(in which individuality has had free and artistic scope), the Roman (in which anarchy has been reduced to rule, but an abstract universal rule), and the German (in which universality and individuality, law and liberty, are reconciled in the modern State) (§§ 352-360). The idea of the State represented by the last coincides with the idea of religion and the idea of knowledge in their modern form. There is no abstract opposition either of God and His world, or of thought and things, or of order and freedom. The fortunes of the Hegelian philosophy, the parting of Hegel's followers into two or even three groups, will be found recorded by Erdmann in his History of Philosophy. In relation to social questions the importance of Hegel is, that of all the abstract philosophers he was the most concrete, both in his ethics, where the truth is represented as only attainable in society, and in his philosophy of history where the true freedom worked out by history is represented as a reconciliation of man with the world. But in economics, which he treated only incidentally, his influence has naturally been indirect; and we shall find it most powerful among the " Young Hegelians," or "Hegelians of the Left.' NOTE. The first part of Hegel's Philosophy of Right has been expounded by Dr. Hutchison Stirling in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Law (1873). Professor Edward Caird has excelled himself in his brief account of the life and philosophy of Hegel (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1883). For the second section of the Philosophy of Right, relating to Morality, Mr. F. H. Bradley, in his Ethical Studies (1876), gives many useful illustrations. 1 Vol. iii. of the translation in this series pp. 5 to 106, $331 to 342. Cf. also below, Book V., ch. i. CHAPTER I. KARL MARX (1818-1883). THE later or "scientific" Socialism of Germany so magnifies the merely economical element in history and society that it seems to allow no place for Philosophy. Nevertheless it is a historical fact that the straitest sect of scientific socialists represented by Marx and Engels sprang from the philosophy of Hegel, and confessed its origin. In the Postscript (dated January, 1873) to a second edition of his book on Capital, Marx complained that his critics had failed to understand his method of exposition. The Revue Positive of Paris accused him of treating economics metaphysically (in the Comtist sense of the word) and then of confining himself to a mere critical analysis of the facts. German reviewers cried out against Hegelian sophistry. A Russian critic found his method of investigation to be strictly realistic, but his method of exposition to be the dialectic of German idealism. Marx replies that investigation and exposition are bound to proceed by different methods. The former has to master the facts in detail, analyse their different complications, and trace their inward connection. Only then can the actual movement of things be adequately expounded. But in the final exposition the life of the things is reflected in ideas, and there may seem to the reader to be a construction, à priori. The method is dialectical (he adds) but the dialectic is not the Hegelian. My dialectical method is fundamentally different from 1 P. 818 (1872). The edition bears this date (1872), though evidently not published till the beginning of 1873. |