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is enough to point out that the particular sensible Hoc Aliquid is declared to be the ultimate subject, to which all Universals attach, as determinants or accompaniments; and that if this condition be wanting, the unattached Universal cannot rank among complete Entia. The Subject or First Substance, which can never become a predicate, is established as the indispensable ultimate subject for all predicates; if that disappears, all predicates disappear along with it. The Particular thus becomes the keystone of the arch whereon all Universals rest. Aristotle is indeed careful to point out a gradation in these predicates; some are essential to the subject, and thus approach so near to the First Substance that he calls them Second Substances; others, and the most in number, are not thus essential; these last are Concomitants or Accidents, and some of them fall so much short of complete Entity that he

These ten κατηγορίαι—γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν, sometimes simply τά γενη -σxÝμаTа Twν karηyopiwv-Prædicamenta in Latin-are as follows:1. Ovoía-Substantia-Substance.

2. IIooov Quantum-Quantity. 3. Iloiòr-Quale-Quality.

4. IIpóc Ti-Ad aliquid-Relation. 5. Пoù-Ubi-Location.

6. ПóтE-Quando-Period of Time.

7. Keiola-Jacēre-Attitude, Posture.

8. "Exev-Habere-Equipment, Appurtenances, Property. 9. Пotiv-Facere-Active occupation.

10. Пláσxew-Pati--Passive occupation.

1. The first Category, Substance, is distributed into Prima and Secunda. Prima, which is Substance par excellence, can only serve as a Subject in propositions, and can never be a Predicate. It is indispensable as a substratum for predicates; though alone and without some of them, it is a mere unmeaning term. Substantia Secunda describes the Species or Genus that includes the First. Respecting an unknown Subject-Kallias-you ask, What is Kallias? Answer is made by declaring the Second Substance, the Species he belongs to--Kallias is

a man.

2. Quantum-How large is he? To this question answer is made under the same Category-He is six feet high, as thin as Kinesias, &c. 3. Quale What manner of man is he? Answer the third Category -He is fair, flat-nosed, muscular, &c.

4. Relata What are the relations that he stands in? He is father, master, director, &c.

5. Ubi-Where is he? In his house, in the market-place, &c.

6. Quando-Of what point of time do you speak? Yesterday, last year, now, &c.

7. Jacere-In what attitude or posture is he? He is lying down, standing upright, kneeling, &c.

8. Habere-What has he in the way of clothing, equipment, arms, property? He has boots, sword and shield, an axe, a house, &c.

9. Facere-In what is he actively occupied? He is speaking, writing, fencing, cutting wood, &c.

10. Pati-In what is he passively occupied? He is being beaten, reproved, rubbed, having his hair cut, &c.

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describes them as near to Non-Entia. But all of them, essential or unessential, are alike constituents or appendages of the First Substance or Particular Subject, and have no reality in any other character.

We thus have the counter-theory of Aristotle against the Platonic Realism. Instead of separate Universal substances, containing in themselves full reality, and forfeiting much of that reality when they faded down into the shadowy copies called Particulars, he inverts the Platonic order, announces full reality to be the privilege of the Particular Sensible, and confines the function of the Universal to that of a Predicate, in or along with the Particular. There is no doctrine that he protests against more frequently, than the ascribing of separate reality to the Universal. The tendency to do this, he signalizes as a natural but unfortunate

Such is the list of Categories, or decuple classification of predicates, drawn up by Aristotle, seemingly from the comparison of many different propositions. He himself says, that there are various predicates that might be referred to more than one of the several heads; and he does not consider this as an objection to the classification. The fourth classRelata-ought to be considered as including them all; the first Category is the common and indispensable Correlate to all the others. Aristotle's conception of relation is too narrow, and tied down by grammatical conjunctions of words. Yet it must be said, that the objections to his classification on this ground, are applicable also to the improved classifications of modern times, which dismiss the six last heads, and retain only the four firstSubstance, Quantity, Quality, Relation. Of these four, the three first properly rank under the more general head of Relata.

Among all the ten heads of the Aristotelian scheme, the two that have been usually considered as most incongruous, and least entitled to their places, are, No. 7 and 8-Jacēre and Habere. They are doubtless peculiarities; and they may fairly be considered as revealing the first projection of the scheme in Aristotle's mind. He began by conceiving an individual man as the Subject, and he tried to classify the various predicates applicable in reply to questions respecting the same. Now, in this point of view, the seventh and eighth Categories will be found important; referring to facts constantly varying, and often desirable to know; moreover not fit to rank under any of the other general heads, except under Relata, which comprises them as well as all the rest. But Aristotle afterwards proceeded to stretch the application of the scheme, so as to comprehend philosophy generally, and other subjects of Predication besides the individual man. Here undoubtedly the seventh and eighth heads appear narrow and trivial. Aristotle probably would never have introduced them, had such enlarged purpose been present to his mind from the beginning. Probably, too, he was not insensible to the perfection of the number Ten.

Aristot. Metaph., E. 1026, b. 21. paíveraι yàp тò ovμßeßnkòç ¿yyús τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.

There cannot be a stronger illustration of the difference between the Platonic and the Aristotelian point of view, than the fact that Plato applies the same designation to all particular objects of sense-that they are only mid-way between Entia and Non-Entia. (Republic, v. 478-479.)

illusion, lessening the beneficial efficacy of universal demonstrative reasoning. And he declares it to be a corollary, from this view of the Particular as indispensable subject, along with the Universal as its predicate:-That the first principles of demonstration in all the separate theoretical sciences, must be obtained by induction from particulars: first by impressions of sense preserved in the memory; then by multiplied remembrances enlarged into one experience; lastly, by many experiences generalized into one principle by the Noûs.†

While Aristotle thus declares Induction to be the source from whence demonstration in these separate sciences draws its first principles, we must at the same time acknowledge that his manner of treating science is not always conformable to this declaration, and that he often seems to forget Induction altogether. This is the case not only in his First Philosophy, or Metaphysics, but also in his Physics. He there professes to trace out what he calls beginnings, causes, elements, &c., and he analyzes most of the highest generalities. Yet still these analytical enquiries (whatever be their value) are usually, if not always, kept in subordination to the counter-theory that he had set up against the Platonic Realism. Complete reality resides (he constantly repeats) only in the particular sensible substances and sensible facts or movements that compose the aggregate Cosmos; which is not generated, but eternal, both as to substance and as to movement. If these sensible substances disappear, nothing remains. The beginnings and causes exist only relatively to these particulars. Form, Matter, Privation, are not real Beings, antecedent to the Cosmos, and pre-existent generators of the substances constituting the Cosmos; they are logical fragments or factors, obtained by mental analysis and comparison, assisting to methodize our philosophical point of view or conception of those substances; but incapable of being understood, and having no value of their own apart from the substances. Some such logical analysis (that of Aristotle or some other) is an indispensable condition even of the most strictly inductive philosophy.

There are some portions of the writings of Aristotle (especially the third book De Anima and the twelfth book of the Metaphysica) where he appears to lose sight of the limit here indicated; but with few exceptions, we find him constantly remembering, and often repeating, the great truth formulated in his Categories—that full or substantive reality resides only in the Hoc Aliquid, with its predicates implicated with it-and that even the highest of these predicates (Second Substances) have no reality apart from some one of their particulars. We must recollect that though Aristotle

* Aristot. Analyt. Poster., I., p. 85, a. 31, b. 19.

+ See the concluding chapter of the Analytica Posteriora.

A similar doctrine is stated by Plato in the Phædon (p. 96 B.), as one among the intellectual phases that Sokrates had passed through in the course of his life, without continuing in them.

REALISM CONTESTED UNDER THE FIRST CATEGORY. 21

denies to the predicates a separate reality, he recognizes in them an adjective reality, as accompaniments and determinants: he contemplates all the ten Categories as distinct varieties of existence.* This is sufficient as a basis for abstraction, whereby we can name them and reason upon them as distinct objects of thought or points of view, although none of them come into reality except as implicated with a sensible particular. Of such reasoning Aristotle's First Philosophy chiefly consists; and he introduces peculiar phrases to describe this distinction of reason, between two different points of view, where the real object spoken of is one and the same. The frequency of the occasions taken to point out that distinction, mark his anxiety to keep the First Philosophy in harmony with the theory of reality announced in his Categories.

The Categories of Aristotle appear to have become more widely known than any other part of his philosophy. They were much discussed by the sects coming after him; and even when not adopted, were present to speculative minds as a scheme to be amended.† Most of the arguments turned upon the nine later Categories; it was debated whether these were properly enumerated and discriminated, and whether the enumeration as a whole was exhaustive.

With these details, however, the question between Realism and its counter-theory (whether Conceptualism or Nominalism) is not materially concerned. The standard against Realism was raised by Aristotle in the First Category, when he proclaimed the Hoc Aliquid to be the only complete Ens, and the Universal to exist only along with it as a predicate, being nothing in itself apart; and when he enumerated Quality as one among the predicates, and nothing beyond. In the Platonic Realism (Phædon, Timæus, Parmenides) what Aristotle called Quality was the highest and most incontestable among all Substances -- the Good, the Beautiful, the Just, &c.; what Aristotle called Second Substance was also Substance in the Platonic Realism, though not so incontestably; but what Aristotle called First Substance was in the Platonic Realism no Substance at all, but only one among a multitude of confused and transient shadows. It is in the First and Third Categories that the capital antithesis of Aristotle against the Platonic Realism is contained. As far as that antithesis is concerned, it matters little whether the aggregate of predicates be subdivided under nine general heads (Categories) or under three.

In the century succeeding Aristotle, the STOIC philosophers altered his Categories, and drew up a new list of their own, containing only four distinct heads instead of ten. We have no record or explanation of the Stoic Categories from any of their

* Aristot. Metaphys., Δ. 1017, a. 24. ὁσαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται (τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας) τοσαυταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει.

This is the just remark of Trendelenburg-Kategorienlehre―p. 217.

authors; so that we are compelled to accept the list on secondary authority, from the comments of critics, mostly opponents. But, as far as we can make out, they retained in their First Category the capital feature of Aristotle's First Category; the primacy of the First Substance or Hoc Aliquid, and its exclusive privilege of imparting reality to all the other Categories. Indeed, the Stoics seem not only to have retained this characteristic, but to have exaggerated it. They did not recognize so close an approach of the Universal to the Particular, as is implied by giving to it s second place in the same Category, and calling it Second Substance. The First Category of the Stoics (Something or Subject) included only particular substances; all Universals were by them ranked in the other Categories, being regarded as negations of substances, and designated by the term Non-Somethings-NonSubstances.

The Neo-Platonist PLOTINUS, in the third century after the Christian era, agreed with the Stoics (though looking from the opposite point of view) in disapproving Aristotle's arrangement of Second Substance in the same Category with First Substance.t He criticises at some length both the Aristotelian list of Categories, and the Stoic list; but he falls back into the Platonic and even the Parmenidean point of view. His capital distinction is between Cogitables and Sensibles. The Cogitabilia are in his view the most real; (i.e. the Aristotelian Second Substance is more real than the First ;) among them the highest, Unum or Bonum, is the grand fountain and sovereign of all the rest. Plotinus thus departed altogether from the Aristotelian Categories, and revived the Platonic or Parmenidean Realism; yet not without some Aristotelian modifications. But it is remarkable that in this departure his devoted friend and scholar PORPHYRY did not follow him. Porphyry not only composed an Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle, but also vindicated them at great length, in a separate commentary, against the censures of Plotinus: Dexippus, Jamblichus, and Simplicius, followed in the same track. Still, though Porphyry stood forward both as admirer and champion of the Aristotelian Categories, he did not consider that the question raised by the First Category of Aristotle against the Platonic Realism was finally decided. This is sufficiently proved by the three problems cited above out of the Introduction of Porphyry; where he proclaims it to be a deep and difficult inquiry, whether Genera and Species had not a real substantive existence apart from the individuals composing them. Aristotle, both in the Categories and in many other places, had declared his opinion distinctly in the negative, against Plato: but Porphyry had not made up his mind between

Prantl-Gesch. der Logik. Vol. I. sect. vi. p. 420. ou Tiva rà κοινὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς λέγεται, &c.

+ Plotinus. Ennead. VI. 1, 2.

Simplicius. Schol. in Aristotel. Categ.-p. 40 a-b. Brandis.

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