To meet the prima facie case made by the collector the objector called as a witness the town clerk, and proved that there was no record of any vote adopting the labor system. The clerk then identified the town road record, and the objector offered in evidence the record of the proceedings of the commissioners of highways at a meeting held April 12, 1905, which recited that they decided to levy thirty-five cents on each $100 as it was on the assessor's books for 1904 district road tax. This evidence tended to prove that on April 12, 1905, the commissioners made an attempt to levy a tax under the labor system by virtue of section 83, and if the town was under the cash system such levy would be illegal. But it was shown that the attempted tax levy of April 12, 1905, was not for the tax which objector was asked to pay. The town clerk testified that the record of the levy offered by the objector was not the record of the levy of the road and bridge tax for 1905, for which judgment was asked. The record of the semi-annual meeting of the commissioners on September 5, 1905, was offered in evidence, showing that the commissioners at that meeting determined that a tax of fifty cents on each $100 should be levied on all the property of the town for road and bridge purposes and for the payment of any outstanding orders. drawn by them on their treasurer for the year 1905, in pursuance of and in compliance with section 13 of chapter 121 of the statute. The levy was not made under section 83, relating to towns under the labor system, but was made under and by authority of section 13, governing towns under the cash system. The record showed the purposes for which the levy was made, and they were those specified in section 13, and the record recited that the levy was made under that section. The objector alleged that the town was under the cash system, and the commissioners were therefore authorized to levy not exceeding sixty cents on each $100 of the property valuation. The objection to the road and bridge tax was groundless.

The county clerk computed interest at ten per cent upon the back assessment of the capital stock and franchise of the objector, and the objection alleged that such interest charge was void and not authorized by law. Such a charge is authorized by section 276 of chapter 120 of the Revised Statutes, relating to revenue, in the case of property omitted in the assessment of any year. But counsel for objector say that this back assessment was neither necessarily nor by inference an assessment of omitted property, and therefore it was not within the statute. The objector offered in evidence a certificate of the State Board of Equalization stating that said board had made a back assessment of capital stock and franchise against the objector for the year 1904, amounting, in the aggregate, to $339,100, and that the amount apportioned to Livingston county was $27,749, and the county clerk was directed to apportion that sum as a back assessment of capital stock and franchise for the year 1904 to the several localities in the county entitled thereto, in the manner provided by law. No objection was made to the back assessment, as it was called, and the only objection was to the interest charge. The board of equalization did not, apparently, attempt to re-value or re-assess property already valued and assessed, and what was called the back assessment could only have been an assessment for omitted property. The board could only make the back assessment as of so much capital stock and franchise omitted from the assessment for the year 1904. The addition of ten per cent was legal and authorized by the statute, and the county court erred in sustaining an objection to it.

The judgment of the county court is reversed as to the road and bridge tax of $182.57 and the interest on the assessment of capital stock and franchise, amounting to $78.10, and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to overrule the objections and enter judgment for said amounts. Reversed and remanded.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-legislature cannot delegate the taxing power to other than corporate authorities. Section 9 of article 9 of the constitution prohibits the legislature from delegating the power of corporate or local taxation to persons other than the corporate authorities directly elected by the people of the district to be taxed or appointed in some mode to which they have assented.

2. SAME-legislature cannot compel a municipal corporation to incur a debt against its will. Section 10 of article 9 of the constitution prohibits the legislature from creating a debt against a municipal corporation for merely local purposes and subjecting the property in such municipality to a tax for its payment without the consent of the tax-payers affected.

3. SAME part of section 40% of the Farm Drainage act is unconstitutional. Section 40% of the Farm Drainage act, in so far as it empowers commissioners of a drainage district embracing several towns to construct bridges or culverts in public highways of a town and collect the cost thereof from the road and bridge fund of the town, is in violation of sections 9 and 10 of article 9 of the constitution. (Heffner v. Cass and Morgan Counties, 193 Ill. 439, explained.)

4. DRAINAGE when bridges or culverts must be built at the expense of district. Section 40% of the Farm Drainage act requires drainage commissioners to construct all bridges and culverts along or across any public highway which may be necessary for the use or protection of the work at the expense of the district, where the necessity for them arises from the construction of an artificial ditch where no natural water-course ever existed.

5. SAME-drainage commissioners are not corporate authorities. Drainage commissioners elected in a drainage district embracing several towns are not corporate authorities of such towns, and can not be empowered by the legislature to impose a burden upon any town, without its consent, which requires resort to taxation to remove it; and this is true notwithstanding the drainage commissioners are not vested with power to levy taxes to discharge the burden.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Mason county; the Hon. T. N. MEHAN, Judge, presiding.

LYMAN LACEY, Jr., for appellants:

The commissioners of highways shall have charge of the roads and bridges of their respective towns, and it shall be their duty to keep the same in repair and to improve them, so far as practicable. Rev. Stat. chap. 121, sec. 2.

If the ditch in question had been constructed by the commissioners of highways, it would have been their duty to have constructed the bridge in controversy. Rev. Stat. chap. 121, sec. 2.

The commissioners of this special drainage district in the county of Mason and State of Illinois are authorized to bring this action. They are the corporate authorities of the district. Farm Drainage act, sec. 15a.

It is the duty of the commissioners of highways to construct the bridge in question upon demand being made upon them by the corporate authorities of the said drainage district. Having failed to do so, the commissioners of the drainage district are authorized to construct said bridge and bring this action for the money expended in constructing it. Farm Drainage act, secs. 40, 402.

A drainage district is a public corporation, in which the public have an interest, and it is only by virtue of the drainage being a matter of public improvement that the inventoried land, only, can be taxed for the improvement. Heffner v. Cass and Morgan Counties, 193 Ill. 439.

A statute imposing upon commissioners of highways the duty to restore highways at crossings to their original usefulness or to provide crossings, creates a continuing duty, and an action to compel the performance of such duty is not subject to the Statute of Limitations. 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, (2d ed.) p. 202, note 1.

Section 40% of the Farm Drainage act is constitutional. Heffner v. Cass and Morgan Counties, 193 Ill. 439.

The legislature of the State of Illinois has full power and control over the public corporations of the State. There is no constitutional restriction upon that power. Richland

County v. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 1; Dennis v. Maynard, 15 id. 480; Pike County v. State, 11 id. 202; Wetherell v. Devine, 116 id. 631; Owners of Lands v. People, 113 id. 305; Marion County v. Lear, 108 id. 349; People v. Power, 25 id. 191; Harris v. Whiteside County, 105 id. 445; Heffner v. Cass and Morgan Counties, 193 id. 439.

NORTRUP & WILLIAMS, for appellees:

It is a part of the duties of the commissioners of highways to lay out, alter, widen or vacate roads, and to exercise such care and superintendence over roads and bridges as the public good may require. Rev. Stat. chap. 121, sec. 5, subdiv. I.

If the drainage district in question, covering only about one-fourth of the area of the town of Pennsylvania, can build the bridge now sued for, it would indirectly levy a tax and compel the entire town to pay it, against the consent of the tax-payers. Taxation must be uniform within the jurisdiction imposing the same. Const. art. 9, secs. 9, 10.

Taxation cannot be imposed without the consent of the tax-payers who have to pay the same. Updike v. Wright, 81 Ill. 49; People v. Knopf, 171 id. 191.

Highway commissioners cannot be compelled, against their judgment and discretion, to build a bridge. People v. Highway Commissioners, 158 Ill. 107.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellants, as commissioners of the Central Special Drainage District in the county of Mason and State of Illinois, brought an action of debt in the circuit court of Mason county, to the February, 1906, term, against appellees, as commissioners of highways of the town of Pennsylvania, in said county, to recover the sum of $317 expended by appellants, as commissioners of such drainage district, in constructing a bridge over a ditch of the drainage district in