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virtue is happiness, even in this world; and, if there be any exception to the rule, it will be rectified in another world. This is in fact the Platonic view. Men are not to pursue happiness; that would be to fall into the narrow rut of selflove, and would be a failure; they are to pursue virtue,) (including the good of others, and the greatest happiness will

ensue to each.

It is a remarkable indication of the spirit of Butler's age, or of his estimate of it, that he would never venture to require of any one a single act of uncompensated self-sacrifice.

IV. The substance of the Moral Code of Butler is in no respect peculiar to him. He gives no classification of our duties. His means and inducements to virtue have just been remarked upon.

V.-The relationship of Ethics to Politics and to Theology needs no remark.

FRANCIS HUTCHESON. [1694-1747.]

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Hutcheson's views are to be found in his 'Inquiry into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,' his Treatise on the Passions,' and his posthumous work, 'A System of Moral Philosophy.' The last-mentioned, as the completest exposition of his Ethics, Speculative and Practical, is followed here.

There are three books; the first treating of Human Nature and Happiness; the second, of Laws of Nature and Duties, previous to Civil Government and other adventitions states; the third, of Civil Polity.

In Book I., Chap. I., Hutcheson states that the aim of Moral Philosophy is to point out the course of action that will best promote the highest happiness and perfection of men, by the light of human nature and to the exclusion of revelation; thus to indicate the rules of conduct that make up the Law of Nature. Happiness, the end of this art, being the state of the mind arising from its several grateful perceptions or modifications, the natural course of the inquiry is to consider the various human powers, perceptions, and actions, and then to compare them so as to find what really constitutes happiness, and how it may be attained. The principles that first display themselves in childhood are the external senses, with some small powers of spontaneous motion, introducing to the mind perceptions of pleasure and pain, which becoming forthwith the object of desire and aversion, are our first notions of natural good and evil. Next to Ideas of Sensation, we acquire Concomitant ideas of Sensation from

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two or more senses together-number, extension, &c. Ideas of consciousness or reflection, which is another natural power of perception, complete the list of the materials of knowledge; to which, when the powers of judging and reasoning are added, all the main acts of the understanding are given. There are still, however, some finer perceptions, that may be left over until the will is disposed of.

Under the head of Will, he notes first the facts of Desire and Aversion, being new motions of the soul, distinct from, though arising out of, sensations, perceptions, and judgments. To these it is common to add Joy and Sorrow, arising in connexion with desire, though they partake more of sensations than of volitions. Acts of the will are selfish or benevolent, according as one's own good, or (as often really in fact happens) the good of others is pursued. Two calm natural determinations of the will are to be conceded; the one an invariable constant impulse towards one's own highest perfection and happiness; the other towards the universal happiness of others, when the whole system of beings is regarded without prejudice, and in the absence of the notion that their happiness interferes with our own. There are also turbulent passions and appetites, whose end is their simple gratification; whereupon the violence and uneasiness cease. are selfish-hunger, lust, power, fame; some benevolent-pity, gratitude, parental affection, &c.; others may be of either kind-anger, envy, &c. In none of them is there any reference in the mind to the greatest happiness of self or others; and that they stand so often in real opposition to the calm motions, is sufficient proof of their distinct character, e.g., the opposition of lust and calm regard for one's highest interest.

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In Chapter II., he takes up some finer powers of perception, and some other natural determinations of the will. Bound up with seeing and hearing are certain other powers of perception or senses-Beauty, Imitation, Harmony, Design, summed up by Addison under the name of Imagination, and all natural sources of pleasure. The two grateful perceptions of Novelty and Grandeur may be added to the list of natural determinations or senses of pleasure. To attempt to reduce the natural sense of Beauty to the discernment of real or apparent usefulness is hopeless. The next sense of the soul noted is the Sympathetic, in its two Phases of Pity or Compassion and Congratulation. This is fellowfeeling on apprehending the state of others, and proneness to relieve, without any thought of our own advantage, as seen

in children. Pity is stronger than congratulation, because, whether for ourselves or others, the desire to repel evil is stronger than to pursue good. Sympathy extends to all the affections and passions; it greatly subserves the grand determination of the soul towards universal happiness.

Other finer senses have actions of men for their objects, there being a general determination of the soul to exercise all its active powers,-a universal impulse to action, bodily and intellectual. In all such action there is real pleasure, but the grand source of human happiness is the power of perceiving the moral notions of actions and characters. This, the Moral Sense, falls to be fully discussed later. Distinct from our moral sense is the Sense of Honour or Shame, when we are praised or condemned by others. The Sense ofj Decency or Dignity, when the mind perceives excellence of bodily and mental powers in ourselves or others, is also natural, and distinct from the moral sense. Some would allow a natural Sense of the Ridiculous in objects or events. There follow some remarks on the tendency to associate perceptions. In addition also to the natural propensity towards action, there is a tendency in repeated action to become Habit, whereby our powers are greatly increased. Habit and Customs can raise, however, no new ideas beyond the sentiments naturally excited by the original actions.

Sexual desire, wisely postponed by nature beyond the earliest years, does not, in man, end in mere sensual pleasure, but involves a natural liking of beauty as an indication of temper and manners, whereupon grow up esteem and love. Mankind have a universal desire of offspring, and love for their young; also an affection, though weaker, for all bloodrelations. They have, further, a natural impulse to society with their fellows, as an immediate principle, and are not driven to associate only by indigence. All the other principles already mentioned, having little or no exercise in solitude, would bring them together, even without family ties. Patriotism and love of country are acquired in the midst of social order.

Natural Religion inevitably springs up in the best minds at sight of the benevolent order of the world, and is soon diffused among all. The principles now enumerated will be found, though in varying proportions, among all men not plainly monstrous by accident, &c.

Chapter III. treats of the Ultimate Determinations of the Will and Benevolent Affections. The question now is to find

BENEVOLENCE.

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some order and subordination among the powers that have been cited, and to discover the ultimate ends of action, about which there is no reasoning. He notices various systems that make calm self-love the one leading principle of action, and specially the system that, allowing the existence of particular disinterested affections, puts the self-satisfaction felt in yielding to the generous sentiments above all other kinds of enjoyments. But, he asks, is there not also a calm determination towards the good of others, without reference to private interest of any kind? In the case of particular desires, which all necessarily involve an uneasy sensation until they are gratified, it is no proof of their being selfish that their gratification gives the joy of success and stops uneasiness. On the other hand, to desire the welfare of others in the interest of ourselves is not benevolence nor virtue. What we have to seek are benevolent affections terminating ultimately in the good of others, and constituted by nature (either alone, or mayhap corroborated by some views of interest) the immediate cause of moral approbation.' Now, anything to be had from men could not raise within us such affections, or make us careful about anything beyond external deportment. Nor could rewards from God, or the wish for self-approbation, create such affections, although, on the supposition of their existence, these may well help to foster them. It is benevolent dispositions that we morally approve; but dispositions are not to be raised by will. Moreover, they are often found where there has been least thought of cultivating them; and, sometimes, in the form of parental affection, gratitude, &c., they are followed so little for the sake of honour and reward, that though their absence is condemned, they are themselves hardly accounted virtuous at all. He then rebuts the idea that generous affections are selfish, because by sympathy we make the pleasures and pains of others our own. Sympathy is a real fact, but has regard only to the distress or suffering beheld or imagined in others, whereas generous affection is varied toward different characters. Sympathy can never explain the immediate ardour of our good-will towards the morally excellent character, or the eagerness of a dying man for the prosperity of his children and friends. Having thus accepted the existence of purely disinterested affections, and divided them as before into calm and turbulent, he puts the question, Whether is the selfish or benevolent principle to yield in case of opposition? And although it appears that, as a fact, the universal happiness is preferred to the individual in the order.

of the world by the Deity, this is nothing, unless by some determination of the soul we are made to comply with the Divine intentions. If by the desire of reward, it is selfishness still; if by the desire, following upon the sight, of moral excellence, then there must necessarily exist as its object some determination of the will involving supreme moral excellence, otherwise there will be no way of deciding between particular affections. This leads on to the consideration of the Moral Faculty.

But, in the beginning of Chapter IV., he first rejects one by one these various accounts of the reason of our approbation of moral conduct:-pleasure by sympathy; pleasure through the moral sense; notion of advantage to the agent, or to the approver, and this direct or imagined; tendency to procure honour; conformity to law, to truth, fitness, congruity, &c.; also education, association, &c. He then asserts a natural and immediate determination in man to approve certain affections and actions consequent on them; or a natural sense of immediate excellence in them, not referred to any other quality perceivable by our other senses, or by reasoning. It is a sense not dependent on bodily organs, but a settled determination of the soul. It is a sense, in like manner as, with every one of our powers-voice, designing, motion, reasoning, there is bound up a taste, sense, or relish, discerning and recommending their proper exercise; but superior to all these, because the power of moral action is superior. It can be trained like any other sense-hearing, harmony, &c.-so as to be brought to approve finer objects, for instance the general happiness rather than mere motions of pity. That it is meant to control and regulate all the other powers is matter of immediate consciousness; we must ever prefer moral good to the good apprehended by the other perceptive powers. For while every other good is lessened by the sacrifices made to gain it, moral good is thereby increased and relished the more. The objects of moral approbation are primarily affections of the will, but, all experience shows, only such as tend to the happiness) \of others, and the moral perfection of the mind possessing them. There are, however, many degrees of approbation; and, when we put aside qualities that approve themselves merely to the sense of decency or dignity, and also the calm desire of private good, which is indifferent, being neither virtuous nor vicious, the gradation of qualities morally approved may be given thus: (1) Dignified abilities (pursuit of sciences, &c.), showing a taste above sensuality

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