SECTION II.

OF THE CHARACTER OF THE INDIVIDUAL, SO

FAR AS IT CAN AFFECT THE HAPPINESS OF OTHER PEOPLE.

THE

INTRODUCTION.

II.

HE character of every individual, fo far as s E c T. it can affect the happiness of other people, muft do fo by its difpofition either to hurt or to benefit them.

Proper refentment for injustice attempted, or actually committed, is the only motive which, in the eyes of the impartial fpectator, can justify our hurting or difturbing in any refpect the happiness of our neighbour. To do fo from any other motive is itself a violation of the laws of justice, which force ought to be employed either to restrain or to punish. The wifdom of every ftate or commonwealth endeavours, as well as it can, to employ the force of the fociety to reftrain those who are fubject to its authority, from hurting or disturbing the happiness of one another. The rules which it establishes for this purpose, conftitute the civil and criminal law of each particular ftate or country. The principles upon which thofe rules either are, or ought to be founded, are the subject of a particular science, of all fciences by far the most most important, but hitherto, perhaps, the least cultivated, that of natural jurifprudence; concerning which it belongs not to our prefent fubject to enter into any detail. A facred and religious

3

PART religious regard not to hurt or disturb in any VI. respect the happiness of our neighbour, even in thofe cafes where no law can properly protect him, conftitutes the character of the perfectly innocent and juft man; a character which, when carried to a certain delicacy of attention, is always highly refpectable and even venerable for its own fake, and can scarce ever fail to be accompanied with many other virtues, with great feeling for other people, with great humanity and great benevolence. It is a character fufficiently understood, and requires no further explanation. In the present section I fhall only endeavour to explain the foundation of that order which nature feems to have traced out for the diftribution of our good offices, or for the direction and employment of our very limited powers of beneficençe: firft, towards individuals; and fecondly, towards focieties.

The fame unerring wisdom, it will be found, which regulates every other part of her conduct, directs, in this refpect too, the order of her recommendations; which are always ftronger or weaker in proportion as our beneficence is more or lefs neceffary, or can be more or lefs useful.

CHAP. I.

Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our care and attention.

EVE

VERY man, as the Stoics used to say, is firft and principally recommended to his own care; and every man is certainly, in every

respect,

II.

refpect, fitter and abler to take care of himself S ECT. than of any other perfon. Every man feels his own pleasures and his own pains more fenfibly than those of other people. The former are the original fenfations; the latter the reflected or fympathetic images of those fenfations. The former may be faid to be the subftance; the latter the fhadow.

After himself, the members of his own family, thofe who usually live in the fame house with him, his parents, his children, his brothers and fifters, are naturally the objects of his warmeft affections. They are naturally and usually the perfons upon whofe happiness or mifery his conduct must have the greatest influence. He is more habituated to fympathize with them. knows better how every thing is likely to affect them, and his fympathy with them is more precife and determinate, than it can be with the greater part of other people. It approaches nearer, in fhort, to what he feels for himself.

He

This fympathy too, and the affections which are founded on it, are by nature more ftrongly directed towards his children than towards his parents, and his tenderness for the former feems generally a more active principle, than his reverence and gratitude towards the latter. In the natural ftate of things, it has already been obferved, the existence of the child, for fome time after it comes into the world, depends altogether upon the care of the parent; that of the parent does not naturally depend upon the care of the child. In the In the eye of nature, it would feem, a

VI.

PART child is a more important object than an old man; and excites a much more lively, as well as a much more univerfal fympathy. It ought to do fo. Every thing may be expected, or at leaft hoped, from the child. In ordinary cafes, very little can be either expected or hoped from the old man. The weakness of childhood interefts the affections of the most brutal and hardhearted. It is only to the virtuous and humane, that the infirmities of old age are not the objects of contempt and averfion. In ordinary cafes, an old man dies without being much regretted by any body. Scarce a child can die without rending afunder the heart of fomebody.

The earliest friendships, the friendships which are naturally contracted when the heart is moft fufceptible of that feeling, are those among brothers and fifters. Their good agreement, while they remain in the fame family, is neceffary for its tranquillity and happiness. They are capable of giving more pleafure or pain to one another than to the greater part of other people. Their fituation renders their mutual fympathy of the utmost importance to their common happinefs; and, by the wifdom of nature, the fame fituation, by obliging them to accommodate to one another, renders that fympathy more habitual, and thereby more lively, more diftinct, and more determinate.

The children of brothers and fifters are naturally connected by the friendship which, after feparating into different families, continues to take place between their parents. Their good

agreement

II.

agreement improves the enjoyment of that S E C T. friendship; their difcord would disturb it. As they feldom live in the fame family, however, though of more importance to one another, than to the greater part of other people, they are of much lefs than brothers and fifters. As their mutual fympathy is lefs neceffary, fo it is lefs habitual, and therefore proportionably weaker.

The children of coufins, being ftill lefs connected, are of ftill lefs importance to one another; and the affection gradually diminishes as the relation grows more and more remote.

What is called affection, is in reality nothing but habitual fympathy. Our concern in the happiness or mifery of those who are the objects of what we call our affections; our defire to promote the one, and to prevent the other; are either the actual feeling of that habitual fympathy, or the neceffary confequences of that feeling. Relations being ufually placed in fituations which naturally create this habitual sympathy, it is expected that a fuitable degree of affection should take place among them. We generally find that it actually does take place; we therefore naturally expect that it should; and we are, upon that account, more fhocked when, upon any occafion, we find that it does not. The general rule is established, that perfons related to one another in a certain degree, ought always to be affected towards one another in a certain manner, and that there is always the highest impropriety, and fometimes even a fort of

VOL. I.

CC

impiety,