VII. PART if poffible, from a ftill nobler and more generous principle, from a firm reliance upon, and a reverential fubmiffion to, that benevolent wif dom which directs all the events of human life, and which, we may be affured, would never have fuffered thofe misfortunes to happen, had they not been indispensably neceffary for the good of the whole. Nature has not prefcribed to us this fublime contemplation as the great business and occupation of our lives. She only points it out to us as the confolation of our misfortunes. The Stoical philofophy prescribes it as the great business and occupation of our lives. That philosophy teaches us to intereft ourfelves earneftly and anxiously in no events, external to the good order of our own minds, to the propriety of our own choofing and rejecting, except in thofe which concern a department where we neither have nor ought to have any fort of management or direction, the department of the great Superintendant of the universe. By the perfect apathy which it prefcribes to us, by endeavouring, not merely to moderate, but to eradicate all our private, partial, and felfish affections, by fuffering us to feel for whatever can befall ourfelves, our friends, our country, not even the fympathetic and reduced paffions of the impartial fpectator, it endeavours to render us altogether indifferent and unconcerned in the fuccefs or miscarriage of every thing which Nature has prescribed to us as the proper business and occupation of our lives. The II. The reasonings of philofophy, it may be faid, SECT. though they may confound and perplex the understanding, can never break down the neceffary connection which Nature has established between caufes and their effects. The caufes which naturally excite our defires and averfions, our hopes and fears, our joys and forrows, would no doubt, notwithstanding all the reafonings of Stoicifm, produce upon each individual, according to the degree of his actual fenfibility, their proper and neceffary effects. The judg ments of the man within the breast, however, might be a good deal affected by thofe reafonings, and that great inmate might be taught by them to attempt to overawe all our private, partial, and selfish affections into a more or lefs perfect tranquillity. To direct the judgments. of this inmate is the great purpose of all fyftems of morality. That the Stoical philofophy had very great influence upon the character and conduct of its followers, cannot be doubted; and that, though it might fometimes incite them to unneceffary violence, its general tendency was to animate them to actions of the moft heroic magnanimity and moft extenfive benevolence. IV. Befides thefe ancient, there are some modern fyftems, according to which virtue confifts in propriety; or in the fuitableness of the affection from which we act, to the caufe or object which excites it. The fyftem of Dr. Clark, which places virtue in acting according to the relations of things, in regulating our conduct LL 3 PART conduct according to the fitness or incongruity VII. which there may be in the application of certain actions to certain things, or to certain relations: that of Mr. Woollafton, which places it in acting according to the truth of things, according to their proper nature and effence, or in treating them as what they really are, and not as what they are not: that of my Lord Shaftesbury, which places it in maintaining a proper balance of the affections, and in allowing no paffion to go beyond its proper fphere; are all of them more or lefs inaccurate defcriptions of the fame fundamental idea. None of thofe fyftems either give, or even pretend to give, any precife or diftinct measure by which this fitnefs or propriety of affection can be afcertained or judged of. That precife and diftinct meafure can be found no where but in the sympathetic feelings of the impartial and well-informed fpectator. The defcription of virtue, befides, which is either given, or at least meant and intended to be given in each of thofe fyftems, for fome of the modern authors are not very fortunate in their manner of expreffing themfelves, is no doubt quite juft, fo far as it goes. There is no virtue without propriety, and wherever there is propriety fome degree of approbation is due. But ftill this defcription is imperfect. For though propriety is an effential ingredient in every virtuous action, it is not always the fole ingredient. Beneficent actions have in them another quality by which they appear II. appear not only to deferve approbation but SEC T. recompenfe. None of thofe fyftems account either easily or fufficiently for that fuperior degree of efteem which feems due to fuch actions, or for that diversity of fentiment which they naturally excite. Neither is the defcription of vice more complete. For, in the fame manner, though impropriety is a neceffary ingredient in every vicious action, it is not always the fole ingredient; and there is often the highest degree of abfurdity and impropriety in very harmlefs and infignificant actions. Deliberate actions, of a pernicious tendency to thofe we live with, have, befides their impropriety, a peculiar quality of their own by which they appear to deferve, not only difapprobation, but punishment; and to be the objects, not of diflike merely, but of refentment and revenge: and none of thofe fyftems eafily and fufficiently account for that fuperior degree of deteftation which we feel for fuch actions. CHAP. II. Of thofe Syftems which make Virtue confift in Prudence. THE HE moft ancient of thofe fyftems which make virtue confift in prudence, and of which any confiderable remains have come down to us, is that of Epicurus, who is faid, however, LL 4 VII. PART however, to have borrowed all the leading principles of his philosophy from fome of those who had gone before him, particularly from Ariftippus; though it is very probable, notwithstanding this allegation of his enemies, that at least his manner of applying those principles was altogether his own. According to Epicurus *, bodily pleasure and pain were the fole ultimate objects of natural defire and averfion. That they were always the natural objects of thofe paffions, he thought required no proof. Pleasure might, indeed, appear fometimes to be avoided; not, however, because it was pleafure, but because, by the enjoyment of it, we fhould either forfeit fome greater pleasure, or expofe ourselves to fome pain that was more to be avoided than this pleasure was to be defired. Pain, in the fame manner, might appear fometimes to be eligible; not, however, because it was pain, but because by enduring it we might either avoid a ftill greater pain, or acquire fome pleasure of much more importance. That bodily pain and pleasure, therefore, were always the natural objects of defire and averfion, was, he thought, abundantly evident. Nor was it lefs fo, he imagined, that they were the fole ultimate objects of thofe paffions. Whatever elfe was either defired or avoided, was fo, according to him, upon account of its tendency to produce one or other of thofe fenfations. The tendency to procure *See Cicero de finibus, lib. i. Diogenes Laert. 1. x. pleasure |