two "-the piece de résistance of its period-was 9 feet 6 inches long, and weighed 56 cwt. The 68 pounder weighed 65 cwt., but was only 9 feet long. The armament of the Vindictive, a rasée fifty-gun frigate, flag-ship on this station from 1845 to 1848, a fine specimen of her class, was, on the upper deck, 4 sixty-eights and 12 thirtytwo-pounder gunnades; on the main-deck, 6 sixty-eights and 28 long thirty-twos. She was of 1,758 tons, having been a seventyfour, and was a fast and powerful frigate of her day. Forty-fours ran about 1,400 tons. Thirty-six-gun frigates about 1,250, and twenty-sixes about 900.

Having thus endeavoured to convey some ideas of relative size, to conduce to a com