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duty in respect of the adequate protection of the employees of common carriers engaged in trade or commerce therein, is in no wise dependent upon its performance in respect of the limited class of employees subject to its jurisdiction in the several States. The latter may be, and are in great measure, protected by State legislation. They have another power to appeal to for their relief, while those in the District of Columbia have not.

The action was brought to recover damages in the amount of $20,000 on account of the death of the intestate, and the question consequently arose whether such an amount could be awarded, since section 1301 of the Code of the District of Columbia, giving a right of action for injuries causing death, limited the amount recoverable under said section to $10,000. The court held that limitation of the code section did not apply to the liability law, saying that—

The objects of the two [statutes] are different. The first remedies a defect in the common law by conferring a right of action in all cases of injuries resulting in death, when, had the injured party survived, he would be entitled to an action, and in no other. The second changes the common law in relation to master and servant by giving the latter a right of action for all damages for injuries occasioned by the negligent acts of fellow-servants, and modifies the law as to the contributory negligence of the injured person. It then extends this right of action, in case of death, to the personal representative of the deceased. The damages so recovered are distributed in a different manner from that provided in the earlier law, and are not expressly discharged of the debts or liabilities of the deceased as therein provided. The third section relates to employment contracts, insurance, relief benefits, etc., not mentioned in the Code, and provides a measure of set-off growing out of the same. Moreover, the act operates alike in the several Territories, where it does. not appear that there is any statute limiting the amount of recovery. Notwithstanding the invidious distinction made between the beneficiaries of the separate statutes in respect of the amount of the recovery, we see no reason why they may not stand together and operate according to their terms in cases coming under them respectively. In conferring a right of action where none existed at common law, Congress can couple the grant with any condition it may deem reasonable in the particular case, and is not bound to affix the same condition to all similar grants. Instead of intending to bring the parties to actions created by the act, under the operation of section 1301 of the Code, we think that the intention was to give it operation according to its terms. It makes complete provision for all of its purposes, and leaves nothing to be supplied by the provisions of the Code. Each is to be construed, therefore, as applying to cases arising under it, and to none other.

EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES-VALIDITY OF FEDERAL STATUTE IN THE TERRITORIES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIAAtchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company v. Mills, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 108 Southwestern Reporter, page 480.—I. L.

Mills, an employee of the company named, had sued in the district court of El Paso County and recovered damages for injuries received in the course of his employment in the Territory of New Mexico. The case is of interest only as it presents a ruling as to the validity of the Federal liability law of 1906 in its application to railroads in Territories. Judge Fly, speaking for the court, held that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Howard case (28 Sup. Ct. 141; see Bulletin No. 74, p. 216) was to the effect that the law was invalid in all respects and as to all places, as appears from the following extracts from his opinion:

While the act was declared unconstitutional and invalid because it was an invasion of the rights of the States, yet it was declared to be invalid, not only as to the States, but also as to the Territories and the District of Columbia. In the opinion of the court, delivered through Mr. Justice White, it was shown that the parts of the act were so blended and interwoven that if one part was unconstitutional the whole act was destroyed. In concluding the opinion of the court Mr. Justice White said: "Concluding as we do that the statute, whilst it embraces subjects, within the authority of Congress, to regulate commerce, also includes subjects not within its constitutional power, and that the two are so interblended that they are incapable of separation, we are of the opinion that the courts below rightly held the statute to be repugnant to the Constitution and nonenforceable.' The two subjects referred to as being interblended mean of course the constitutional and unconstitutional parts of the statute, and must refer to that part of the law relating to the territories and the District of Columbia and that part relating to the States.

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Courts have no means of knowing that Congress would have passed the law in question, and made it applicable to the District of Columbia and the Territories alone, and to strike out portions of a section of the act to make it conform to that hypothesis would be making, by judicial construction, a law which Congress did not make.

EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN-AGE LIMIT-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE VIOLATION-EMPLOYMENT AS CAUSE OF INJURY-Starnes v. Albion Manufacturing Company, Supreme Court of North Carolina, 61 Southeastern Reporter, page 525.-Harry Starnes was employed in a cotton mill as a sweeper in the spinning room, and was injured while visiting his father, who worked at a carding machine in the same establishment. He was less than 10 years of age when the accident causing his injury occurred, and his employment was in violation of section 3362 of the Revisal of 1905, which prohibits the employment in factories of children under 12 years of age. Damages for injuries were awarded in the superior court of Mecklenburg County, from which judgment the company appealed, basing its action on three grounds: First, that the law deprives the citizen of his property rights without due process of law, and denies to certain citizens the equal protection of the law; second, that it was error for the court

to charge that employment in violation of the act was negligence per se; and third, that the court had improperly refused to instruct that unless the child was injured while engaged in the work for which he was hired the employer was not liable.

None of these grounds was allowed by the supreme court, and the judgment of the court below was affirmed. The position of the court on each of the points involved is set forth in the following extracts from its opinion, as delivered by Judge Brown:

Child labor laws have been adopted in nearly all the States of this Union and Canada, and are in force in nearly all the governments of Europe and of the Australian Continent. They are founded upon the principle that the supreme right of the State to the guardianship of children controls the natural rights of the parent, when the welfare of society or of the children themselves conflict with parental rights. In this country their constitutionality, so far as we can ascertain, has never been successfully assailed. The supervision and control of minors is a subject which has always been regarded as within the province of the legislative authority. How far it shall be exercised is a question of expediency, which it is the province of the legislature to determine.

The constitutional guaranty of the liberty of contract does not apply to children of tender years nor prevent legislation for their protection. "So far as such regulations control and limit the powers of minors to contract for labor, there has never been," says Mr. Tiedmann, "and never can be, any question as to their constitutionality. Minors are the wards of the nation, and even the control of them by parents is subject to the unlimited supervisory control of the State." (1 Tiedmann, State & Fed. Con., p. 325.)

The statute we are considering appears to have been framed in good faith, and for the purpose of promoting the general welfare by protecting minors from injury by overwork, from liability to injury by machinery in large manufacturing plants and by facilitating their attendance at schools. It is not an undue restriction of the right of the parent to the labor of the child, assuming that he has such rights, when opposed to the general welfare. It does not close to him all fields of employment for his child, but only those in factories and manufacturing establishments, where the child is more likely to be injured in health or body, or from his childish carelessness, as in this case, than in many other useful employments.

The right to the labor of the child is not a vested right in the parent, nor is it of any more importance than the right to control its education. Both are subject to the paramount power of the State when it deems it necessary to exercise it for the general good. Upon this idea compulsory education laws have been enacted in a large number of States and their constitutionality has been sustained where drawn in question.

As to the second contention, it is decided squarely against the defendant in the recent case of Leathers v. Tobacco Co., 144 N. C. 330, 57 S. E. 11 [Bulletin No. 71, p. 373], where it is held not only that a cause of action accrues to the child, if injured, but that it is negligence per se, and not merely evidence of negligence, to violate the statute. The writer can add nothing to the well-considered

opinion of Mr. Justice Connor in that case, and we find nothing in the well-prepared brief of defendant which induces us to reverse it.

This brings us to consider defendant's third contention, a matter not fully determined in the Leathers Case, and which may be thus stated: That the plaintiff can not recover because the employment of him, although willfully and knowingly done in violation of the statute, was not the proximate cause of his injury, inasmuch as he did not receive the injury while in the discharge of the duties to which he was assigned. It is true that the plaintiff was not engaged in performing his duties in the spinning room, and had gone to the lower floor where the carding machines were, and got his hand caught in one and badly cut. Under such circumstances there are respectable courts which hold that the injury is not the proximate result of a violation of the statute, because not received in performing the work the child was assigned to do, and that therefore the employer is not liable. We are not impressed with the persuasive authority of those precedents, and are not inclined to follow them. To do so, would, in our opinion, unduly restrict the liability of the employer, and would be contrary to the evident intention of the legislature. The act was designed not only to protect the health, but the safety, of children. of tender age from the indiscretion and carelessness characteristic of immature years. One who knowingly and willfully violates its provisions is not only guilty of an indictable offense, but he commits à tort upon the rights of the child and should be judged as a culpable wrongdoer, and not as one guilty of mere negligence. The injury done the child is a willful wrong and does not flow from the negligent performance of a lawful act. We think that the breach of the statute constitutes actionable negligence wherever it is shown that the injuries were sustained as a consequence of the wrongful employment of the child in the factory in violation of the law. In this case we think there is a direct causal connection between the unlawful employment of the plaintiff and the injuries sustained by him. By employing this boy of 10 years in violation of the law, the defendant exposed him to perils in its service which, though open to observation, he, by reason of his youth and inexperience, could not fully understand and appreciate.

INJUNCTION-STRIKES-PICKETING-PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES AS MEMBERS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MINE OWNERS-CONSPIRACYEVIDENCE-Goldfield Consolidated Mines Company v. Goldfield Miners' Union, No. 220, et al., United States Circuit Court, District of Nevada, 159 Federal Reporter, page 500.-The Goldfield Consolidated Mines Company is a Wyoming corporation which owns mines in the Goldfield district, besides owning about 97 per cent of the stock in a number of other mine corporations, the mines of which it operates, together with its own, for the benefit of all parties in interest. The Goldfield Miners' Union is an unincorporated association of perhaps 2,000 members, and is a branch of the Western Federation of Miners, likewise a voluntary, unincorporated association. The complainant company charged that the miners' union, though

claiming to be a labor organization, is a criminal society, organized to agitate certain so-called political questions, tending by its attitude and activities. to subvert the general principles of government, and maintaining as one of its cardinal principles that there shall be a continuous state of warfare between employers and employees. It was further alleged that the union encouraged employees to take the property of employers by stealth and force, and, if the demands of employees be not complied with, to destroy the property of the employers. Unreasonable demands enforced by threats, boycotts, picketing, assaults, deportations, etc., were included in the charges, and a preliminary injunction was asked for to prevent interference with the operation of the mines, the intimidation of employees, congregating on and picketing the company's works, and the maintenance of a boycott against the company, its agents, or employees; also prohibiting the holding or attending of any meeting of the Goldfield Miners' Union.

The charges made were denied in detail, and the company itself was charged with violating the provisions of the constitution of Wyoming against consolidations and combinations to prevent competition. It was also alleged that this and other companies had conspired to oppress, boycott, and drive out the members of the Western Federation of Miners, and that the present strike was due to the fact that the members of the union were unwilling to accept depreciated paper in lieu of money for wages.

The opinion of the court was preceded by a lengthy statement of facts setting forth the conditions at the mines for the year preceding the rise of the present cause of action. It was sworn to and not denied that the employees in the Mohawk mines had stolen not less than $1,000,000 worth of ore within a period of six months. In pursuance of an order of the Federal court, watchers were sent to the Mohawk property to prevent the stealing of ore, whereupon the employees, all of whom were members of the defendant union, refused to work below the surface where watchers were stationed. One of these watchers testified that he was waited on by members of the union and remonstrated with on the ground that no good union man would act as watcher. He refused to give up his position and was shortly afterwards expelled from the union. The union subsequently demanded his discharge, claiming that he had violated his obligations. The company refused to discharge him, and a strike was ordered. On settlement, wages were advanced and provisions made for change rooms in which the men were to change their outer garments, a watchman being present.

In March, 1907, a dispute arose between the Federation of Miners and the American Federation of Labor as to jurisdiction over mine carpenters, whereupon the mines were closed until the unions should

56749-No. 78-08-12

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