THE ORATION AGAINST ANDROTION. THE ARGUMENT. THE Council of Five Hundred was required every year to build some new ships of war, and, if they failed to perform this duty, they were forbidden by a special law to ask for the customary reward of a crown, when they went out of office. It happened somewhere about the year B. C. 356, that the treasurer of the shipbuilders ran away with a sum of two talents and a half, and the Council, for want of funds, was not able to provide a single galley for the public service. Notwithstanding this, at the close of their official year Androtion moved a decree in their favour, commending them for good conduct, and awarding them a crown as usual. The decree was passed, but he was indicted and brought to trial for it by two of his personal enemies, Euctemon and Diodorus. Four charges were preferred against him: first, that he had transgressed the above-mentioned law; secondly, that his motion was not founded upon a previous resolution of the Council; thirdly, that he had been guilty of infamous practices, which disabled him to speak in public; fourthly, that he laboured under the like disability for having neglected to pay a state-debt due from his father at his decease. Euctemon, as the elder of the two prosecutors, opened the case to the jury: Diodorus followed with this speech, composed for him by Demosthenes. The orator commences by declaring the motives which induced him to prosecute. He had been deeply injured by Androtion: this, according to the opinions of his countrymen, fully justified him in coming forward as a public accuser. He then proceeds to deal with those parts of the case which had not been handled so fully by Euctemon, and especially to meet certain defences which he expected Androtion would set up. It was clear, he contends, that a constitutional principle was violated in moving a decree without the previous sanction of the Council, although there might have been some precedents for such a course. It was equally clear, that, as the Council were forbidden to ask for a crown after neglecting the duty of shipbuilding, it was illegal for any other person to move that they should be rewarded with a crown. The law which required ships to be provided was one of the greatest importance; for the safety of the commonwealth depended on her navy. It would be said, that the treasurer who ran away with the fund, and not the Council, was to blame; but it was dangerous to admit such excuses, and at any rate the law was imperative, that, if there were no ships built, there should be no crown. If it seemed hard, that five hundred councillors should suffer for the negligence or misconduct of a few persons, it would be a good lesson to them not to be guided hereafter by bad advisers. With respect to the personal charges against Androtion, he would object, that they ought not to be brought forward now, but should rather be made the subject of a distinct prosecution. The law however allowed more than one method of punishing such crimes; and wisely so; for it was dangerous to the constitution that men of infamous lives should obtain a hearing of the people. He would say perhaps, that he was persecuted because he made himself unpopular as a collector of taxes. Any such observations would be wholly irrelevant to the question before the court. The fact was however, that he had got himself appointed a commissioner for collecting arrears of property tax, and invested for that purpose with arbitrary powers, which he had exercised with unnecessary harshness, entering and searching men's houses, insulting them and throwing them into prison. By such conduct he had rendered himself odious, and not by the performance of his duty as collector; for the arrears which he had enforced the payment of were very small. The whole thing was a job of his own. Neither as a tax-collector nor in any other way had he ever rendered or sought to render a service to the state. His whole political career had been vicious and corrupt. The orator refers to one special instance, in which Androtion had contrived to rob the public by the melting down of some sacred crowns, and, after dwelling for a while on the particulars of that case, concludes with an appeal to the Athenians to choose worthier and better ministers in future. It is said that Demosthenes laboured with great care in the composition of this speech, knowing that he was opposed to an able and experienced orator, who had been a pupil of Isocrates. We find in it much of the subtlety and elegance which we have remarked in the Leptinea. As Euctemon having been wronged by Androtion, men of the jury, determines at the same time to seek justice for the commonwealth and satisfaction on his own account, I will endeavour to do the same, if I possibly can. It so happens that, while Euctemon has suffered cruel outrages in violation of all the laws, they do not equal the troubles which Androtion has caused me. The plot against my friend related to money and an unjust expulsion from Athens: but I should have been excluded from all society whatsoever, if the charges got up against me by the defendant had found credence with you. He accused me of what any one would have been afraid to mention, who did not resemble him, namely, that I had killed my own father; and having got up an indictment for impiety, not against me but against my uncle, charging as impiety that he had associated with me after an act of parricide, he put me upon a defence, in which if I had failed by any chance, I should have suffered the most cruel of injuries by his contrivance. For what friend or what stranger would have liked to meet me afterwards? what city would have allowed to be anywhere in its precincts a person supposed to be guilty of such impiety? None. I without difficulty cleared myself of the charge on my trial before you: in fact, the defendant did not obtain a fifth part of the votes. And I will endeavour with your assistance, both now and at all times hereafter, to avenge myself upon him, So much for personal matters, though indeed I could say a good deal more. As to the questions upon which you are now to give your verdict, and as to the defendant's public acts by which he has done you no little damage, I will endeavour to state briefly what it seemed to me that Euctemon had omitted, and what it is better you should hear. If I saw that Androtion had any honest defence upon the present indictment, I would not have mentioned such matters: but I am quite sure he can have nothing fair or straightforward to urge, but will try to catch your verdict by artful arguments dressed up to meet the various charges. For he is a well-trained speaker, O Athenians, and all his life has had nothing else to do. Therefore, that he may not cajole you -that he may not persuade you to vote contrary to your oaths, and to acquit a man whom on many accounts you ought to punish-attend to what I shall say. Having heard me, you will be provided with a fit answer to every plea that he can urge. He has one argument, which he thinks very clever, about the omission of a resolution of Council. There is a law, he says, that, if the Council appear to have performed their duties worthily of reward, the people shall give them their reward. The question, says he, was put by the chairman; the people voted; it was carried in the affirmative. There is no need, says he, for a previous resolution of Council here; for what took place was according to law. I think quite differently, and I imagine you will agree with me, that resolutions of Council are only to be brought up in cases where the laws permit; for upon a question that is not lawfully open surely nothing at all ought to be proposed. He will say however, that all the Councils which have ever had rewards from you have received them in this manner, and that no previous resolution of Council has ever been passed for any. I believe that what he asserts is untrue; indeed I am sure of it; but were it ever so true, when the law orders differently, we ought not surely, because an error has frequently been committed before, to persist in it now, but on the contrary, we should begin with you first and compel people to do as the law directs. Don't you tell us then about the frequency of the. practice, but show that the practice is right. If the laws have been violated formerly and you have followed the precedent, you ought not to be acquitted on that account, but to be condemned all the more. For as, if any of the former parties had been convicted, you would not have moved this decree, so, if you are punished now, no one will move it again.1 1 This argument is repeated in partly the same words in the Aristocratea, p. 653. It is cited with praise by Quintilian, v. 14, and Aulus Gellius, x. 19. It touches a question which frequently arises, both in courts of judicature and elsewhere, how far and in what manner it is right to punish people for unlawful or vicious practices, which have long been tolerated or connived at. It is urged on the one hand, "how hard it would be, that a man should suffer for doing what hundreds had done before him with impunity;" to which it is replied, "we must begin with some one; it is necessary to make an example; else the thing will go on for ever;" and the like. Thus we find Cicero reasoning on the subject. In Verrem, Act II. Lib. iii. 88: "Quid igitur dicet? Fecisse alios. Quid est hoc? Utrum crimini defensio, an comitatus exilio quæritur? Tu in hac republicâ, atque in hâc hominum libidine et (ut adhuc habuit se status judiciorum) etiam licentiâ, non ex jure, non ex æquitate, non ex lege, non ex eo quod oportuerit, non ex eo quod licuerit, sed ex eo quod aliquis fecerit, id quod reprehenditur recte factum esse defendes? . . . . . Illud, in quo te gravissime accusavi, quod ob judicandam rem pecuniam accepisses, eâdem istâ ratione defendes, fecisse alios? Ut ego assentiar orationi, defensionem tamen non probabo. Potius enim, te damnato, ceteris angustior locus improbitatis defendendæ relinquatur, quam, te absoluto, alii quod audacissime fecerunt recte fecisse existimentur." Again, ibid, ss. 89, 90: "Desinite dubitare, utrum sit utilius, propter multos improbos uni parcere, an unius improbi supplicio multorum improbitatem coercere. Quo me igitur, aut ad quæ exempla revocas? Ab illis hominibus qui tum versati sunt in republicâ, cùm et optimi mores erant, et hominum existimatio gravis habebatur, et judicia severa fiebant, ad hanc hominum licentiam et libidinem me abducis? Et in quos aliquid exempli populus Romanus statui putat oportere, ab iis tu defensionis exempla quæris?" [It As to the law which expressly forbids the Council to ask for their reward without having built the ships, it is worth while to hear the defence which he will set up, and, by what he will venture to argue, to see what an impudent person he is. "The law," says he, "forbids the Council to ask for their reward, if they have built no galleys; I concede. But it nowhere prevents the people granting a reward:" he says. "If I gave it at their request, I have moved contrary to the law but if I have made no mention of the ships in the whole of my decree, and assign some other reasons for awarding a crown to the Council, how have I moved contrary to the law?" To this it is not difficult for you to make a proper reply-first, that the committee of Council and the chairman who puts these things to the vote asked the question, and divided the assembly on it-" who thinks that the Council It is worth while also to compare the language of the Duke in Measure for Measure, Act I. Sc. 4: DUKE. We have strict statutes and most biting laws, (The needful bits and curbs for headstrong steeds,) That goes not out to prey: Now, as fond fathers, Becomes more mocked than feared, so our decrees, The baby beats the nurse, and quite athwart FRIAR. It rested in your Grace DUKE. I do fear, too dreadful : Sith 'twas my fault to give the people scope, "Twould be my tyranny to strike and gall them And not the punishment. Therefore indeed, my father, I have on Angelo imposed the office; Who may, in the ambush of my name, strike home, To do it slander. |