front of the building, and directly in front of each door there were five or six steps leading up from the surface of the ground to the platform. There was no railing on the front of the platform nor the sides of the steps except one at the north side of the north steps, separating the same from the entrance to the premises next north. Kate Wheeler, the appellant, accompanied by her sister and son, made some purchases in the store in the evening of September 18, 1897. On coming out of the store it was dark and there was no light in front of the building, and appellant, supposing that the steps ran across the front of the building, got over a little too far and fell from the platform. She sued appellee in the superior court of Cook county for the resulting damages and the case was tried with a jury. The only evidence introduced was on the part of the plaintiff, at the conclusion of which the court stated that the only question in the case was one of law to be decided by the court, and asked the parties to agree on the amount of plaintiff's damages provided she was entitled to any damages. The parties then agreed on $1750 as the amount of damages if plaintiff was entitled to damages, and upon the suggestion of the court they agreed to discharge the jury and submit the case to the court. The jury were discharged, and it was stipulated that plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for her own safety at the time of the injury, whereupon the court found the defendant not guilty and entered judgment accordingly. The record was removed by writ of error to the Appellate Court for the First District and assigned to the branch of that court. The judgment was affirmed, and a motion was then made by plaintiff for a certificate of importance and an appeal to this court. The motion was taken under advisement, and the record recites. that the court found that it appeared from an inspection of the record of the superior court that it was agreed on the trial of the cause that the amount of the plaintiff's damages, provided there was a finding that she was entitled to dam

ages, was $1750, and therefore it was ordered that an appeal be allowed to this court on filing the bond required by the order, but no certificate of importance was made. The bond was filed and the record certified to this court.

Section 8 of the act to establish Appellate Courts provides that in all cases sounding in damages, heard in such courts, when the judgment of the court below is less than $1000 exclusive of costs and the judgment is affirmed or otherwise finally disposed of in the Appellate Court, the judgment, order or decree of the Appellate Court shall be final, and no appeal shall lie or writ of error be prosecuted therefrom unless the Appellate Court shall grant the certificate of importance therein specified. This was an action sounding in damages and the judgment of the trial court was a judgment against the plaintiff for costs. There was no judgment for damages and there is no certificate of importance, so that we have no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. (Baxtrom v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. 117 Ill. 150; Indiana and Illinois Southern Railroad Co. v. Sampson, 132 id. 527; Tucker v. Champaign County Agricultural Board, 154 id. 593; People v. Midkiff, 174 id. 323.) It is the amount of the judgment, and not what the evidence showed or what the parties agreed upon as to the amount of damages if damages should be awarded, which controls the right of appeal. To authorize an appeal without a certificate of importance the judgment must equal $1000, and if such a judgment does not appear in the record it is wholly immaterial that it appears therefrom that counsel agreed on the amount of damages to be awarded if it should be found that the plaintiff was entitled to damages. The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

MATHIAS J. KRETZMANN

V.

EDWARD F. DUNNE, Mayor.

Opinion filed June 19, 1907.

DRAM-SHOPS when refusal to grant license is not an abuse of mayor's discretion. Refusal of the mayor to grant a license to keep a dram-shop close to a charitable institution maintained as a place to reform wayward young girls is not an abuse of the mayor's discretion, even though the requisite majority of property owners in the locality have signed the petition for the license. (Harrison v. People, 222 Ill. 150, adhered to.)

APPEAL from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. AXEL CHYTRAUS, Judge, presiding.

Appellant filed a petition in the superior court of Cook county for a writ of mandamus against appellee, as mayor of Chicago, commanding him to issue to petitioner a license to keep a dram-shop at 2146 North Clark street. The cause was submitted to the superior court on an agreed state of facts, and, after hearing, that court awarded a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the defendant to issue a license as petitioned for. On appeal to the Appellate Court the judgment of the superior court was reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to dismiss the petition. Appellant then perfected an appeal to this court.

From the record it appears that the building in question is located at the north-east corner of North Clark and Grace streets. North Clark street here extends in a north-westerly direction and crosses Racine avenue just south of Grace street. Grace street extends east and west and Racine avenue north and south. The premises known as 2146 North Clark street are located on an irregular-shaped lot lying north of and bordering on Grace street and between North

Clark street on the west and Racine avenue on the east. Immediately across Racine avenue from the premises, and about one hundred and twenty-five feet distant therefrom, is located the property of the House of the Good Shepherd, occupying apparently one entire block, bounded by Racine avenue on the west, Grace street on the south, Byron street on the north and Seminary avenue on the east. The buildings used by said institution when these proceedings were instituted were located at the north end of said premises, about five hundred feet from the building named in the application, but other buildings were then being erected by the institution between two hundred and fifty and two hundred and seventy-five feet from the premises named in the application. Along the entire western boundary of the block occupied by said institution, on Racine avenue, runs a brick wall about two feet thick and ten feet high. The House of the Good Shepherd is a charitable and religious institution conducted for the purpose of reforming and caring for young girls sent there by their parents and by the juvenile court of Cook county, supported largely by charity and by voluntary subscriptions and conducted somewhat in the nature of a penal institution, the inmates being under certain restraint and not permitted to leave the premises.

It appears from the agreed state of facts that "there has been placed on file with the mayor a petition of a majority of the property owners in the vicinity of Clark and Grace streets * * * requesting that a license be issued" to appellant; that appellant has complied in all respects with the ordinance now in force, which would entitle him to a license thereunder, and that he is a man of good moral character and the inspector of police has recommended that a license be granted to him. License was refused for the reason that objections had been made by the representatives of the House of the Good Shepherd, and the appellee, said mayor of the city of Chicago, "further stated as a reason for refusal to grant the license relator seeks, that in so do

ing he is conserving the best interests of the people, and that he has adopted the plan of refusing to grant a license to keep a dram-shop at any point within two hundred and fifty feet of a charitable or a religious institution."

GENTZEL & CRANE, for appellant.

WILLIAM D. BARGE, (JAMES HAMILTON LEWIS, Corporation Counsel, of counsel,) for appellee.

Per CURIAM: The ordinance in question in this case is identical with the one passed upon and set out in the statement of facts in Harrison v. People, 222 Ill. 150. The questions decided in that case are substantially the same as those raised in this proceeding. In that case the dram-shop was sought to be located a short distance from a public school. Because the location of the proposed dram-shop in the former case was adjacent to a school, and not to a charitable or reformatory institution, as here, counsel for the appellee seek to distinguish that case from this. They also insist that it should be distinguished because in this case there was a petition of a majority of the property owners in the locality favoring the issuing of the license, while in the Harrison case they claim the adjacent property owners were against the license. We find nothing in the Harrison case to indicate that the question of the wishes of the adjacent property owners influenced in any way the decision.

Counsel for appellant, however, most earnestly insist that even though this case cannot be distinguished from Harrison v. People, supra, that case ought not to be followed. We have examined the authorities cited by counsel and find no reason to depart from the conclusions laid down by this court in that case. No one can contend that a saloon adjacent to or in the immediate neighborhood of this charitable institution may not, in a greater or less degree, tend to demoralize the young girls who are sent there for the purpose of removing them from just such influences as are