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caufe which excites it, it is fcarce poffible that S ECT. we should make ufe of any other rule or canon but the correfpondent affection in ourselves. If, upon bringing the cafe home to our own breast, we find that the fentiments which it gives occafion to, coincide and tally with our own, we neceffarily approve of them as proportioned and fuitable to their objects; if otherwife, we neceffarily disapprove of them, as extravagant and out of proportion.

Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another.. I judge of your fight by my fight, of your ear by my ear, of your reafon by my reafon, of your refentment by my refentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them.

CHAP. IV.

The fame fubject continued.

WE may judge of the propriety or impro

priety of the fentiments of another perfon by their correfpondence or disagreement with our own, upon two different occafions; either, first, when the objects which excite them are confidered without any peculiar relation, either to ourselves or to the perfon whofe ffentiments we judge of; or, fecondly, when they C 3

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PART are confidered as peculiarly affecting one or I. other of us.

1. With regard to thofe objects which are confidered without any peculiar relation either to ourselves or to the perfon whofe fentiments we judge of; wherever his fentiments entirely correspond with our own, we afcribe to him the qualities of tafte and good judgment. The beauty of a plain, the greatness of a mountain, the ornaments of a building, the expreffion of a picture, the compofition of a discourse, the conduct of a third perfon, the proportions of different quantities and numbers, the various appearances which the great machine of the univerfe is perpetually exhibiting, with the fecret wheels and springs which produce them; all the general fubjects of fcience and tafte, are what we and our companions regard as having no peculiar relation to either of us. We both look at them from the fame point of view, and we have no occafion for fympathy, or for that imaginary change of fituations from which it arifes, in order to produce, with regard to thefe, the most perfect harmony of fentiments and affections. If, notwithstanding, we are often differently affected, it arifes either from the different degrees of attention, which our different habits of life allow us to give eafily to the feveral parts of thofe complex objects, or from the different degrees of natural acutenefs in the faculty of the mind to which they are addreffed.

When the fentiments of our companion coincide with our own in things of this kind, which

are

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are obvious and easy, and in which, perhaps, we SEC T. never found a fingle perfon who differed from us, though we, no doubt, must approve of them, yet he feems to deferve no praife or admiration on account of them. But when they not only coincide with our own, but lead and direct our own; when in forming them he appears to have attended to many things which we had overlooked, and to have adjufted them to all the various circumftances of their objects; we not only approve of them, but wonder and are furprifed at their uncommon and unexpected acuteness and comprehenfivenefs, and he appears to deserve a very high degree of admiration and applaufe. For approbation heightened by wonder and furprise, conftitutes the fentiment which is properly called admiration, and of which applaufe is the natural expreffion. The decision of the man who judges that exquifite beauty is preferable to the groffeft deformity, or that twice two are equal to four, muft certainly be approved of by all the world, but will not, furely, be much admired. It is the acute and delicate difcernment of the man of taste, who distinguishes the minute, and scarce perceptible differences of beauty and deformity; it is the comprehenfive accuracy of the experienced mathematician, who unravels, with eafe, the most intricate and perplexed proportions; it is the great leader in fcience and tafte, the man who directs and conducts our own fentiments, the extent and fuperior juftnefs of whofe talents aftonish us with wonder and furprife, who excites

C 4

PART excites our admiration, and feems to deferve

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:

our applause and upon this foundation is grounded the greater part of the praife which is bestowed upon what are called the intellectual virtues.

The utility of thofe qualities, it may be thought, is what firft recommends them to us; and, no doubt, the confideration of this, when we come to attend to it, gives them a new value. Originally, however, we approve of another man's judgment, not as fomething useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality: and it is evident we attribute those qualities to it for no other reafon but because we find that it agrees with our own. Taste, in the fame manner, is originally approved of, not as ufeful, but as juft, as delicate, and as precisely fuited to its object. The idea of the utility of all qualities of this kind, is plainly an afterthought, and not what firft recommends them to our approbation.

2. With regard to those objects, which affect in a particular manner either ourfelves or the person whose sentiments we judge of, it is at once more difficult to preferve this harmony and correspondence, and at the fame time, vaftly more important. My companion does not naturally look upon the misfortune that has befallen me, or the injury that has been done me, from the fame point of view in which I confider them. They affect me much more nearly. We do not view them from the fame ftation, as we do a picture, or a poem, or a system of philofo

phy,

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phy, and are, therefore, apt to be very differ- s EC T. ently affected by them. But I can much more eafily overlook the want of this correspondence of fentiments with regard to fuch indifferent objects as concern neither me nor my companion, than with regard to what interefts me fo much as the misfortune that has befallen me, or the injury that has been done me. Though you defpife that picture, or that poem, or even that fyftem of philosophy, which I admire, there is little danger of our quarrelling upon that account. Neither of us can reasonably be much interested about them. They ought all of them to be matters of great indifference to us both; fo that, though our opinions may be oppofite, our affections may ftill be very nearly the fame. But it is quite otherwise with regard to those objects by which either you or I are particularly affected. Though your judgments in matters of fpeculation, though your fentiments in matters of taste, are quite opposite to mine, I can easily overlook this oppofition; and if I have any degree of temper, I may ftill find fome entertainment in your converfation, even upon thofe very fubjects. But if you have either no fellow-feeling for the misfortunes I have met with, or none that bears any proportion to the grief which diftracts me; or if you have either no indignation at the injuries I have fuffered, or none that bears any proportion to the refentment which tranfports me, we can no longer converfe upon thefe fubjects. We become intolerable to one another. I can neither fupport your company, nor you