original wrong must be considered as reaching Ry. Co., 28 Wash. 428, 68 Pac. 954, 58 L. R. to the effect, and proximate to it. The inquiry A. 293, 92 Am. St. Rep. 864, has said: must, therefore, always be whether there was any intermediate cause disconnected from the primary fault, and self-operating, which produced the injury." And again: "In the nature of things, there is in every transaction a succession of events, more or less dependent upon those preceding, and it is the province of the jury to look at this succession of events or facts, and ascertain whether they are naturally and probably connected with each other by a continuous sequence, or are disse vered by new and independent agencies. * [3] Was not Dalehart's impulse to shoot born of the refusal of the driver to stop the automobile? Was not that refusal to stop the result of the unlawful command? Who will say that if the appellants had not combined to intercept and stop the respondent and acted in pursuance thereof, there would have been any shooting? How can it be found that the impulse to shoot was a new and independent agency when it followed as a natural sequence the failure to obey the unlawful demand to stop? "Was there an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury?" "Did the facts constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to make a natural whole?" Was there any other independent intervening cause? The trial court saw none; can see none; and the text-books and textwriters generally sustain this view. In such cases, so far as can be found in the reports, it has universally been held that the original wrongful act was the proximate cause of the injury. we “Where two or more are engaged in an unlawful enterprise, each is individually responsible for all injuries committed in its prosecution, and this, although the specific injury was done by one of the parties alone. Here the liability of the other is founded upon the concert of action." 38 Cyc. 487. "While one who suffers from a conspiracy forbidden by the criminal law may maintain a civil action for damages caused by the parties to the combination, it is not essential to civil liability for a consummated conspiracy to do an unlawful act that the means resorted to to effect the purpose should be criminal or that the act should be criminal. It is sufficient if it be to commit an act wrongful because of its affording a ground of action, either civilly or criminally." 12 C. J. p. 581. "It is, and has long been, a generally recognized rule that there is no line of separation between the liability of joint tort-feasors. The tort is a thing integral and indivisible, and any claim for injuries arising therefrom runs through and embraces every part of the tort. The liability of one cannot be carried into any portion of the joint tort that is not followed by an equal liability of the other tort-feasors. Each is liable for the whole, and the injured party may pursue one separately, or he may pursue all jointly, or any number jointly less than the whole number." [4] The appellants contend that the respondent was violating the speed laws of the state and city, and the state and city laws with reference to the possession of liquor. But we find nothing in these contentions. The evidence shows that the automobile in which the respondent was a passenger was traveling at about fifteen miles per hour until intercepted by the appellants. And in view of the circumstances of being unlawfully intercepted and ordered to stop by unknown men displaying nothing to indicate that they were officers of the law, at midnight and on a public highway, we are unwilling to say that it was unlawful to increase the speed for the purpose of escaping from supposed highwaymen. In any event such increase of speed, even if unlawful, occurred only after the unlawful attempt by the appellants to stop the respondent. [5] Nor was the possession of less than a pint of whisky, which was found in the automobile, necessarily unlawful, especially as respondent is not shown to have known that the whisky was in the automobile. [6] While giving the fullest effect to the acknowledged and admitted fact that the appellants were in good faith intending to do only their duty, and recognizing that if they had in fact intercepted and stopped no one except some person engaged unlawfully in transporting liquor, their actions would have been approved by all right-thinking citizens, yet when an officer of the law, without a warrant, and upon general suspicion only, at midnight, without making known his official character, attempts to intercept and stop a peaceful citizen, lawfully pursuing his way upon the public highway, and personal injuries result therefrom, he acts at his own peril, and the good intention of the officer is no defense. Nor did the advice given by the city attorney justify the act. For as we read the evidence, that advice did not contemplate the stopping of any traveler except one engaged in the act of unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquors. This falls far short of justification. See, also, Kirkwood v. Miller, 5 Sneed No question is raised here as to the amount (Tenn.) 455, 73 Am. Dec. 134; Daingerfield of the recovery, and we have not considered v. Thompson, 33 Grat. (Va.) 136, 36 Am. Rep. that feature of the case. Much as we regret 783; Murphy v. Wilson, 44 Mo. 313, 100 Am. that the burden of compensating the reDec. 290. spondent must fall upon men who intended And this court in Abb v. Northern Pacific to do no wrong, we are yet constrained by the law as we find it to affirm the judgment | if such liquor should be found," etc. This of the trial court. Judgment affirmed. MAIN, C. J., and PARKER, MITCHELL, MACKINTOSH, CHADWICK, and MOUNT, JJ., concur. HOLCOMB, J. (concurring). I disagree with the restrictive statement of the law of arrest as pronounced in the majority opinion. It is the law, as stated by Judge FULLERTON in his dissent, that the "officers having information that an offense was being perpetrated owed a duty to intercept the perpetrators. If they caught the perpetrators in the commission of the act they could lawfully arrest them, although they had no warrant of arrest. Under our statutes, as at the common law, an officer may arrest without a warrant an offender caught in the commission of an offense, even though the offense be a misde meanor. finding, it seems to me, is justified by the facts and merely puts all the parties upon the same ground as would be private citizens so engaged, for their joint intent of stopping at night on a public highway and without a warrant any automobile which they suspected of containing intoxicating liquor being conveyed in violation of law was unlawful and unjustifiable. The assault and injury happened in consequence thereof and in pursuance of their joint purpose and common intent to stop any such suspected automobile, and resulted in the joint or common commission of the tort and damage. The facts being so found and being supported by the record, the judgment appealed from was proper. I therefore concur in the result for the foregoing reasons. FULLERTON, J. (dissenting). I am unBut neither does this statement cover the able to concur in the conclusion reached by ground fully. "While an officer may arrest without a warrant under certain circumstances, as already seen, he may not act arbitrarily, but must exercise his discretion in a legal manner, using all reasonable means to avoid mistakes. The reasonable and probable grounds that will justify an officer in arresting without a warrant one whom he suspects of felony must be such as would actuate a reasonable man acting in good faith. The rule is substantially the same as that in regard to a probable cause in actions for malicious prosecution, and there is no difference in its application between arrests for felonies and arrests for misdemeanors. The necessary elements of the grounds of suspicion are that the officer acts upon a belief in the person's guilt, based upon facts or circumstances within the officer's own knowlegde, or upon information imparted to him by reliable and credible third persons, provided there are no circumstances known to the officer sufficient to materially impeach the information received. An arrest without a warrant is illegal when it is made upon mere suspicion or belief unsupported by facts, circumstances, or credible information calculated to produce such suspicion or belief." 5 C. J. 416. In this case none of these officers nor the acting officer or private citizen took any precautions to avoid mistakes in arresting innocent persons. They had no foundation for belief that the persons intercepted were the guilty persons, and they took no precautions, such as wearing uniforms, badges, or otherwise, to give notice of their official character to any unknown persons they might intercept and arrest without warrant, upon their information. Defendant Dalehart, the officer who fired the shots and who has not appealed from the judgment below, certainly could hardly justify his mistaken act. The trial court found that Dalehart together with Hughes, Stewart, and Flynn, "concerted and assembled together for the common purpose and with the joint intent of stopping at night on a public highway and without a warrant any automobile which they suspected of containing intoxicating liq the majority. A careful reading of the record has convinced me that the evidence does not justify the finding of the trial court, to the effect that the defendants Hughes, Stewart, Flynn, and Dalehart concerted and assembled together for the common purpose and with the joint intent of stopping at night on a public highway and without a warrant any automobile which they suspected of containing intoxicating liquor being conveyed in violation of law. On the contrary, I think the evidence clearly demonstrates that their purpose was merely to signal suspected automobiles to stop, without any intent to enforce a stopping if the driver of the automobile refused to obey the signal. This being their purpose and intent I am unable to conclude that appellants were engaged in an unlawful enterprise. In this state it is an offense against the laws to transport liquor on the highways in quantities in excess of a limited amount. These officers, having information that such an offense was being perpetrated, owed a duty to intercept the perpetrators. If they caught the perpetrators in the commission of the act they could lawfully arrest them, although they had no warrant of arrest. Under our statutes, as at the common law, an officer may arrest without a warrant an offender caught in the commission of an offense, even though the offense be a misdemeanor. I need not argue that, when two or more persons are acting lawfully together in the furtherance of a common lawful purpose, one is not liable for an assault committed by another, if committed without his concurrence, although committed in furtherance of the common purpose. This is horn-book law. Since, therefore, I can find no unlawful intent or purpose on the part of the appellants, and can find no participation in the excessive unlawful act resulting in the in that the recovery permitted to stand is con- | Davis and George C. Beck. From, the judgtrary to the rules governing in such cases. ment for plaintiff for part only of his claims I think the judgment should be reversed. he appeals, and defendants file a cross-appeal. Affirmed. See, also, 172 Pac. 919. Voorhees & Canfield and C. E. H. Maloy, all of Spokane, for appellant. MOHNEY v. DAVIS et al. (No. 14237.) (Supreme Court of Washington. Nov. 20, 1918.) 1. TRIAL 253(3)— LIMITATIONS-INSTRUC- & Witherspoon, of Spokane, for respondents. TIONS. Where plaintiff and his assignors were fraudulently induced to buy stock, and then became officers of the corporation, and, after being an officer for four years, plaintiff sued on his own and the assigned causes, instruction that, if plaintiff and his assignors knew of the fraud more than three years prior to suit, he could not recover, and that the jury could consider that they were officers in determining knowledge, held not to ignore to plaintiff's prejudice the rule that, to start limitations, plaintiff must have known of the fraud. 3. FRAUD 30 MISREPRESENTATIONS OF THIRD PERSON-SALES OF STOCK. A corporation officer cannot recover from other officers on an assigned cause of action for fraudulently inducing plaintiff's assignor to purchase stock, where defendants did not make or authorize the representations which induced the purchase. 4. APPEAL AND ERROR_1043(6)-HARMLESS ERROR-EXCLUDING EVIDENCE. There was no prejudice in excluding a deposition where the result must have been the same if it had been admitted. 5. Fraud 33-GROUND OF ACTION-FRAUD IN SALE OF STOCK-OBJECTIONS TO TITLE TO LAND. A corporation officer suing other officers for fraud in the sale of stock to him cannot complain that the corporation obtained no title to fand constituting its assets, because its purchase was in fraud of the government of British Columbia, wherein the lands lay, when such government had never taken steps to declare the sale void. 6. APPEAL AND ERROR 1062(2)-HARMLESS ERROR-FAILURE TO SUBMIT ISSUE. Where corporation officer sought recovery on seven causes of action, assigned by innocent individuals, three assigned by other officers, and one of his own for fraud inducing purchase of corporate stock, failure to submit issue whether the corporation had title to the land, as bearing on measure of damages, was not prejudicial, where the jury found for plaintiff on the seven causes, and against him upon the others, and he did not complain of amount of damages in the seven Hanna & Hanna, of Colfax, and Wakefield PARKER, J. This action was brought by the plaintiff, Mohney, against the defendants, Davis and Beck, in the superior court for Spokane county, seeking recovery of damages upon eleven causes of action, ten of which were assigned to him. Trial upon the merits in that court, sitting with a jury, resulted in verdict and judgment awarding the plaintiff recovery upon seven of the assigned causes of action, and denying him recovery upon the other four causes of action, one of the latter being taken from the jury; the court deciding, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff could not recover thereon. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment in so far as it denies him recovery upon the four causes of action. The defendants thereafter appealed from the judgment in so far as it awards Mohney recovery against them upon the seven causes of action. The claim of damages made by Mohney and his assignors rests upon the alleged false and fraudulent representations made by Davis, Beck, and others, acting in concert, with a common design, as to the quality and value of lands owned by the Skeena Valley Land Company, inducing Mohney and his assignors to purchase shares of the capital stock of that company. In the fall of 1909 one Callahan approached Davis and Beck with a view to inducing them to become interested with him in the organization of a corporation to purchase and sell lands situated in the Cassiar land district in British Columbia. Callahan was apparently acquainted with the lands which It was contemplated should be acquired by the corporation. Davis and Beck were both residents of this state, and knew nothing of the quality or value of the lands or of the agricultural possibilities of the district in which they were situated. After arriving at an understanding with Callahan, one Crane, and some others, touching the acquisition of the lands, the capitalization of the company, and the number of shares of capital stock to be left in the treasury of the company to be offered for sale to the public, articles of incorporation were prepared and signed by Callahan, Crane, Davis, Beck, and two others, which were duly filed in the proper offices of this state, resulting in the due incorporation of the Skeena Valley Land Com Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane Coun- pany in May, 1910. In June, 1910, the first ty; Bruce Blake, Judge. payments were made upon the lands to the Action by J. M. Mohney against Walter proper officers of the British Columbia gov. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes red by the three-year statute of limitations; or upon the ground that there were no false representations made by Davis or Beck to Mohney, Clemmer, or Dr. Balsiger, and that they at the time they purchased their stock were possessed of all the information, and from the same source, as to the value of the company's lands, as were Davis and Beck. The judgment, in so far as it denied to Mohney recovery upon the remaining cause of action which was assigned to him by Henry Balsiger, a cousin of Dr. Balsiger, was evidently rested upon the theory that there was no evidence of any representations, for which Davis or Beck were responsible, inducing Henry Balsiger to purchase his stock. It is contended in appellant Mohney's be half that the trial court erred in giving to the jury its instruction No. 4, as follows: ernment, and some time thereafter title thereto was perfected to the satisfaction of that government, through which title the land company acquired its title to the lands. Callahan, Crane, Davis, Beck, and two others were the original trustees named in the articles of incorporation; Mohney, Clemmer and Dr. Balsiger, two of Mohney's assignors, having become interested in the company by the purchase of treasury stock, were at a meeting on July 30, 1910, duly elected trustees of the corporation, and thereafter, it seems to us, exercised as much, or even more, active control over the affairs of the company than did either Davis or Beck. In June, 1910, Crane was authorized by the trustees to go to British Columbia, examine the lands, and report upon their quality and value, with a view to checking the information on that subject acquired from the talk "(a) Having laid before you the character of with Callahan. Crane reported to the meet- the action and the claims of the parties as set ing of July 30, 1910. This report was favor-up in their pleadings, I will now state to you the law that is to govern you in your consideraable as to the quality and value of the lands, tion of the evidence. At the threshold of the which, and with the talk of Callahan, furnish- case we are met by a statute of the state of ed Mohney, Clemmer, and Dr. Balsiger all the Washington which provides that actions for fraud shall be commenced within three years information which Davis or Beck ever had after the party claiming the fraud discovers the on that subject until long after the purchase facts constituting the fraud. In this connection of stock by Mohney and his assignors. Most I instruct you that if the plaintiff, or any of his of the stock purchased by these three was pur- claim to be fraudulent (or if the plaintiff or any assignors, knew of the facts which they now chased after this meeting. Clemmer, how- of his assignors were in a position where, by the ever, had purchased some stock before then, exercise of reasonable prudence, they could or but he did so upon information of the same would have discovered such facts, or if they were kind and from the same source as Davis and suspicion of a reasonably prudent man, and put cognizant of such facts that would arouse the Beck had acted upon, to wit, the representa- him on inquiry to ascertain the truth or falsitions of Callahan. Long after the stock pur- ty of such facts), more than three years prior to chase by Mohney and his assignors the the 9th day of March, 1915 (the day on which this action was commenced), then the action of lands were discovered to be of little value. the plaintiff or the cause of action upon the asWhile Davis and Beck were, in law, officers signment of such an assignor is barred by the of the company they were practically only statute and no recovery can be had on such cause of action. And in this connection you nominally so in so far as the active manage- may take into consideration the official connec ment of its affairs were concerned, Calla- tion, as director or other officer of the corporahan having the active management, especial- tion, of the plaintiff or assignor in determining at what time he came into such knowledge of the ly in so far as the sale of the treasury stock facts, or came into a position where it was inwas concerned. This was accorded him by cumbent upon him to make inquiry or investigaMohney, Clemmer, and Dr. Balsiger, as well tion. (b) And I further instruct you that a dias by Davis and Beck. This action was comrector or officer of the corporation is chargeable with knowledge of all facts which the records menced in March, 1915, more than four years of the corporation disclose." after Mohney, Clemmer, and Dr. Balsiger had purchased their stock, become officers of the corporation, and possessed all the knowledge as to the value of its lands which was possessed by either Davis or Beck. The verdict and judgment, in so far as it awarded recovery to Mohney upon the seven assigned causes of action, was evidently rested upon the theory that Davis and Beck, being officers of the corporation, were liable to those assignors as strangers to the corporation, and hence in law liable for the misrepresentations made by Callahan as to the value of the lands, inducing those assignors to purchase the treasury stock. The verdict and judgment, in so far as it denied to Mohney recovery upon his own cause of action and those of Clemmer and Dr. Balsiger assigned to him, was evidently rested upon the theory that those causes of action were bar [1] We have italicized; as counsel have done, the portions of this instruction of which they complain as being "particularly objectionable." We have also designated the two portions thereof by letters (a) and (b), since we think they require separate treatment by us. We are to remember that the only question of error here to be considered is as to whether or not this instruction was erroneous and worked to the prejudice of the rights of Mohney as to his own cause of action and as to those of Clemmer and Dr. Balsiger assigned to him. Manifestly, this instruction did not work to the prejudice of Mohney's rights to recover upon the seven causes of action assigned to him by strangers to the corporation upon which he was awarded recov ery by the verdict and judgment, since the verdict and judgment determined, in effect, that those causes of action were not barred. We are also to remember that Mohney, Clem-, facts disclosed by the records of the corporamer, and Dr. Balsiger were, as early as tion, but this portion of the instruction was July, 1910, more than four years prior clearly without prejudice in this case, beto the commencement of this action, trus- cause the facts upon which recovery was tees of the corporation, and at least as sought were not facts disclosed by the records actively engaged in the management of its of the corporation. This portion of the inaffairs as were Davis and Beck, and also that struction was so clearly foreign to any questhey had at that time as much knowledge of tion the jury was called upon to decide that the quality and value of the lands as had we think it must be concluded that the jury Davis and Beck, which knowledge came to were not thereby in the least prejudiced them from the same source as that from against Mohney, Clemmer, or Dr. Balsiger. which Davis and Beck received their knowl- [3, 4] Contention is made that the trial edge upon that subject. It is argued that court erred in taking from the jury the cause the instruction ignores the rule, as claimed of action assigned by Henry Balsiger to Mohby counsel, that in such cases as this, in or- ney, and deciding as a matter of law that no der to start the statute of limitations run- recovery could be had thereon; and in this ning against the injured party, he must have connection it is contended that the trial court such knowledge as will put him upon inquiry erred in excluding the deposition of Henry as to the wrong which he claims worked to Balsiger, taken in Colorado. This purchase his injury. Reading the portion (a) of the of stock was made by Henry Balsiger through instruction as a whole, we think it does not Dr. Balsiger, his cousin. We think there ignore to Mohney's prejudice the rule invoked was no evidence that Davis or Beck made by counsel in so far as we are concerned or authorized any of the representations with his own cause of action and those of which induced this purchase by Henry BalClemmer and Dr. Balsiger. In the first ital- siger, but that the acts and words of Dr. icized portion of the instruction the jury | Balsiger, his cousin, induced the purchase; are told that "if the plaintiff or any of his and this we think must be the conclusion to assignors [this for present purposes means be reached even though the excluded deponly Mohney, Clemmer, and Balsiger] were osition be considered in evidence, which in a position where, by the exercise of rea- deposition we find among the exhibits and sonable prudence, they could or would have have read. We think the court did not err discovered such facts," then such cause or in deciding as a matter of law that there causes would be barred. As to these could be no recovery upon this cause of accauses of action the question was not merely tion, nor was there prejudicial error in exof Mohney, Clemmer, and Dr. Balsiger having cluding the deposition, since the result must knowledge of facts suggesting inquiry on have been the same had the deposition been their part as to the quality and worth of read in evidence at the trial. the lands, but it was a question of their knowledge and duty in that respect as officers of the corporation with Davis and Beck. It is not a question of their rights as strangers to the corporation against Davis and Beck. The peculiar position in which we find Mohney, Clemmer, and Dr. Balsiger, we think, calls for their exercising reasonable pru-eral tracts of land from the government of dence and care in their official positions at that time looking to the learning of the quality and value of the company's lands in so far as their rights against Davis and Beck are concerned. If they had been stran gers to the corporation and to Davis and Beck, instead of being trustees and fellow officers with Davis and Beck, there might be some reason for the narrower application of the rule invoked by counsel for Mohney. We think the portion (a) of the instruction, read as a whole, was as favorable to Mohney, touching his own cause of action and those of Clemmer and Dr. Balsiger, assigned to him, as he was entitled to under the facts of the case. Indeed, it might well be argued that the facts of the case did not call for any instruction of this nature. [2] Contention is made in Mohney's behalf that the portion (b) of the instruction was erroneous. There may be circumstances under which an officer of a corporation would not be chargeable with knowledge of all 176 P.-3 [5] Some contention is made that the lands were acquired from the government of British Columbia in fraud of its rights, and that therefore the land company never acquired any title to the lands. A sufficient answer to this contention seems to be found in the fact that title was acquired to the sev British Columbia by proceedings and payment of purchase price to its satisfaction, and that it is not in any manner challenging such title or seeking the setting aside of it upon the ground of fraud. [6] This contention is made as affecting the measure of damages, it being claimed that had the trial court not in effect assumed, in the presence of the jury, that the corporation acquired good title, but left that question for determination by the jury, it might have awarded a larger amount of damages upon the theory that the company had no title to any land, rather than upon the theory that it had title to land of some value. But this view at once shows that the assumption of the court was in any event without prejudice to Mohney, because he is not appealing from the award of recovery made to him by the judgment rendered upon the seven causes of action, and hence there is no question of error here touching the measure of damages as to those causes of action; and, |