had to be manumitted at once, even at the expense of creditors of the estate. There was this difference between freedom given by making the slave an heir or imposing on the heir a direct charge to manumit (directa libertas), and freedom given through the medium of a trust. In the former case, the manumitted slave became a freedman without being liable to any of the duties towards the manumitter or patron, which it will be seen shortly in many respects qualified his freedom. He was sometimes called an orcinus, that is, one who had his patron in the shades below. Where the manumission was by trust, the freedman had for his patron the person who, by completing the manumission, executed the trust. (2) In Justinian's time, owing to a number of social and political causes, among which the influence of the Christian Church is not the least conspicuous, manumissions were exempted from a number of hampering restrictions which, in former times, had attended them and had been, in fact, rigidly enforced. The lex Furia Caninia, which had strictly limited the number of slaves capable of being manumitted by will, was abolished by Justinian; and the same emperor preserved only one of the vexatious formalities and impediments prescribed by the lex Elia Sentia, that is the one which prohibited manumissions in fraud of creditors. Justinian further abolished a number of practical restrictions which had grown up through judicial decisions, such as those due to the alleged claims of the co-proprietor of a slave enfranchised by one of his masters; or to the fact that a manumitter had only the abstract ownership of a slave, but not the usufruct or C. (vii. 15). only the usufruct. (3) The chief duties of a freedman towards his patron, or his patron's family, that is, his children and direct descendants, were (a) the exhibition of such loyalty and respect to them as would not permit him to bring against them an action carrying with it the punishment of infamy, or an action at all, without the permission of the magistrate. Where the manumitter was a corporation, individual members of the corporation did not enjoy this exempting privilege; but the acting representative of the corporation could not be sued on its behalf by the freedman without the magistrates' leave. The penalty for the "ingratitude" which disobedience to these rules was held to involve was made, by Constantine, the return to the condition of slave to the offended patron. The freedman L. 2, C. (vii. 7). or "client" was (b) held bound to supply, in cases of necessity, food and the necessaries of life to the patron, and to the patron's children and parents; and, if required, to become guardian to the patron's children. On the other hand, the patron was entitled himself to assume the guardianship of his freedman, and of his freedman's children; and he had furthermore a right of succession to the property of his freedman, where the latter died intestate and left no children. Justinian, however, a good deal altered the law in this respect, and even in cases where the client left a will, recognized, where the property was large, L. 4, C. (vi. 4). the claims of patrons. The general rule still 3 J. (iii. 7). continued that the freedman could displace the rights of the patron and his family by making a will; but if he died intestate, these rights, originally given by the XII. Tables, survived in full force. Where the estate of the deceased freedman exceeded a hundred thousand sesterces (a little under £800 sterling, counting the sestertium at £7 16s.), the patrons had no rights as against children or descendants, where there were any. But if there were a will, and the testator left no descendants, or the testator had expressly disinherited them, or, being their mother or maternal grandfather, had omitted mention of them or, at least, not left them so small an amount as to risk the will being treated as invalid (on the ground of being inofficiosum, or, as will be explained in a later chapter, regardless of natural claims), in this case the patron was entitled to claim a third part of the goods of the deceased, or so much as, in addition to what was expressly left him by will, would make up the third part. In this case legacies and trusts due in respect of this third part to the children of the deceased, were not chargeable on the patron's share, but solely on that of the other inheritors of the property. The patron could furthermore exact from his client, either by simple agreement or by mere promise confirmed by oath, special engagements to render him and his family services of various kinds, and even to make him or them stated presents. A distinction was drawn between "official" services, which were held merely to testify affection and respect, and industrial services having a pecuni- D. (xxxvii. 14, ary value. The latter alone could be imposed 15). D. 1, 2, in favour of the patron's personal relations. 3, 4, 5). By the special favour of the emperor, freedmen could acquire all the rights of freeborn citizens signified by the privilege of wearing the gold ring, a privilege formally conceded only to officers of State or to senators. The rights, however, of the patron could, even in this case, only be extinguished on the patron's consent being obtained, the emperor thereupon making a special grant in the freedman's favour of what was called "restituD. (xl. 10, 11). tion of natal rights." By the latest legislation of Justinian, the patron could confer on his freedman the honorary rights attributed to the wearing of a gold ring by formally declaring him a Roman citizen. But still, as under the older law, the distinction remained little more than honorary, and left the claims of the patron Nov. (lxxviii.). intact. §2.-Children and Descendants. (1) AS REGARDS THE PERSON. The power of the head of the household over his children and children's children, natural and adopted, was in many respects more complicated in character than that over his slaves, and underwent many modifications in the direction of freedom to which the other institution was a stranger. The power related either to the person of him who was the subject of it-who may be conveniently designated here throughout as the." son," unless a daughter or grandson is specially mentioned-or to his property, According to the very earliest law of which we have any knowledge, the power of the father over his legitimate children, not adopted by another, knew no limit. The father was sole lawgiver, judge, and, if need were, executioner. There is no doubt that, up to very late days in the history of the empire, the theory that the father had the right of putting his children to death and, a fortiori, of punishing, and even of torturing them at his caprice, was still formally recognized. The first legislative restriction on this plenary right of the father is contained in a constitution of Valentinian and Valens (cir. 364-375), which forbade the exercise of the right of domestic chastisement beyond a limit, not very definitely described as in immensum, where the atrocity of an offence seemed to be inadequately reached by this domestic jurisdiction. Those guilty of an offence exceeding the bounds C. (ix. 15). (enormis delicti reos), were to be handed over to public justice. Even under Constantine, however, a constitution was made which reappears in Justinian's Code, 2 C. (iv. 43). preserving and indeed reviving with amendments the antique practice of selling children. A general principle affirmed by Diocletian was still maintained that no valid title could be given by parents on a sale, gift, pledge, or other conveyance of their children; but the law of Constantine introduced an exception in the case of new-born children, sold through want. In this case, the purchaser acquired the right to the child's services, but the vendor or the child himself, or any one else, could redeem him and reinstate him in his civil rights on offering a fitting price, or providing a slave or free labourer of equal value. Justinian finally, in alluding to the practice, once said to have existed, of a father surrendering his child,—as at all times he could surrender his slave,-to an injured person, by way of compensation for an injury inflicted by the child, repudiates it on the ground of its flagrant inhumanity and immorality, especially 7 J. (iv. 8). in the case of daughters. He preserves the institution as affecting a slave, who was said to be given up as a noxa. The offence was called a noxia, and the action for obtaining such compensation a noxalis actio. The various degrees of offence which a son might be guilty of towards his father, with the corresponding domestic penalties, seem to be marked in a law of Alexander Severus, embodied in Justinian's Code. The law seems to point to the fact that the father was expected to exert his personal influence in controlling the son's conduct with respect to property. The words are as follows: "If your son is in your power, he cannot part with property acquired from you. If he does not recognize the dutiful obligations owing to his father, there is nothing to prevent you punishing him in the exercise of your parental power. If he persists in the same contumacious conduct, you can resort to severer remedial measures. You may further take him before the president of the district, who will pronounce a sentence such as will meet your wishes." A constitution of Diocletian and Maximian further 3 C. (viii. 47). laid down that the governor of the province would compel a son not only to show his father due reverence but to supply him with the necessaries of life. About the father's control over the son's person, and his claims to formal respect and submission, a conflict naturally presented itself in certain of the emergencies of civil life between the position of the son in his family and his position as a citizen, and perhaps even a public official,—in the State. It was here, indeed, that the legal situation of a son was most noticeably contrasted with that of a slave. It was discussed at one time rather as a theoretical than a practical question, whether a father who was a proconsul ought to make the customary obeisance in the street on meeting his son, who was Aulus Gellius, a consul; and the better opinion seemed to be N. A. (ii. 2). that he ought. The principle was that the private relationship gave way to the public one, but only within the precisely ascertained limits to which the public relationship necessarily extended. The private relationship, again, in |