and, in remembering it, a different portion. The facts are opposed to such a conclusion.

In very lively recollection, we find a tendency to repeat the actual movements. Thus, in mentally recalling a verbal train, we seem to repeat, on the tongue, the very words; the recollection consists of a suppressed articulation. A mere addition to the force or vehemence of the idea, or the withdrawal of the restraint of the will, would make us speak out what we speak inwardly. Now, the tendency of the idea of an action to become the action, shows that the idea is already the fact in a weaker form. But if so, it must be performing the same nervous rounds, or occupying the same circles of the brain, in both states.

The same doctrine must equally apply to the Sensations of the Senses, and will derive illustration from them. The mere idea of a nauseous taste can excite the reality even to the production of vomiting. The sight of a person about to pass a sharp instrument over glass excites the well-known sensation in the teeth. The sight of food makes the saliva begin to flow. In the mesmeric experiments, this effect is carried still farther; the patient, through the suggested idea of intoxication, simulates the reality. Persons of weak nerves have been made ill actually, by being falsely told that they looked ill.

So it is with the special Emotions and passions. The thought or recollection of anger brings on the same expression of countenance, the same gestures, as the real passion. The memory of a fright is the fright re-induced, in a weaker shape.

To this doctrine it may be objected, that the loss of eyesight would be the loss of memory of visible things; that Milton's imagination must have been destroyed when he became blind. The answer is, that the inner circles of the brain must ever be the chief part of the agency both in sensations and in ideas. The destruction of the organ of sense, while rendering sensation impossible, can be but a small check upon the inward activity; it cuts off merely the extremity of the course described by the nerve currents. Moreover, the decay of the optic sensibility does not impair the activity of the muscles of the eye, wherein are embodied the perceptions of visible motion, form, extension, &c., which are one half, and not the least important half, of the picture.

12. The tendency in all Ideas to become Actualities, according to their intensity, is a source of active impulses distinct from the ordinary motives of the Will.

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The mes

The Will is under the two influences-pleasure and pain; being urged to the one and from the other. But an idea strongly possessed may induce us to act out that idea, even although it leads to pain rather than to pleasure. meric sleep shows the extreme instance; in ordinary sleep, also, we are withdrawn from the correcting influence of actualities, and follow out whatever fancy crosses the view. In the waking state, we do not, as a rule, act out our ideas; they are seldom strong enough to neutralize the operation of the will. Still the power exists, and is, on occasions, fully manifested.

As an unequivocal instance of the power of an idea to generate its actuality, we may quote the infection of special forms of crime, and even of self-destruction. The impression made on susceptible minds by some notorious example is often carried out to the full, in spite of the deterring action of the usual motives of the will.

The fascination of a precipice is also in point. The spectator, seeing himself near precipitation, has the act of falling so forcibly suggested, that he has to put forth an effort of will to resist the suggestion.

Temptation to do something forbidden often comes of merely suggesting the idea, which is then a power to act itself out. In this way, ambition is inflamed, so as to master the sober calculation of future happiness.

The operation of an idea strongly possessed is especially prominent in the outgoings of Fear. It is the peculiarity of this passion to impress the mind unduly with its object, to magnify evil possibilities, and so to exaggerate the idea of escape, that one cannot be restrained from acting it out.

13. In the workings of Sympathy, there seems to be the carrying out of an Idea, apart from the usual operation of the will.

If the will be defined the pursuit of pleasure and the abstinence from pain, then disinterested conduct, involving frequently self-sacrifice, must spring from some other part of our nature. Now, as we are able, by means of our own experience, to form ideas of other men's pains and pleasures, we are disposed, according to the principle in question, to act these out, even although we forfeit a certain amount of pleasure, or incur a certain amount of pain. We conceive the pain of another man's hunger, and act out the idea by procuring for him food, even at some cost to ourselves.

14. It is a consequence of the doctrine as to the seat of revived feelings, that the Idea and the Actuality must have a great deal in common.

Memory and Imagination may be described in the language used for sensation, with certain allowances. A person vividly recollecting a former transaction, exclaims, 'I now see before me.' Next, the delicacy of the senses is likely to be reproduced in the recollection and in the imagination. Also, for the purposes of the will, in pursuit or in avoidance, the idea operates like the actuality. Farther, the same exhaustion of brain, and in the same parts, follows prolonged exercise in sensation and in thought.

15. Feelings of Movement may be associated together. Since we can repeat mentally the steps of any complicated action, as a dance, we may, in consequence of this mental repetition, strengthen the cohesion of the train of movements. Practically, the process is seen at work in our vocal acquirements. We can acquire trains of language, without repeating aloud, although perhaps not quite so well. Children have often to learn their lessons by conning them in a whisper, which is the next stage to a mere idea. So, in meditating a discourse, and fixing it in the memory, without writing, as was the practice of Robert Hall, an adhesion takes place between ideal movements of articulation.

16. The Growth of Associations among Ideal movements must be supposed to follow the law of associations among the corresponding Actual movements.

The centres where the connexions are formed being the same, the only difference will be the feebler impetus of nerve action in the case of the ideal movements. Under great excitement, this difference will not exist, and the adhesion may be equally good in both.

Hence in any part of the system, where the adhesiveness of actual movements is good, that of ideal movements will be good also; and all the circumstances and endowments favour ing one will favour both.

17. A movement, whether real or ideal, is Mentally known as a definite Expenditure of Energy in some Special muscle or muscles.

We must first discriminate degrees of expenditure, and next associate the different modes or degrees into grouped

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situations. A delicate discrimination is thus the condition of all retentiveness, as it marks out clearly the distinctive features of what is to be retained. To this we must add, as above remarked, that nice discrimination is to be regarded as indicating a superior organization in the centres of muscular activity-a higher multiplication of the nervous elements, whence arises a corresponding superiority in the plastic power, or Retentiveness.

SENSATIONS OF THE SAME SENSE.

18. Throughout all the Senses, the associating process connects sensations that happen frequently together.

In the inferior senses, the examples are neither numerous nor interesting. We may have a series of Organic pains, representing the course of an attack of illness, and remembered by the patient. We might also have a train of ideas of Taste, the first recalling to the mind all the rest; but there are few occasions for acquiring such trains. As regards Smell, there might be a succession of odours, regularly encountered in going in a particular track, through gardens, &c.; and if such an experience were often repeated, there would be found in the memory a cohering train of ideas of smell; the occurrence of one to the mind would suggest the others.

19. In the same operation that fixes, in the mind, a train of ideas, formed from sensations, the individual ideas become Self-sustaining.

In order that the first member of an often repeated train of tastes or odours should recall the next, each must be so far impressed or engrained that it can subsist of itself, without the original, to a greater or less degree of vividness. Before the taste of bread recalls the taste and relish of butter, usually conjoined, we must have tasted butter often enough to be able to retain some idea, more or less adequate, of that particular taste. This is equally a consequence of the retentive process of the mind, and follows all the laws governing the rate of adhesive growth.

The simplest sensation that we can have is a complex fact, as far as concerns being retained. A coherence must be effected in the mechanism of the brain, to enable a touch, or sound, or an idea of light, to possess a mental persistence; and the greater the degree of this coherence, in consequence of repetition and the other means of retentiveness, the better will be the mental conception.

20. The cohesive grouping of Sensations of the same sense appears largely in Touch.

In Touch, we have great variety of sensations; the purely emotional,- -as soft touches and pungent touches; and those entering into intellectual perceptions, -as the feelings of roughness, weight, size, form, &c. Associations are formed among the different modes of these sensations; resulting in our tactual notions of familiar things. The child accustomed to handle a muff, forms an association between its softness, its elasticity, and its warmth to the touch; to these are added the muscular elements of size and form. If this aggregate has been definitely connected in one group, by familiarity with the same thing, the experience of one of the qualities would recall the whole aggregate. The soft touch would make the mind expect everything else. So it is that we acquire distinctive notions of all the objects we are accustomed to handle; the lady knows her fan in the dark, the workman knows the tool he wants by the first contact; we each know whether we touch the poker or the hearth brush, a cinder or an ivory ball, a pen or a piece of string, a book or the cat, the table or the mantel-shelf. Every one of these familiar things is a definite grouping by plastic association between different modes of touch, some purely tactile, and others muscular.

Of course, one definite touch will not recall the whole of the tactile qualities of a specific object, unless there has been an exclusive association. When the cold touch of polished marble has been associated with many different forms, it will not recall any one in particular. The hand placed on a wooden surface tells nothing, because so many known things have the same touch; either a plurality of different objects will be recalled, or some one will be singled out by other links of association, or there will be no revival at all.

21. In considering the Rate of Acquirement among associations of Touch we must take into account, besides the general conditions of acquirement, the special character of the sense.

Touch being a two-fold sense, we must refer to the constituents in separation.

The purely tactile sensibility, the passive element of touch, is, in the scale of intellect, superior to Taste and Smell, inferior to Hearing and Sight. This comparative superiority and inferiority must be supposed to attach equally to the discrimi

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