that the trustees had re-conveyed all the property received by them and had made a full accounting of their acts and doings as trustees, and thereupon they were by the court discharged. Upon mutual agreement of all the parties to that suit, John Fuller, the solicitor for the complainants in that suit, was by the same decree appointed a trustee for Daniel H. Hampleman, with a general power to conserve. and administer his property for the benefit of Hampleman and subject to the control of the circuit court, and the bill in the case at bar alleges that Fuller entered upon the execution of his trust and continued in the administration thereof down to the time of the death of Daniel H. Hampleman. The latter departed this life on the 10th day of November, 1905, leaving as his only heirs-at-law, appellant, Ann M. Jones, his daughter, and appellees, Elizabeth Abbott, his. daughter, and Nellie Nason, child of a deceased daughter, and Albert Hampleman, Marion L. Hampleman, Alice I. Bushman and Sarah Anderson, children of a deceased son.

All of said heirs had reached their majority at the death of Daniel H. Hampleman, and he was then owner of the real estate and of some part or all of the personal property described in the deed of trust and in the contract of March. 21, 1900. The instrument referred to in that contract as "my will heretofore made" was a will which had been executed by Daniel H. Hampleman, and which was then in existence but which he thereafter destroyed or revoked. The appellant was a devisee or legatee under the provisions of that will. Shortly after Daniel H. Hampleman's death certain of his heirs-at-law, other than appellant, caused an instrument in writing executed on the 18th day of June, 1900, purporting to be the last will of the deceased, to be admitted to probate in said county, by which he bequeathed $500 to appellant and the remainder of his estate to his other daughter and the grandchildren above named. John Dagley was nominated to be executor of that instrument and by its terms directed to convert the entire estate into money for

the purpose of distributing the same in accordance with the provisions of the will. On January 2, 1906, Dagley was appointed and qualified as executor, and entered upon the performance of his duties. He took possession of the real estate of the testator, and continues to hold the same.

It further appears that upon the death of Daniel H. Hampleman the trust confided to John Fuller terminated, but that there is now in his hands a large amount of personal property received by him as trustee and that he has made no final settlement of his accounts as trustee. It is further alleged that by virtue of the contract of March 21, 1900, appellant is the owner of the undivided one-fourth of the lands mentioned in that contract and of such of the personal property described therein as was owned by the deceased at the time of his demise, and that appellant, in such ownership, is a tenant in common with the other heirs-atlaw of Daniel H. Hampleman.

The bill prays for partition of the real estate and for an accounting as to the rents; prays that Fuller and Dagley be required to account and each of them be decreed to deliver to appellant the one-fourth of the personal property held by each, respectively, which is included in the agreement of March 21, 1900, and asks the appointment of a receiver pending litigation. All the heirs of the deceased, other than appellant, were with Fuller as trustee and Dagley as executor made defendants to the bill and all demurred.

Had Daniel H. Hampleman died intestate the appellant would have inherited from him the one-fourth part of the property mentioned in the contract of March 21, 1900, excepting such portions thereof as might have been used or consumed by him in his lifetime, and her contention is, that as he destroyed or revoked the will which was in existence when that contract was made, she was entitled, under that contract, to the said one-fourth of the property, and with that right he could not interfere by will made subsequent to the execution of the contract.

The owner of property may make a valid enforceable contract binding himself not to dispose of his property by will and binding himself to permit his possessions to descend according to the laws of intestacy. Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 Ill. 229; Taylor v. Mitchell, 87 Pa. St. 518.

Appellees assert that the contract of March 21, 1900, by which Daniel H. Hampleman agreed to permit his property to descend according to the statute of this State was without consideration and void. At the time that agreement was made the suit was pending by which Daniel H. Hampleman sought to obtain a re-conveyance of the property which he had theretofore transferred to three trustees, to be conveyed by them, after his death, to his "legal representatives." That suit, as appears from the bill, was being defended in good faith by his daughter, the appellant, who was one of the trustees, and she finally re-conveyed upon his executing the contract in question. This contract itself recites that it is made in consideration of the re-conveyance by the trustees, and the bill avers that this contract was made in compromise and settlement of the pending litigation. We think the re-conveyance by the trustees and the compromise of the suit then pending afforded a valid consideration for the execution of the contract. Honeyman v. Jarvis, 79 Ill. 318; Pool v. Docker, 92 id. 501; Jackson v. Horton, 126 id. 566; Hall v. Hall, 125 id. 95; McDole v. Kingsley, 163 id. 433.

The significance of the words "legal representatives" as they appear in that portion of the trust deed above set out has been much discussed in the briefs. We think their meaning immaterial in considering the demurrer. Under the facts as they appear from the amended bill the agreement of March 21, 1900, is enforceable in equity, (Whiton v. Whiton, 179 Ill. 32; Hudnall v. Ham, 183 id. 486; Wallace v. Rappleye, supra;) and appellant may have partition and will be entitled to a receiver to take charge of the real estate and collect the rents and profits thereof pending liti

gation. As the property by the contract was to descend as intestate property, the personal property must pass to the executor, who will account to the appellant, if the bill be proven, for the portion thereof to which she is entitled by the language of the agreement, without any reference to the terms of the will, making deduction for property, if any, enumerated in the agreement which was not owned by Daniel H. Hampleman at his decease. According to the case stated, Fuller should account to the executor for personal property in his hands as trustee at the time of the death of Daniel H. Hampleman.

The decree of the circuit court will be reversed and the cause will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views in this opinion expressed.

Reversed and remanded.

THE PEOPLE Cx rel. John J. Healy, State's Attorney,

v.

WILLIAM P. THORNTON.

Opinion filed June 19, 1907.

DISBARMENT-evidence of guilt must be clear to warrant disbarment. To justify disbarment of an attorney the evidence of his guilt with reference to the transactions charged in the information must be clear; and it is not sufficient that, taken as a whole, the evidence shows a state of facts not entirely creditable to the respondent and the other parties to the transactions, but fails to show that the respondent has been guilty of dishonorable or criminal conduct.

INFORMATION to disbar.

JOHN J. HEALY, State's Attorney, (Hoyr KING, and JOIN L. FOGLE, of counsel,) for relator.

JOHN S. COOPER, JAMES E. MUNROE, and RUSSELL WHITMAN, for respondent.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an information filed in this court by John J. Healy, as State's attorney for Cook county, acting in conjunction with John F. Holland and other attorneys, who constitute the grievance committee of the Chicago Bar Association, praying that the license of William P. Thornton as an attorney of this court be revoked.

The charges set forth in the information divide themselves substantially under three heads:

First-That respondent, who had theretofore had considerable professional connection with the insurance department of the State and with Fred H. Rowe, attorney for that department, entered into a corrupt agreement with one J. W. Lauderdale, substantially as follows: That a certain life. insurance company (the Traders' Mutual) was in the hands of a receiver appointed by the circuit court of Sangamon county upon the application of the insurance department of the State of Illinois; that another life insurance company, (the Western Union,) with which said Lauderdale and his alleged principal, C. F. Binckley, were connected, was desirous of purchasing the list of names of the policy holders in the insolvent company with a view to securing the re-insurance of such as might wish to continue; that in consequence of said agreement between Lauderdale and the respondent, Thornton, an order was entered by the Sangamon county circuit court authorizing the receiver, J. W. Butler, to sell the list of names for $2000, whereas it was worth a much larger sum; that said Lauderdale and one Morgan, acting for said Binckley and the Western Union Life Insurance Company, thereupon paid the receiver the $2000 for the list of names and in addition paid respondent $6000, of which $1000 was to be retained by respondent as his share and $5000 was to be corruptly used to influence the receiver to sell the list of names for such inadequate sum, and to cause the insurance department, by its attorney, Fred H. Rowe,