off. The crisis became more and more acute, and the conflict extended gradually to the whole foreign management and representation. The questions in dispute are now: The nationality of the foreign minister; his responsibility towards one or both national representations, or towards delegates chosen by them both; the continuation or dissolution of the previous common action of the countries in regard to the diplomatic and consular services. and handed over to purely Swedish | promise, and could only place the aims institutions, the Swedish Riksdag and and means of the Swedish policy in the Ministerielle Statsraad. For the anything but a favorable light. The latter remained, in spite of the pres- negotiations were, therefore, broken ence of a single Norwegian, a purely Swedish institution, mentioned only in the Swedish and not in the Norwegian Grundlov. The rights of Norway as a sovereign and independent State had previously not been expressly negatived in the international law of the countries, although not fully realized. But by the reform of 1885 they were formally denied, and trampled under foot as long as steps were not taken from the side of Norway to counteract its effects. Norway was in an unveiled The different opinions or shades of manner placed under Swedish suprem- opinion at present current within the acy in regard to some of the most Norwegian and the Swedish nations or important matters of State. If the the solution of these problems may be Norwegians had accepted this change characterized thus: in their constitutional status, they would have signed their own sentence of death as an independent nation. The Norwegian Liberals hold that Norway is not only not bound by contract to the existing Swedish manageThere was also a feeling in Swedish ment of the foreign affairs and the ruling circles that their country had foreign representation of both counusurped by this reform such great ad-tries, but that this arrangement is vantages, that it was necessary, for incompatible with formal stipulations very shame, to offer Norway a small in the Norwegian Grundlov as well as equivalent. Negotiations were conse- with the principle of equality and equal quently opened with the Norwegian rights of both the countries contained government, and such an equivalent in the first clause of the Rigsakt, and was offered, originally a very slight that it is therefore quite illegal. As its one Norway should have two mem- programme, for which it obtained a bers against the Swedish three in the majority of the last general election, "Ministerielle Statsraad;" later on the Liberals have demanded: Dissolusomewhat more - that there should be tion of the existing fusion between the three Norwegian and three Swedish countries, in so far as it is not fixed by members. But as it was at the same contract; that Norway and Sweden time demanded that to get these con- should have each their own minister, cessions the Norwegians should agree responsible for the foreign policy to the that the foreign minister should be a national representations; and that both Swede and a member of the Swedish countries should have their separate Cabinet, or, in other words, that they consular and diplomatic services, which should become a party to an equally would not preclude their being in many stupid and dishonorable traffic with cases represented by the same person. their inalienable rights as a sovereign The prevalent opinion within the power, and enter into a contract by Norwegian Right is that although the which they acknowledged the Swedish existing arrangement for the managesupremacy and management of the ment of foreign affairs and foreign Norwegian foreign policy, these nego-representation is not fixed by contract, tiations, of course, came to nothing. it is not illegal that the existing comThey were looked upon by the Norwe-munity between the countries belongs gians rather as an attempt to take us to the "nature of the Union,” and is by surprise than as an offer of com- necessary to its existence-that it ought, therefore, to be maintained in its an equivalent by which the Union full extent, covering not only the question of peace or war but all relations with foreign powers; but at the same time it is held that a more thorough realization of the principle of equality within this community ought to be obtained. Instead of leaving, as now, the management to the Swedish foreign minister, they desire a real common minister, Norwegian or Swede, responsible towards both the Norwegian and the Swedish representatives, or towards delegates chosen by them both, and composed of an equal number of Norwegians and Swedes. might be strengthened and extended to some purpose. Various views have been expressed both as to the amount and the kind of this equivalent. Some would seem to be satisfied if Norway were to be bound by a Union contract to keep an army and navy of a strength corresponding with the strength of the Swedish army and navy in the uumerical proportion of the populations of both countries; others demand that the Norwegians should make certain alterations in their constitution to bring it more in accordance with the Swedish constitution, particularly in the direction of strengthening the power of the crown, while the influence of the national representatives would be curtailed, and, like the Swedish Parliament, divided between two chambers, etc. In Sweden there is a circle of politicians, very active, and, particularly lately, very loud, who declare that Norway has in no way the rank and right of a sovereign state. At the utmost she may be sovereign in her internal affairs. These men base their opinion of the Finally, there is in Sweden a party Union on the Treaty of Kiel, and they whose Union policy is mainly the same think that, as it has been consummated as that of the Norwegiau Right; that with 66 Swedish arms and Swedish is to say, there are some who desire a money," it is only Swedish, not Nor- settlement on the basis of equality, wegian advantages and interests, which while retaining the existing commuhave to be considered. They declare nity between the countries, whose that the supremacy of Sweden, demon-programme is a common Swedishstrated by the leadership of the foreign Norwegian foreign minister, without policy, is not only a fact, but a right. demanding any equivalent for the preThis right should not only not be compromised, but, on the contrary, it ought to be further strengthened and extended. The Union would thereby in their eyes become the "new possession," and "compensation for Finland and Pomerania," which the Swedes from the commencement hoped for, and which was promised them by the great powers of Europe. rogative which they thus renounce. They think that this prerogative has, by the development of events, become worthless or even worse, positively injurious both to Sweden and to the Union. Judging from expressions in the Swedish press and Riksdag this party is, however, in a decided minority, at all events in those circles which are at present the leading circles in There is another and more moderate Sweden. Still smaller seems to be the view, which has been strongly advo- number of those Swedes who share the cated in the Swedish press, and which opinion of the Norwegian Left, and seems to be rather widely held in lead- who think that the knot ought to be ing Swedish circles. According to this cut by dissolving the existing commuview the Swedish leadership of the nity between the countries in so far as foreign policy of the countries is a it is not fixed by contract, thus reducprerogative which Sweden has bar- ing the Union to a defensive alliance gained for on the accomplishment of with a common king and common the Union, but this prerogative might peace or war, Their number is apparbe renounced in order to meet the Nor- ently so insignificant that they do not wegian demand for equality, provided count in the solution of the questions a corresponding equivalent be given-between the countries. This situation is commonly described | subscribe to a Union policy such as in the following way: Arrayed against the one contained in the draft of 1866 the Norwegian Liberals and their Union for a new Rigsakt. policy is the "smaller" half of the Norwegian and the entire Swedish nation. The Norwegian Right and all Swedish parties, all their differences of opinion notwithstanding, agree in this, that they are "Unious-venlige" (friendly to the Union), that they will have the Union maintained with its present limits or further widened and strengthened. In opposition to these are the Norwegian Liberals, which party is called "Unions-frenthgt" (hostile to the Union), because it desires a dissolution of the existing community between the countries in so far as it is not fixed by contract. From what has already been said it will be seen that this grouping is quite arbitrary, giving an altogether erroneous picture of the relative position of the various parties. They are in this estimate grouped together more after an apparent than a real agreement, and this classification starts from the Union as a definite conception, which cau only be understood in one manner, while the very difference of opinion on this conception is the origin and object of the conflict. It would probably also be doing the Swedish nation an injustice to suppose that the supremacy policy is a Swedish national policy in the sense, that it is entertained by the overwhelming majority of the Swedish nation. What can be said with certainty is only that it is just now very fashionable in Sweden, and that it has been accepted in quarters which are exercising a dominant influence, although they do not possess any great amount either of ability or enlightenment. And this is bad enough, for nothing is more certain than that this supremacy policy is as stupid as it is brutal and unjust. The Swedish Suprematists base their postulates on what they call "historic " foundation: The rights of Sweden by the Treaty of Kiel; the non-recognition by the European great powers of the Norwegian sovereignty, from which follows that the rising against that treaty was rebellion; the conquest of Norway with Swedish arms; the consummation of the Union with Swedish blood and money; the thankfulness on the part of the Norwegians due to Sweden for liberating them from the "Danish yoke," and more of the same kidney. It would be doing the Norwegian Right a great injustice to attribute to them an 66 Unions-venlighed" (friend- This is bad pleading, even looked at ship for the Union) of the same kind from a purely formal and judicial point as that which has played first fiddle in of view, made up by bungling historical the Swedish upper chamber, or to be- facts. According to international law lieve that they would, with regard to the Norwegians were not bound to subthe Union, feel themselves more in mit to the disposition of them made by agreement with Swedish Suprematists the Treaty of Kiel; the sovereignty of than with Norwegian Liberals. The Norway did not require the recognition very contrary is the fact. Against a of the powers in 1814, as it was recogSwedish supremacy policy and Swedish |nized long before; Norway was not negation of the principle of equality conquered in 1814, least of all with within the Union and of the sover- Swedish blood and money; the war eignty of Norway stands a unanimous might rather be said to have taken and united Norwegian people. Lead-place with German blood and English ing members of the Right have, on several occasions, publicly declared as their programme: Either Norway must get full equality within the Union or it must go out of the Union. And so much, at any rate, is certain, that no Norwegian public man will or dare money; the Norwegians have never known any "Danish yoke," and they owe to themselves and their good fortune, not to the Swedes, what they gained of freedom and independence in 1814. But even if this Swedish "his torical" argument for the Swedish |ing to renounce that supremacy of supremacy had been as clear and un- which Sweden is, as a matter of fact, answerable as it is loose and unreliable, how insufficient would it not after all have been against this one fact, that the Norwegians have been and are as distinct a nationality and a national personality as the Swedes are, and that they have the right, which belongs to every nation with vital power, to be independent, and to defend their independence against all comers so far as their strength goes. How should the right, which is deduced from deeds of conveyance and treaties, let them be ever so good and legal, outweigh, in the eyes of any enlightened man that right which life itself and historic development gives? And, further, what can reasonably be expected from the Swedish supremacy policy, except the nourishing of an idle and contemptible vanity? Real advantages it could only bring to Sweden, if the time could ever come, when the Norwegian nationality were completely crushed and Norway incorporated as an integral part of Sweden. But even if the Swedes might have thought anything of this kind possible in 1814, when Norway seemed to be on the verge of extinction, and the Norwegian nation had not yet fully shaken off the long, lethargic sleep in which it had lain during the union with Denmark, it ought to be plain that now, after the nation has developed so rapidly, and has become so fully equal to the Swedish in every respect, Sweden could not, when using all its might to coerce and subjugate Norway, obtain anything more thereby than an enemy. The goal which the Swedish Suprematists are aiming at is unattainable, and if it were not impossible it would be a crime. Those who pursue this policy are really what a Swedish politician of standing has branded them, “criminal lunatics." But as Norway cannot by coercion become a part of Sweden, just as little can this happen by peaceful means, by a steady peaceful extension of the community between the countries. Those Swedish politicians who are will in possession, but only in return for an equivalent, by which the Union should be further extended and strengthened; who are against a dissolution of the community in the management of foreign affairs and the representation abroad, but place on their programme a common Swedish-Norwegian foreigu minister; who, in other words, prefer to renounce part of the sovereignty of Sweden rather than allow a more complete realization of the sovereignty of Norway - those politicians, we say, can only act thus because they stick to the old idea of the Union of 1814 as being a commencement, a first step on the road which should finally lead to the complete assimilation of the two nations, to the amalgamation of the two countries in a single state. This idea is a chimera; experience has already sufficiently proved it. The two nations are destined by nature and history to progress apart in different lines of development. The Union has not tended to bring them nearer to each other, rather to remove them further apart. And it has had this effect, not because it was originally too loosely knit, but rather because it was too tightly bound, because the common points were extended beyond the limits dictated by the well-understood interests of both nations, so that it has been felt as a burden and considered as a menace by the one part, as an unfulfilled promise by the other. It is, however, not difficult to explain why the Swedes cling so tenaciously to the idea of the Norwegian-Swedish Union as the beginning of a new development, and consequently why they are so reluctant to accept the thought of a limitation or a dissolution of the existing community. Firstly, because the Union was accomplished, if not with Swedish blood and money, at all events on Swedish initiative. Secondly, because the community between two countries of such unequal power and population as Norway and Sweden may always be considered, with some reason, as an advantage to the greater 66 These experiences have not The Union policy of the Liberals, demanding a dissolution of the community so far as it is not fixed by contract, remains the only thing which can unite the Norwegian nation. The cause of the Liberals is in this respect also the cause of Norway. It is even possible to go a step further; it is also in reality the cause of Sweden, and of the Swedish nation. Sweden is just power, which can count upon always | cial position ought to be the very pillars being, as a matter of fact, the dominant of the Conservative cause - the peasand leading partner in all common ac-antry. tions, let the principle of equality be been without their influence; the ever so carefully realized. on paper. friendship for the Union" of the It is more strange that a Norwegian Right has lately cooled considerably, party should also carry their "friend- and one need not be a prophet to foreship for the Union," so far as to oppose see that in the future it will cool still a dissolution of the community where more, or that the party will come to it is not expressly stipulated by con- understand that the Union may be a tract, although this dissolution would good thing in itself, but that it is necboth as a realization of the principle of essary to be careful not to make too national independence and for purely great use of it, and that by working practical reasous bring Norway great for its extension it may be undermined and evident advantages. The explana- altogether. tion can only be sought in considerations of purely party politics. It has already been stated that Norwegian servants of the crown and the moneyed classes had shown an inclination to entertain the proposal of the Swedish Riksdag of 1860 for a revision of the Act of Union, as they looked upon the Union as a safeguard of so great value against all democratic movements that they did not object to its extension, now dominated by a thoroughgoing even when this would be on the basis bureaucratic-aristocratic reaction. Suof Swedish supremacy, and not on the basis of equality. A policy so unpatriotic as this could evidently not in the long run be upheld, nor gather round itself a party of vital power. The Right, composed originally principally of the Norwegian friends of the Swedish revision, relinquished gradually the far too-exposed position which it had at first occupied. But it continued to look upon the Union as the stronghold of the Conservative interests, in which it frequently took refuge, and which it would gladly have extended and strengthened, when this could be done in a manner which was not too openly in opposition to the honor and rights of Norway as an independent country. The Union policy of the Liberals is Recent experiences have, however, finally also that which ought to meet clearly demonstrated that the party has with support and sympathy in the rest lost more than it has gained by its of Europe, in so far as Europe is inUnion policy, that it must pay a price terested in peace and good fellowship for the protection of the Union, which between the two nations of the Scandiwill in the end be too high. For on navian peninsula. But this good felaccount of this policy the national feel-lowship can only be gained by reducing ing has turned against this party, and the Union to the limits determined by it has offended thereby that section of the historical and geographical condithe Norwegian people which by its so- tions: a defensive alliance, a common premacy and "a single state" suits |