wisdom and power in the first constitution of the several monads, and the arrangement by which this agreement is effected he denotes by the term preëstablished harmony. He is led to this doctrine in this way. It was an old maxim of the philosophers that like only can act on like, i. e., that things wholly unlike in their nature can exert no reciprocal influence on each other. But the monads of body and those of mind are wholly unlike. Mind and matter, then, can have no influence on each other. How then do they have any union or co-action? This is brought about by the divine power and skill in so constituting and arranging them that they shall correspond and work together in complete unison. This harmony is preëstablished-hence the term, all things are pre-formed, and from eternity. He who produces them perceives in them, as resulting from their nature, all their future movements. Hence the harmony of all things, of the past and the future, of the divine decree and human conduct.

It is evident that from this system there proceeds, as by natural and inevitable consequence, the doctrine of philosophical necessity in all its purity and depth. The only kind of liberty consistent with this preëstablished constitution and harmony of all things, is liberty to do that which actually is done-that, and nothing else. The only point remaining worthy of special notice, in the philosophy of Leibnitz is his celebrated doctrine of optimism, which is developed in his Theodicea, or treatise on theology. The object of this treatise more especially is, to defend the wisdom of the Creator against the charges brought against it on the score of the existence of evil in the uniThe position assumed is, that of all possible worlds an infinite number of which are possible, God has actually chosen the very best. Everything which is, however imperfect, in itself considered, is still, all things considered, and in its relation to all things, the very best possible. Hence the name, optimism, given to this doctrine and the

verse.

system framed upon it. According to this system the existence of evil is no argument against the supreme wisdom and benevolence, for metaphysical evil-from which natural and moral evil, or suffering and sin, necessarily result is only the necessary limitation, or imperfection, inherent in, and pertaining to the nature of things. Moral evil is based on the premise of human freedom, or the choice we have of one among many acts, all of which are physically possible. The future is indeed determined, and all the actions of men; yet man is ignorant of that future and of that determination, and acts only according to reason and preference. From various causes he choses oft that which is ill-hence moral evil, or sin; yet in the end even this shall prove for the best as regards the whole, and every being, however imperfect, and every act and event, however evil in itself, shall contribute as a necessary part to the perfection of the whole.

The close correspondence of this system with the theological tenet, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and also with the theology of a more infallible standard, which asserts that all things work together for good to them that love God, is too obvious to require statement.

The system of Leibnitz as now explained, was somewhat modified subsequently by its most distinguished adherent and disciple, Christian Wolf, about the beginning of the eighteenth century. He supplied what was previously wanting, a clear, connected, methodical form, modifying somewhat the doctrine of monads, drawing a broader line of distinction between matter and mind, and limiting the preëstablished harmony to the mutual relations of soul and body, rather than to monads in general, and applying to the whole a strictly mathematical method, he first gave the whole system a complete scientific form.

The whole province of philosophy with him consists of two parts, theoretical and practical. The former comprises

logic proper, and metaphysics, which latter includes ontology, psychology, cosmology, and natural theology. Practical philosophy comprises ethics, the law of nature, and politics. Thus improved, the system found its way into most of the universities of Europe and held sway predominant for the first half of the eighteenth century.

CHAPTER VII.

HOBBES.

THE manifest tendency of the Baconian doctrines was to give undue prominence to natural philosophy and to physical science generally, greatly at the expense of mental and moral philosophy, which, whether by design or not, yet in fact and almost inevitably, were thrown into the background. Nothing in human knowledge was held of much importance or considered as fully reliable which was not based on processes and investigations purely experimental.

The empirical element preponderated over every other, and the ultimate tendency and final result was of course decidedly in the direction of a wide-sweeping and thorough sensationalism. The practical lesson learned by the wisdom of the age from this master teacher was to fall back ultimately, and as the only safe method, upon the testimony and experience of the senses as the main if not the only sound and sure basis of knowledge. The master left the age and his disciples little more than a new and a true method. It was for them to apply it and discover results. Many arose to do this in the department of natural and physical research. One man alone, a warm admirer of the Baconian doctrines, appeared, to apply the empirical method to the investigation of mental and moral science. This man was Thomas Hobbes, the philosopher of Malmesbury, one of the most distinguished writers of the seventeenth century. He was born April 5, 1588, in the

borough of Malmesbury. After studying at Oxford, and making the tour of France and Italy in company with the son of Lord Hardwicke, he spent several years in the family of that nobleman as secretary. Here he formed the acquaintance of Lord Bacon, Lord Herbert, and Ben Jonson, and subsequently at Paris and Pisa, during a tour to the continent, he became acquainted with Gassendi and Galileo. Returning to England he fixed his residence at Chatsworth. The prospect of political troubles soon drove him to Paris, where he resided during the wars of the revolution, and where he published most of his works. He was employed to teach Prince Charles (Charles II.) the elements of mathematical science. Returning to England he was kindly received by the Devonshire family, with whom he passed the remainder of his life, employed mostly in writing upon philosophical and political subjects. A treatise, in 1650, on Human Nature, and another, in 1658, on Man, in which he treats of the moral and intellectual faculties, are his principal philosophical writings. But the work on which his fame chiefly rests is the Leviathan, 1651, in which he treats of the matter, form, and power of a commonwealth, ecclesiastical and civil, which work greatly alarmed the ecclesiastics, and excited no little ferment in England. It was severely censured in Parliament sixteen years after its publication; so great was the disapprobation with which it was generally regarded.

His other literary labors were a translation of the Iliad and Odyssey, which passed through three editions in ten years, and a History of the Civil Wars, which did not appear till after his death. After the restoration, Hobbes was received with favor by the King, who gave him a pension of 100 pounds per annum from his privy purse. He died, December 4, 1679, at Hardwicke, a seat of the Earl of Devonshire, at the age of 91.*

* See amusing account of his personal habits, especially his smoking-Sydney Smith's Sketches of Moral Philosophy, pp. 365–366.

Perhaps no writer, unless it be Spinoza, has been more generally caluminated than the philosopher of Malmesbury. By some he is regarded as a dangerous man; by others as a shallow and superficial man. His influence has never been great, owing to the fear which has been entertained of his doctrines. Yet that very fear is a tribute to his strength, and proclaims him anything but a weak and shallow writer. "Impartial minds," says Lewes, "will always rank Hobbes among the greatest writers England has produced; and by writers we do not simply mean masters of language but masters of thought. He is profound and he is clear, weighty, and sparkling. His style, as mere style, is in its way as fine as anything in English; it has the clearness as well as the solidity and brilliancy of crystal" (Hist. Phil. ii. 495).

The

He is, in a word, one of those cool, collected, resolute thinkers, who in their search after truth are startled by no consequences, turned back by no results, but keep on in close pursuit of the game with all the tenacity and perseverance of the hound upon the track of the stately deer. world at large is too lazy to keep up with such runners, too timid to follow at such a rate, a leisurely walk or jogtrot is the most it can venture, and it must be a tame and slow-footed animal that shall allow itself to be fairly overtaken in such a race.

We by no means intend by this, however, to approve the recklessness of such a writer as Hobbes, or to vindicate his conclusions.

The main features of his philosophy may be thus sketched. Bacon had relied upon experience as the main source of knowledge. Upon this ground Hobbes takes his stand, and so develops the principle as to make sensation the real basis of all knowledge and all thought. Hence the material tendency of his philosophy. By sensation we perceive only what is material, and as sensation is the source of all our knowledge, hence matter is the only