cessors kept the dam in repair and exercised such acts of ownership over the land in question as from its nature and location were susceptible of being exercised. The land was conveyed to the appellee the Dixon Power and Lighting Company and its grantor, the Dixon Milling Company, with no reservation of the land upon which the dam stood, and sufficient acts of ownership were exercised over it to comply with this section of the statute. Possession of the part of the tract occupied by the mill buildings was sufficient to give title to the whole tract. It was said in Zirngibl v. Calumet Dock Co. 157 Ill. 430, that "it is, of course, settled law that possession of part of a tract of land under color of title to the whole tract is possession of the whole tract described in the deed." This language was quoted in Bellefontaine Co. v. Niedringhaus, 181 Ill. 426, where the same principle was announced. It therefore appears that appellee the Dixon Power and Lighting Company sustained its defense of payment of taxes, with possession for seven successive years under claim and color of title made in good faith.

Appellants contend that the appellee the Dixon Power and Lighting Company was chargeable with notice of the reservation and exception in the deed of Harriet Godfrey to Becker and Underwood. This court has held that the rule in relation to notice of title in another party of adverse claims or defects in the title is of no consequence, and has no application to a claim of this kind arising under this section of the Statute of Limitations. Keppel v. Dreier, 187 Ill. 298; Dickenson v. Breeden, 30 id. 279.

Appellees having sustained their defense of title under the seven-year Statute of Limitations, it follows that the court did not err in so holding and in refusing appellants' propositions of law to the contrary. Arriving at this conclusion renders unnecessary a discussion of the other questions relative to the chain of title under which appellants claim.

The judgment of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

MARY BRECHBELLER

V.

LUCY WILSON et al.

Opinion filed June 19, 1907—Rehearing denied Qctober 9, 1907.

I. WILLS-clear intent not to vest estate until time of distribution must be carried out. A clear intention of the testator, as gathered from the entire will, not to vest a remainder until the time of distribution, must be carried out by the courts, notwithstanding the rule that the law favors the vesting of estates.

2. SAME-rule as to vested and contingent remainders. A remainder is vested if, after words giving a vested interest, a conditional clause for divesting it is inserted; but if the conditional element is incorporated into the description of the remainder-men or the gift to them, the remainder is contingent.

3. SAME when remainder does not vest until time of distribution. Where a will creates a trust for the benefit of the widow and two minor children, and provides that upon the death of the widow the remainder of the estate shall be equally divided among such of the testator's four children (naming them) as may survive the widow or the issue of any such children as may have died before the widow, the remainder is contingent, and vests at the death of the widow in such of the testator's children, or their issue, as survive the widow.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. C. D. MYERS, Judge, presiding.

Mary Brechbeller filed a bill for partition in the McLean county circuit court in which she alleged that she was the owner of an undivided one-fourth part of certain real estate which formerly belonged to her father-in-law, John Brechbeller, who died December 20, 1889, leaving a last will, which was afterwards admitted to probate in the McLean county court. Lucy Wilson, Nannie Belle Koos and Adolph. F. Brechbeller, surviving children of John Brechbeller, and Charles Lamp, as trustee under the will of John Brechbeller, were made parties defendant. The defendants other than the trustee interposed a demurrer to the bill, which was sustained, whereupon the bill was amended, and the de

murrer was extended to the amended bill and again sustained, and the complainant electing to stand by her bill it was dismissed for want of equity and a decree was rendered against the complainant for costs, from which Mary Brechbeller, complainant below, prosecutes this appeal.

The controversy here turns on the construction of the last will of John Brechbeller. By the first paragraph of said will the testator provided for the payment of his debts and funeral expenses. The second paragraph gives his daughter Lucy Wilson $300, to be paid out of the personal estate. The third paragraph devises to Frank Oberkoetter and Charles Lamp, as trustees, for the benefit of the widow and two minor children, Adolph F. and Nannie Belle Brechbeller, all of the residue and remainder of testator's property, to have and to hold in trust for the use and benefit of the widow and the two children above named, for the uses and purposes and subject to the limitations therein expressed. The fourth paragraph directs that the trustees shall have full charge of the estate, (with no power of sale,) and that they shall secure, collect, hold and invest, for increase and accumulation, all of his personal estate and the income from the real estate, and that the trustees shall from said income pay to the said widow such sums from the trust estate as shall be deemed necessary for her comfortable support during the term of her natural life if she remains unmarried, such payments to cease on her re-marriage; and said trustees are also directed to pay to the legal guardian of Adolph F. and Nannie Belle Brechbeller such sum or sums as shall be deemed necessary for their support and education until they attain their majority. The fifth is the paragraph under which appellant claims a one-fourth interest in the real estate in question. Whether appellant has such interest depends upon a construction of the fifth paragraph of the will. That paragraph is as follows:

"Fifthly-I direct that on the death of my said wife, Caroline Brechbeller, the said trust estate shall cease and

be determined, and that all of the residue, rest and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed, then remaining in the hands of said trustees, shall be equally divided among such of my four children, John Brechbeller, Lucy Wilson, Adolph F. Brechbeller and Nannie Belle Brechbeller, as may survive my said wife, or the issue of any of my said children who may have died before my wife, such issue to take the share which would have belonged to the parent; and in the event of the death of any one or more of my said four children without issue before the death of my said wife, then his, her or their share of said residue, rest and remainder of my estate shall belong equally to the survivors and the children of any who may have died leaving issue, such issue to take the share which would have belonged to the parent. And I hereby give, devise and bequeath to those of my said children who may be living at the time of the death of my said wife and to the issue of those of my said children who may have died as aforesaid, the said residue, rest and remainder of my estate in this fifth paragraph of my will mentioned, in the manner in this said fifth paragraph above stated, as their absolute property forever, in fee simple."

At the time of his death the testator, in addition to his widow and the three children above referred to, left another son surviving him, whose name was John Brechbeller. The last named son was the husband of the appellant, Mary Brechbeller. John Brechbeller, the son, died intestate January 10, 1893, never having made any disposition of his interest under the will, and leaving Herman Brechbeller his only child and heir-at-law. Herman Brechbeller died March 16, 1898, intestate, leaving his mother, appellant herein, as his only heir-at-law. Caroline Brechbeller, widow of the testator, died in 1906, having never re-married.

lant.

EDMUND O'CONNELL, and D. D. DONAHUE, for appel

BARRY & MORRISSEY, for appellees.

Mr..JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant contends that paragraph 5 creates a vested remainder in the four children of the testator, subject only to be divested by death without issue before the life estate expired; that appellant's husband having died leaving issue, his interests became absolute, under the will, in his son, Herman, by whose death the estate passed to his mother, appellant herein. Appellees contend that the interests of the four children were contingent; that only those living when the life estate expired could take under the will, and that it was the intention of the testator that the issue of such of his children as might die before the life estate was extinguished should be substituted for the deceased child, and that the interests of such issue were contingent and would vest only in such issue as might be living at the time of distribution.

It is to be noted that by the third and fourth paragraphs of the will the testator devised the estate to the trustees to manage, control, invest and accumulate, and to pay out, from time to time, such sums as might be necessary for the support of the widow and for the nurture and education of the two minor children. There is nothing obscure or doubtful about the trust estate. It is to continue until the widow dies or re-marries. By the fifth paragraph the testator then directs that at the death of his wife the trust estate shall cease and be determined, and "that all of the residue, rest and remainder of my estate, real, personal and mixed, then remaining in the hands of said trustees, shall be equally divided among such of my four children (naming them) as may survive my said wife, or the issue of any of my said children who may have died before my wife, such issue to take the share that would have belonged to the parent."

Applying the general rule that the expressed intention of the testator, as gathered from a consideration of the