tion of several thousand cars and the direction of from eight to ten thousand employees engaged in car building. Dr. Parsons, his physician; Woods, an agent for a railway spring company; Dunbar, manager of the Pullman car works; Ristine, a railway expert; Hampton, upholstering foreman of the Pullman Company; Mansure, a manufacturer; Newell, some of whose testimony has been mentioned; Goodnow, general manager of a railroad; Bird, assistant auditor of the Pullman Company; Brightaupt, foreman painter for that company; Lihou, an employee of the company; Sollitt, a contractor; Ripley, president of a railroad; Harris, another railroad president; Field, president of an ice company; Smith, a publisher; Charlton, a general passenger agent; Father Tinan, a clergyman; Brown, treasurer of the Pullman Company; Martyn, a division superintendent of that company; Dr. Harsha, testator's former physician; Ettinger, a retired manufacturer; Sweet, secretary to the president of the Pullman Company,—all testified that they believed testator was of sound mind and memory. His relations with women may not have been in accordance with the well recognized standards of society, and if that were the sole issue in these proceedings we would be compelled to hold that the evidence in this record tended to show that they were not in accordance with good morals. But that is not the issue. We think the great preponderance of evidence upholds the finding of the jury that testator was of sound mind and memory when he executed this will.

The bill of exceptions was amended by the lower court after the cause was brought to this court. After a somewhat careful examination of the question we think the trial court ruled correctly on this question. In view of our conclusions as set forth in the foregoing opinion on the other branches of the case we deem it unnecessary to discuss at length the law covering this amendment.

Finding no reversible error in the record the decree of
Decree affirmed.

the circuit court will be affirmed.

THE SOUTH SHORE COUNTRY CLUB

v.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Opinion filed June 19, 1907.

1. DRAM-SHOPS-right to sell intoxicating liquors at retail not a common right. The right to engage in the business of selling intoxicating liquors at retail is not now a common right, and it can be exercised only in the manner and upon the terms which the statute prescribes. .

2. SAME―court cannot disregard the legislative definition of a "dram-shop." The statute defines a dram-shop to be a place where spirituous or vinous or malt liquors are retailed by less quantity than one gallon, and the fact that the popular acceptation of the term "dram-shop" is restricted to a place where liquors are sold at a public bar to the public generally, does not authorize the courts to give such restricted meaning to the term, in view of its legislative definition.

3. SAME-a profit is not essential to a sale. A profit upon intoxicating liquors dispensed by a social club to members paying therefor is not essential to constitute the transaction a sale, nor is it material that the dispensing of such liquors is merely incidental to the main purpose of the club, nor that only members of the club and accompanying friends are admitted.

4. SAME-Stockholders of corporation are not tenants in common of property. Stockholders of an incorporated social club are not tenants in common of the club property, including the stock of intoxicating liquors; and the distribution of such liquors to members paying a fixed price there for cannot be regarded as a mere equitable distribution of the common property among its owners.

5. SAME a social club, though not incorporated, is not a pártnership. An association organized merely for social, literary, scientific or political purposes, although not incorporated, is not a partnership, and the members have no individual rights in the club property and own no proportionate share thereof, but have only the right to its joint use so long as they remain members.

6. SAME-transfer of specific part of common property for stipu lated price is a sale. Even though property is owned by persons as tenants in common, if a specific portion of the property is transferred to one or more of such persons for a stipulated price the transaction is a sale.

7. SAME-Social club dispensing liquors to members is within meaning of Dram-shop act. A social club, incorporated or unin

corporated, which dispenses intoxicating liquor to members, who pay a fixed price therefor, even though no profit is made, is within the meaning of the Dram-shop act, notwithstanding the club is organized in good faith for social purposes, and not as a mere device to evade the statute requiring a dram-shop license to be obtained. (People v. Law and Order Club, 203 Ill. 127, adhered to.)

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. GEORGE A. DUPUY, Judge, presiding.

GEORGE P. MERRICK, (SILAS H. STRAWN, and MASON B. STARRING, of counsel,) for appellant:

The Dram-shop act is a penal statute and should be strictly construed. Albrecht v. People, 78 Ill. 510; Cruse v. Aden, 127 id. 231; Schulte v. Schleeper, 210 id. 357.

The provisions of the Dram-shop act are aimed at dramshops and those engaged in the liquor traffic or business. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231; People v. Cregier, 138 id. 401; Strauss v. Galesburg, 203 id. 234; Hogg v. People, 15 Ill. App. 288.

In the construction of a statute courts are not confined to the literal meaning of the words of the statute, but the intention may be collected from the necessity or object of the act, and the words may be enlarged or restricted according to its true intent. Castner v. Walrod, 83 Ill. 171; Cruse v. Aden, 127 id. 232; People v. Chicago, 152 id. 546; Tudor v. Railroad Co. 154 id. 129; Railroad Co. v. People, 154 id. 558; People v. Hinrichsen, 161 id. 223; People v. Harrison, 191 id. 257.

A statute may be construed contrary to its literal meaning when a literal construction would result in an absurdity or inconsistency, and the words are susceptible of another construction which will carry out the manifest intention. Sutherland on Stat. Const. sec. 324; People v. Hoffman, 97 Ill. 234; Hogan v. Akin, 181 id. 448.

The furnishing of intoxicating liquors without profit by a club organized and existing in good faith, with a limited

and selected membership, and which furnishing is merely incidental to the main purpose of the club, does not constitute a sale, within the meaning of the statute prohibiting sales without a license. 23 Cyc. 205; 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, (2d ed.) 361; Freund on Police Power, sec. 456; Black on Intoxicating Liquors, sec. 142; Klein v. Livingston Club, 177 Pa. St. 224; State v. St. Louis Club, 125 Mo. 308; People v. Adelphi Club, 149 N. Y. 5; Commonwealth v. Pomphret, 137 Mass. 564; Tennessee Club v. Dwyer, 79 Tenn. 452; Commonwealth v. Smith, 102 Mass. 144; Piedmont Club v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 540; Columbia Club v. McMaster, 35 S. C. 1; State v. Austin Club, 89 Tex. 20; Barden v. Montana Club, 10 Mont. 330; Commonwealth v. Ewing, 145 Mass. 119; Graff v. Evans, L. R. 8 Q. B. 373.

JOHN J. HEALY, State's Attorney, (HOWARD S. TAYLOR, and CHURCH, MCMURDY & SHERMAN, of counsel,) for appellee:

The furnishing and dispensing of liquor by a club to its members in the manner admitted in this case constitute a sale, within the meaning of the statute. People v. Law and Order Club, 203 Ill. 127; Wright v. People, 101 id. 126; State v. Social Club, 73 Md. 98; State v. Boston Club, 45 La. Ann. 585; Newark v. Essex Club, 53 N. J. L. 99; Marmont v. State, 48 Ind. 21; Martin v. State, 59 Ala. 34; State v. Lockyear, 95 N. C. 633; State v. Neis, 108 id. 787; Kentucky Club v. Louisville, 92 Ky. 309; State v. Shumate, 44 W. Va. 490; People v. Soule, 74 Mich. 250; Wittig v. United States, 2 Lowell, 44.

Shareholders or stockholders in a corporation are not tenants in common nor co-owners of the property of the corporation in any sense, but the title is in the corporate body. 10 Cyc. 373, and cases cited; Smith on Personal Property, sec. 30; Cook on Stockholders, secs. 6, 11, 12, 709; Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549; Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U. S. 304.

There is no common law right in Illinois to sell liquor at retail. The business can only be carried on under the terms and conditions prescribed by law. This includes the requirement of a license. All unlicensed sales are unlawful. People v. Creiger, 138 Ill. 401.

The fact that appellant does not sell intoxicating liquors to the public generally, but only to members of the club, does not take appellant out of the operation of the statute. Rickert v. People, 79 Ill. 85; People v. Law and Order Club, 203 id. 127; Wright v. People, 101 id. 126; Noecker v. People, 91 id. 494; Hewitt v. People, 186 id. 340.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the

court:

By leave of court the State's attorney of Cook county filed in the superior court of said county an information in the name of the People, against appellant, a corporation not for pecuniary profit, organized under the general incorporation laws of this State for pleasure, social recreation and the promotion of outdoor sports, to require it to show by what warrant it sells intoxicating liquors without a license, and praying that its charter should be forfeited and it be ousted of its corporate franchise, or that such other penalty be imposed as the court might deem just. To the information appellant filed a plea showing the nature of the corporation and its objects, and the circumstances and conditions under which it keeps a stock of intoxicating liquors in its club. house and furnishes the same to its members. A general demurrer to the plea was sustained, and appellant having elected to stand by the plea, the court adjudged it to be guilty, as charged in the information, of a misuse of its corporate powers by selling intoxicating liquors without a license and imposed a fine of $500, together with the costs. From that judgment an appeal was taken to this court.

The facts stated in the plea, which the court adjudged insufficient as a defense to the charge of the information,