I.

too, is to recompenfe, to remunerate, though SECT. in a different manner; it is to return evil for evil that has been done.

There are fome other paffions, befides gratitude and refentment, which intereft us in the happiness or mifery of others; but there are none which fo directly excite us to be the inftruments of either. The love and efteem which grow upon acquaintance and habitual approbation, neceffarily lead us to be pleased with the good fortune of the man who is the object of fuch agreeable emotions, and confequently to be willing to lend a hand to promote it. Our love, however, is fully fatisfied, though his good fortune fhould be brought about without our affistance. All that this paffion defires is to fee him happy, without regarding who was the author of his profperity. But gratitude is not to be fatisfied in this manner. If the perfon to whom we owe many obligations, is made happy without our affistance, though it pleases our love, it does not content our gratitude. Till we have recompenfed him, till we ourselves have been inftrumental in promoting his happiness, we feel ourfelves ftill loaded with that debt which his past services have laid upon us.

The hatred and diflike, in the fame manner, which grow upon the habitual disapprobation, would often lead us to take a malicious pleasure in the misfortune of the man whofe conduct and character excite fo painful a paffion. But though diflike and hatred harden us against all fympathy, and fometimes difpofe us even to

rejoice

PART rejoice at the diftrefs of another, yet, if there is II. no refentment in the case, if neither we nor our friends have received any great perfonal provocation, these paffions would not naturally lead us to wish to be inftrumental in bringing it about. Though we could fear no punishment in confequence of our having had fome hand in it, we would rather that it fhould happen by other means. To one under the dominion of violent hatred it would be agreeable, perhaps, to hear, that the perfon whom he abhorred and detefted was killed by fome accident. But if he had the least spark of justice, which, though this paffion is not very favourable to virtue, he might ftill have, it would hurt him exceffively to have been himself, even without defign, the occafion of this misfortune. Much more would the very thought of voluntarily contributing to it fhock him beyond all measure. He would reject with horror even the imagination of fo execrable a defign; and if he could imagine himself capable of fuch an enormity, he would begin to regard to himself in the fame odious light in which he had confidered the perfon who was the object of his dislike. But it is quite otherwise with refentment: if the perfon who had done us fome great injury, who had murdered our father or our brother, for example, fhould foon afterwards die of a fever, or even be brought to the fcaffold upon account of fome other crime, though it might footh our hatred, it would not fully gratify our refentment. Refentment would prompt us to defire, not only that he fhould be

punished,

I.

punished, but that he should be punished by our S E C T. means, and upon account of that particular injury which he had done to us. Refentment cannot be fully gratified, unless the offender is not only made to grieve in his turn, but to grieve for that particular wrong which we have fuffered from him. He must be made to repent and be forry for this very action, that others, through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified from being guilty of the like offence. The natural gratification of this paffion tends, of its own accord, to produce all the political ends of punishment; the correction of the criminal, and example to the public.

Gratitude and refentment, therefore, are the fentiments which most immediately and directly prompt to reward and to punish. To us, therefore, he must appear to deserve reward, who appears to be the proper and approved object of gratitude; and he to deferve punishment, who appears to be that of refentment.

CHAP. II.

Of the proper objects of gratitude and refentment.

To be

O be the proper and approved object either of gratitude or relentment, can mean nothing but to be the object of that gratitude,

and

PART and of that refentment, which naturally feems

II.

proper, and is approved of.

But thefe, as well as all the other paffions of human nature, feem proper and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial fpectator entirely fympathizes with them, when every indifferent by-ftander entirely enters into, and goes along with them.

He, therefore, appears to deserve reward, who, to fome perfon or perfons, is the natural object of a gratitude which every human heart is difpofed to beat time to, and thereby applaud : and he, on the other hand, appears to deserve punishment, who in the fame manner is to fome perfon or perfons the natural object of a refentment which the breaft of every reasonable man is ready to adopt and sympathize with. To us, furely, that action must appear to deserve reward, which every body who knows of it would with to reward, and therefore delights to fee rewarded: and that action muft as furely appear to deserve punishment, which every body who hears of it is angry with, and upon that account rejoices to fee punished.

1. As we fympatize with the joy of our companions, when in profperity, so we join with them in the complacency and fatisfaction with which they naturally regard whatever is the caufe of their good fortune. We enter into the love and affection which they conceive for it, and begin to love it too. We fhould be forry for their fakes if it was deftroyed, or even if it was placed

I.

placed at too great a diftance from them, and sECT. out of the reach of their care and protection, though they should lofe nothing by its abfence except the pleasure of feeing it. If it is man who has thus been the fortunate inftrument of the happiness of his brethren, this is still more peculiarly the cafe. When we fee one man affifted, protected, relieved by another, our fympathy with the joy of the perfon who receives the benefit ferves only to animate our fellowfeeling with his gratitude towards him who beftows it. When we look upon the perfon who is the caufe of his pleasure with the eyes with which we imagine he must look upon him, his benefactor feems to ftand before us in the most engaging and amiable light. We readily therefore fympathize with the grateful affection which he conceives for a perfon to whom he has been fo much obliged; and confequently applaud the returns which he is disposed to make for the good offices conferred upon him. As we entirely enter into the affection from which thefe returns proceed, they neceffarily feem every way proper and suitable to their object.

2. In the fame manner, as we fympathize with the forrow of our fellow-creature whenever we fee his distress, fo we likewife enter into his abhorrence and averfion for whatever has given occafion to it. Our heart, as it adopts and beats time to his grief, fo is it likewife animated with that spirit by which he endeavours to drive away or destroy the cause of it. The indolent and paffive fellow-feeling, by which we accompany him