II.

PART ought to be punished in this life, merely on account of the order of fociety, which cannot otherwise be maintained, that Nature teaches us to hope, and religion, we fuppofe, authorifes us to expect, that it will be punished, even in a life to come. Our fenfe of its ill defert purfues it, if I may say fo, even beyond the grave, though the example of its punishment there cannot ferve to deter the rest of mankind, who fee it not, who know it not, from being guilty of the like practices here. The juftice of God, however, we think, ftill requires, that he should hereafter avenge the injuries of the widow and the fatherless, who are here fo often infulted with impunity. In every religion, and in every fuperftition that the world has ever beheld, accordingly, there has been a Tartarus as well as an Elyfium; a place provided for the punishment of the wicked, as well as one for the reward of the juft.

SECTION III.

OF THE INFLUENCE OF FORTUNE UPON THE SENTIMENTS OF MANKIND, WITH REGARD TO THE MERIT OR DEMERIT OF ACTIONS.

INTRODUCTION.

WHATEVER praife or blame can be due SECT.

to any action, muft belong either, firft,

to the intention or affection of the heart, from which it proceeds, or, fecondly, to the external action or movement of the body, which this affection gives occafion to; or, laftly, to the good or bad confequences, which actually, and in fact, proceed from it. Thefe three dif ferent things conftitute the whole nature and circumftances of the action, and must be the foundation of whatever quality can belong to

it.

That the two laft of thefe three circumftances cannot be the foundation of any praise or blame, is abundantly evident; nor has the contrary ever been afferted by any body. The external action or movement of the body is often the fame in the moft innocent and in the most blamable actions. He who fhoots a bird, and he who shoots a man, both of them perform the fame external movement: each of them draws the trigger of a gun. The confequences

3

III.

II.

PART quences which actually, and in fact, happen to proceed from any action, are, if poffible, ftill more indifferent either to praife or blame, than even the external movement of the body. As they depend, not upon the agent, but upon fortune, they cannot be the proper foundation for any fentiment, of which his character and conduct are the objects.

The only confequences for which he can be anfwerable, or by which he can deferve either approbation or difapprobation of any kind, are thofe which were fome way or other intended, or those which, at leaft, fhow fome agreeable or difagreeable quality in the intention of the heart, from which he acted. To the intention or affection of the heart, therefore, to the propriety or impropriety, to the beneficence or hurtfulness of the defign, all praife or blame, all approbation or difapprobation, of any kind, which can juftly be bestowed upon any action, muft ultimately belong.

When this maxim is thus proposed, in abstract and general terms, there is nobody who does not agree to it. Its felf-evident juftice is acknowledged by all the world, and there is not a diffenting voice among all mankind. Every body allows, that how different foever the accidental, the unintended and unforeseen confequences of different actions, yet, if the intentions or affections from which they arofe were, on the one hand, equally proper and equally beneficent, or, on the other, equally improper and equally malevolent, the merit or demerit of

the

III.

the actions is ftill the fame, and the agent is $ E C T. equally the fuitable object either of gratitude or of refentment.

But how well foever we may feem to be perfuaded of the truth of this equitable maxim, when we confider it after this manner, in abftract, yet when we come to particular cafes, the actual confequences which happen to proceed from any action, have a very great effect upon our fentiments concerning its merit or demerit, and almost always either enhance or diminish our fenfe of both. Scarce, in any one inftance, perhaps, will our fentiments be found, after examination, to be entirely regulated by this rule, which we all acknowledge ought entirely to regulate them.

This irregularity of fentiment, which every body feels, which scarce any body is fufficiently aware of, and which nobody is willing to acknowledge, I proceed now to explain; and I fhall confider, first, the cause which gives occafion to it, or the mechanifm by which nature produces it; fecondly, the extent of its influence; and, laft of all, the end which it anfwers, or the purpose which the Author of nature seems to have intended by it.

CHAP.

PART
II.

CHAP. I.

Of the caufes of this Influence of Fortune.

THE

HE caufes of pain and pleasure, whatever they are, or however they operate, seem to be the objects, which, in all animals, immediately excite thofe two paffions of gratitude and refentment. They are excited by inanimated, as well as by animated objects. We are angry, for a moment, even at the ftone that hurts us. A child beats it, a dog barks at it, a choleric man is apt to curfe it. The leaft reflection, indeed, corrects this fentiment, and we foon become fenfible, that what has no feeling is a very improper object of revenge. When the mifchief, however, is very great, the object which caufed it becomes difagreeable to us ever after, and we take pleasure to burn or destroy it. We should treat, in this manner, the inftrument which had accidentally been the cause of the death of a friend, and we should often think ourfelves guilty of a fort of inhumanity, if we neglected to vent this abfurd fort of vengeance upon it.

We conceive, in the fame manner, a fort of gratitude for those inanimated objects, which have been the caufes of great, or frequent pleafure to us. The failor, who, as foon as he got afhore, fhould mend his fire with the plank upon which he had juft efcaped from a fhipwreck,

would