was made for years after the completion of the contract and no attempt to dissent from the decision of the superintendent. A somewhat similar provision was found in the contract passed on in this court in Parmelee v. Hambleton, 24 Ill. 605. Under that decision we think appellant cannot now invoke this provision in the contract in this proceeding. (See, also, Pacaud v. Waite, 218 Ill. 138.) This being so, under article 9 of the contract the granting of the final certificate was "conclusive evidence of the performance of this contract," and could be overthrown only by proof of fraud or mistake. (McAuley v. Carter, 22 Ill. 53; Korf v. Lull, 70 id. 420; Hennessy v. Metzger, 152 id. 505; Barbee v. Findlay, 221 id. 251; Lohr Bottling Co. v. Ferguson, 223 id. 88; Stose v. Heissler, 120 id. 433.) The cases of VanBuskirk v. Murden, 22 Ill. 446, and Monahan v. Fitzgerald, 164 id. 525, do not attempt to lay down a contrary rule. The defects in the work in both of those cases were held to amount to fraud. No valid claim can be made that there is any proof of fraud on this record. The only claim made as to defective work by anyone competent to testify from experience was by a witness who never saw the work until three years after it was completed. Neither the superintendent nor any one else in charge of the work when it was being executed was called to testify, and no explanation was given or attempted as to why this was not done. Most, if not all, of the defects claimed were slight. It has been held frequently that in building contracts a literal compliance with the specifications is not necessary to a recovery by the contractor. A substantial performance in good faith is sufficient. (Keeler v. Herr, 157 Ill. 57; Evans v. Howell, supra.) This instruction, which cast the burden of proving that the contract had been fully carried out upon appellee, was properly refused. The second refused instruction set forth that if, by reason of a departure from the specifications, the plant was less effective than if constructed in accordance therewith, the defendant was entitled to recoup

or set off damages. This instruction was properly refused for the reasons given as to the other instruction. The certificate of the architect was conclusive unless overthrown because of fraud or mistake. Both these instructions were

properly refused, also, on the ground that they ignored the explanation in the testimony by the plaintiff that some of the departures complained of were authorized by the superintendent.

Appellant also complains of the modification of the third instruction. As originally drawn this authorized a set-off for unfitness of the appliances for the purpose for which they were made, and was modified by the court by adding a provision unless the defect was occasioned by the act or interference of appellant. There is nothing in the record. to indicate any fraud or mistake that would invalidate the final certificate. That instruction, therefore, whether in the modified or original form, should have been refused.

On the re-direct examination of the appellee one of the counsel for appellant objected to one of the answers, and asked to have it stricken out on the ground that it was not responsive. The court overruled the motion. This is complained of. Such matters are entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and a case will not be reversed on such rulings unless the discretion is plainly abused.

The next question asked of the same witness was as follows: "Do you make that same statement with reference to all the changes you made in those specifications?" One of the counsel for appellant objected to the question, but the court said the witness might answer. Thereupon associate counsel of appellant said, "I wish to state the grounds of our objection." The court thereupon said, "I don't care what your grounds are." Exception was taken to this ruling. The witness answered, "I acted directly under Mr. Wheatley's advice and instructions all through." The question and answer were both proper, but counsel should have been permitted to state his grounds of objec

tion. Neither he nor his associate had made clear why they objected. It is the duty of counsel always to state the ground of objection. In many instances a general objection without stating the reasons is insufficient, but we do not think appellant was so prejudiced by this ruling of the court that this should reverse the case.

Appellant also objects to the admission of certain testimony on the re-direct examination of appellee, and especially to his answer that they "expressed themselves as perfectly satisfied." Appellant claims that the witness did not say who expressed themselves, or when, or where or what was said. We have examined the record as to this evidence and find that the witness fully explained who were talking and what was said, and it is clearly inferable from his evidence when and where the conversation took place.

Appellant also objects to the ruling of the court in refusing to allow appellee to be asked, on cross-examination, as to the payment of a certain bill. The record discloses that the court sustained the objection to this question on the ground that it was not proper cross-examination. We think the court was right in this ruling.

The re-direct examination of appellee is also complained of. This subject was within the sound discretion of the trial court. We have read the entire re-direct examination, and do not think there was any such abuse of this discretion as to be reversible error.

We think the interest on the unpaid balance was properly allowed under section 2 of chapter 74, Hurd's Statutes of 1905. See, also, on this point, Palmer v. Meriden Britannia Co. 188 Ill. 508; Keeler v. Herr, supra; Heiman v. Schroeder, 74 Ill. 158.

We have gone over not only the briefs and abstracts, but the record as well. We find no reversible error.

The judgment of the Appellate Court will accordingly be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

ALFRED L. JONES

ข.

MINERVA P. YOUNG et al.

Opinion filed June 19, 1907-Rehearing denied October 9, 1907.

1. JUDGMENTS AND DECREES—when decree as to solicitor's fees is interlocutory, only. A partition decree which finds that the costs, "including a reasonable solicitor's fee, be apportioned among the parties," and that "upon the filing and confirmation of the commissioners' report the cause be referred to the master in chancery to hear proof and ascertain the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable solicitor's fees," is merely interlocutory as to the costs and solicitor's fees, and until the master's report concerning them is confirmed and their allowance made by the chancellor there is, as to such matters, no final decree.

2. SOLICITOR'S FEES-when apportionment of fees in partition is inequitable. Apportionment of complainant's solicitor's fees among the parties to a partition proceeding is inequitable where the procceding was not amicable and there was a substantial contest growing out of an honest difference of opinion between the complainant and the defendants, and the counsel employed by them, as to the interests of the various parties and the best way to adjust them, and where, from the first, the parties were unable to agree upon a division of the estate or the value thereof.

APPEAL from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN L. HEALY, Judge, presiding.

This is a proceeding in the circuit court of Cook county for the partition of real estate in that county. The only question here involved is whether the fees of complainant's solicitors should be apportioned among the parties and taxed as costs. The trial court allowed $4000 so taxed. The Appellate Court reversed the decree on this.point and remanded the cause.

Florence Brayton Jones, wife of appellant, died intestate April 2, 1895, leaving no children, her only heirs being said husband and Sweet Brayton, her grandfather. The last

named died before the filing of the bill, leaving his two children, Minerva P. Young and William B. Brayton, his only heirs. During the pendency of the partition suit William B. Brayton died, leaving some of the appellees as his only heirs.

The record discloses that prior to the filing of the bill for partition on June 2, 1896, by appellant herein, there had been some contention between the parties as to several matters connected with the division of the property, and that counsel had been employed by the parties interested before the proceedings were started in court. On June 9, 1896, William B. Brayton and Minerva P. Young entered their appearance in these proceedings. June 17, 1896, the bill was amended in several minor particulars and also so as to claim on behalf of the complainant a homestead estate. July 1, 1896, the bill was again amended by adding a prayer for accounting of the rents and payments made by the various parties, appellant having been in possession of the city property and appellees at that time being in possession of the farm property. July 29, 1896, the answer of William B. Brayton and Mrs. Young was filed, admitting the allegations of the bill as to the interests of the parties, except as to complainant's right to homestead in certain of the property. Afterward the bill was amended for the third time, correcting certain descriptions of real estate, omitting ten acres and including a block of land, and admitting that Mrs. Young had a homestead in a part of the property. The matter was referred by the trial court to a master in chancery, who, after hearing evidence, made a report finding title substantially as set out in the bill as finally amended, and that a partition and division ought to be made as prayed. The chancellor substantially approved the report and entered a decree of partition, appointing three commissioners to divide the property. The decree further provided "that the costs of the proceeding, including a reasonable solicitor's fee, be apportioned among the parties according to their