after the words, " if any one shall kill," has immediately added, that he may be lawfully apprehended. Keep this in your remembrance, that to try a man, and to proscribe him without allowing trial, are the most opposite things in the world. Again, the second law forbids one to ill-use or extort money from even a convicted murderer: the defendant, in making him liable to arrest, has allowed all these things; for it will be in the power of the captors to do what they please. The law requires him to be carried before the Judges, even though he be taken in the native land of the deceased: Aristocrates has permitted the very man who brings the charge to carry him to his own house, even though he has taken him in a foreign country. There are certain offences for which the law has given permission to take life: Aristocrates, without any preamble, even if life be taken under such circumstances, gives up to punishment a man whom the law lets off with impunity. If such misfortune has occurred to any one, the law requires that satisfaction shall first be demanded: Aristocrates on the contrary, without himself appointing any trial, without demanding satisfaction from the persons against whom his claim is, declares at once that the homicide may be arrested, and, whoever attempts to rescue him, he excludes that instant from the benefit of our alliance. The laws ordain that hostages to the number of three may be taken from the people among whom the homicide dwells, if they refuse to render justice: the defendant, if any one should rescue him from the captor, not liking to give him up before judgment, excludes him from our alliance immediately. The legislator forbids any one to introduce a law, unless he make it the same for all the defendant frames a special decree for an individual. The law does not permit a decree to be of greater validity than a law: Aristocrates, when so many laws are in existence, annuls them, and establishes a decree. Keep these things in your memory while you sit in judgment. Reject, refuse to hear the arguments by which they will strive to lead you astray, but bid them show you, where he has ordered any trial, or where he has said that the party convicted of murder shall suffer the penalty. Had he either said that any party tried and condemned elsewhere should be punished, or himself appointed a trial to determine the fact of homicide, or whether it were justifiable or unjustifiable, he would have done no wrong. But when after employing the simple term of accusation, "if any one shall kill," and omitting to add, "and shall be convicted of murder," or "shall be adjudged to have killed," or "let him submit to judgment for the murder," or "he shall be amenable to the same penalty as if he killed an Athenian”— omitting (in short) everything that is just he has inserted a clause for the arrest of the homicide; do not be imposed on, but rest assured that his decree is a most complete violation of law., A.PPENDIX I. CHARACTER OF THE LEPTINEAN ORATION. THIS Oration, one of the first which established the high reputation of Demosthenes for eloquence, has always been greatly admired. Ancient critics, among whom it bore the title of the "Oration on the Immunities," are unanimous in praising it: nor has it received less commendation in modern times. It is not animated with the glowing eloquence of the Philippics, but it has merits and beauties of another kind. Here we have Demosthenes in the character of the sound constitutional lawyer, or rather the sagacious politician, warning his countrymen against the dangers of an unwise measure of legislation. The speech is such as an enlightened member of the English Parliament might address to the House of Lords or Commons, or to a Committee, upon the merits of some proposed bill or its clauses: with this difference however, that it is a rare thing for an Englishman to produce an elaborate work of art like this which the Athenian has handed down to posterity. Dionysius says, that of all the speeches of Demosthenes this is the most elegant and perfect in point of composition.1 Cicero speaks of it as being peculiarly subtle in argument. Undoubtedly one of the remarkable characteristics of this Oration is its close, careful, and (speaking in a good sense) artful method of reasoning. But on another ground also it merits our peculiar attention; I mean, for the purity of sentiment and high tone of political morality which it breathes throughout. This, which in some measure redounds to the credit of the Athenians themselves, has not escaped the notice of ancient writers. Plutarch tells us, it was remarked by Panatius the Stoic, that Demosthenes usually represented virtue and honour as things to be chosen for their own sake; more especially in the Oration on the Crown, in that against Aristocrates, that on the Immunities, and the Philippics, where he urges his countrymen to disregard pleasure, profit, and ease, and in some cases to postpone even safety and security to the honourable and the becoming. If we examine the arguments of the Leptinea, we shall find this praise to be just. (1) Χαριέστατος ἁπάντων τῶν λόγων καὶ γραφικώτατος. Dionysius, ad Ammæum, 724. (2) Multæ sunt ejus totæ orationes subtiles, ut contra Leptinem. Orator, 31. While the orator does not lose sight of other topics likely to exercise an influence upon his hearers, such as the necessity of preserving to the people their privilege of making grants, the importance of holding out rewards as a stimulus to good conduct, the danger of alienating friends and benefactors, the illegal character of the proposed statute, and the like; he appeals still more confidently and vehemently to the noble and generous sentiments of his countrymen; reminding them that it was their duty to keep good faith, to maintain the character of their ancestors for truth and honour; that they should not do as a people what they would be ashamed to do as private individuals; that a good name was better than riches for a state. Gratitude was a topic naturally arising out of the question in debate; since by the law of Leptines certain rewards which had been given for services were to be abolished. To this Demosthenes recurs again and again, putting it in every kind of shape, and in connexion with it citing the names and deeds of many eminent benefactors. The case of Epicerdes the Cyrenæan was a striking one; he had assisted the Athenians at times when they were in the greatest distress, and when he could have had very little hope of ever receiving a return. "All people who rendered service should be requited," says Demosthenes, "but especially those who rendered it at a critical time like Epicerdes." He seems to dwell with particular pleasure on the glorious actions of Chabrias, whose son's cause he was partly advocating. Chabrias had lost his life in battle. Demosthenes presses this most happily upon the court:-" It would be shameful to deprive the son of a reward, which had been earned by making him an orphan. Chabrias was distinguished for being a safe and cautious general: but his caution was exercised purely on his country's behalf: his own life he willingly threw away to serve her." He winds up with a bold declaration to the jury-"It is not the law that is tried, whether it be a proper one or otherwise: you are on your probation, whether or no you are fit people to receive benefits in future." Gratitude is a frequent theme of declamation; and it is not a very difficult one; for the duty is acknowledged by all hearts. Demosthenes handles it not as a declaimer, but as an orator. Let us see how the same subject has been treated by Cicero. It is profitable and interesting to compare the two orators together. The Roman was deeply imbued with Attic lore, an ardent admirer of Demosthenes, often an imitator; yet how different are their styles. Thus he dilates on gratitude, in the Oration Pro Plancio, 33. Etenim, judices, cum omnibus virtutibus me affectum esse cupiam, tamen nihil est quod malim quam me et gratum esse et videri. Hæc est enim una virtus non solum maxima, sed etiam mater virtutum omnium reliquarum. Quid est pietas nisi voluntas grata in parentes? qui sunt boni cives, qui belli, qui domi de patriâ bere merentes, nisi qui patriæ beneficia meminerunt? qui sancti, qui religionum colentes, nisi qui meritam diis immortalibus gratiam justis honoribus et memori mente persolvunt? Quæ potest esse jucunditas vitæ, sublatis amicitiis? que porro amicitia potest esse inter ingratos? Quis est nostrum liberaliter educatus, cui non educatores, cui non magistri sui atque doctores, cui non locus ille mutus ipse, ubi altus aut doctus est, cum gratâ recordatione in mente versetur? Cujus opes tantæ esse possunt, aut umquam fuerunt, quæ sine multorum amicorum officiis stare possint? quæ certe sublatâ memoriâ et gratiâ nullæ exstare possunt. Equidem nil tam proprium hominis existimo, quam non modo beneficio sed etiam benevolentiæ significatione alligari: nihil porro tam inhumanum, tam immane, tam ferum, quam committere ut beneficio non dicam indignus, sed victus esse videare." No less strong is the language of Shakspeare in the Twelfth Night, Act III. Scene 4. I hate ingratitude more in a man Than lying, vainness, babbling, drunkenness, Demosthenes denounces the law of Leptines as tainted with the vices of envy and jealousy; vices not only odious in themselves, but un-Athenian: for it had always been the habit of his countrymen to admire and to reward distinguished merit of every kind of which the funeral honours paid to the brave who fell in battle were an example. The people should rejoice at any glorious achievements of a fellow-citizen; for by them the fame of the republic was exalted. In the same strain we find Cicero speaking, in the Oration Pro Archiâ, 9: "At iis laudibus certè non solum ipsi qui laudantur, sed etiam populi Romani nomen ornatur. In cœlum hujus proavus Cato tollitur: magnus honos populi Romani rebus adjungitur. Omnes denique illi Maximi, Marcelli, Fulvii, non sine communi omnium nostrûm laude decorantur." Again, he warns the Athenians in solemn but respectful terms(and looking at what befel them in less than twenty years after, one cannot fail to be struck by the warning)-that they should not abolish the rewards formerly given for eminent services under the idea that such services were not then needed. An occasion might arise which called for extraordinary services, such as those rendered by the patriots of olden time. In legislation they ought not to assume the impossibility of such an occurrence. The language of their laws should be as cautious as that of common life, in which all arrogance of expression was eschewed, as offensive to gods and men. He appeals more especially to that reverence for Nemesis, which formed a part of the Greek religion. The admonition however is pregnant with eternal truth, and applicable to all times and circumstances. I have said enough to show the high moral character of the Oration, which indeed cannot be too carefully studied. We are fortunate in having an excellent edition of it by F. A. Wolf, whose Commentary has not only cleared away a great many difficulties from the text, but |