I.

PART public bufinefs, or by the prouder and more dazzling tumult of war, he may endeavour to efface, both from his own memory and from that of other people, the remembrance of what he has done; that remembrance never fails to purfue him. He invokes in vain the dark and difmal powers of forgetfulness and oblivion. He remembers himself what he has done, and that remembrance tells him that other people must likewife remember it. Amidft all the gaudy pomp of the most oftentatious greatnefs; amidst the venal and vile adulation of the great and of the learned; amidst the more innocent, though more foolish, acclamations of the common people; amidst all the pride of conqueft and the triumph of fuccefsful war, he is ftill fecretly pursued by the avenging furies of fhame and remorfe; and, while glory feems to furround him on all fides, he himself, in his own imagination, fees black and foul infamy faft pursuing him, and every moment ready to overtake him from behind. Even the great Cæfar, though he had the magnanimity to difmifs his guards, could not difmifs his fufpicions. The remembrance of Pharfalia ftill haunted and purfued him. When, at the requeft of the fenate, he had the generosity to pardon Marcellus, he told that affembly, that he was not unaware of the defigns which were carrying on against his life; but that, as he had lived long enough both for nature and for glory, he was contented to die, and therefore defpifed all confpiracies. He had, perhaps, lived long enough for nature.

But the man who felt himself the object of fuch s deadly refentment, from thofe whofe favour he wifhed to gain, and whom he ftill wifhed to confider as his friends, had certainly lived too long for real glory; or for all the happiness which he could ever hope to enjoy in the love and esteem of his equals.

E c T.

III.

THE

THE

THEORY

OF

MORAL SENTIMENTS.

PART II.

Of MERIT and DEMERIT; or, of the Objects of REWARD and PUNISHMent.

Confifting of Three Sections.

SECTION I.

OF THE SENSE OF MERIT AND DEMERIT.

PART

II.

THE

INTRODUCTION.

HERE is another fet of qualities afcribed to the actions and conduct of mankind, diftinct from their propriety or impropriety, their decency or ungracefulness, and which are the objects of a diftinct fpecies of approbation and difapprobation. These are Merit and Demerit, the qualities of deferving reward, and of deferving punishment.

I.

It has already been obferved, that the fenti- SECT. ment or affection of the heart, from which any action proceeds, and upon which its whole virtue or vice depends, may be confidered under two different aspects, or in two different relations: first, in relation to the caufe or object which excites it; and, fecondly, in relation to the end which it proposes, or to the effect which it tends to produce: that upon the suitableness or unsuitableness, upon the proportion or difproportion, which the affection feems to bear to the cause or object which excites it, depends, the propriety or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness of the confequent action; and that upon the beneficial or hurtful effects which the affection propofes or tends to produce, depends the merit or demerit, the good or ill defert of the action to which it gives occafion. Wherein confifts our fenfe of the propriety or impropriety of actions, has been explained in the former part of this difcourfe. We come now to confider, wherein confifts that of their good or ill defert.

CHAP.

PART
II.

CHAP. I.

That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deferve reward; and that, in the fame manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of refentment, appears to deferve punishment.

To us, therefore, that action must appear to deferve reward, which appears to be the proper and approved object of that fentiment, which moft immediately and directly prompts us to reward, or to do good to another. And in the fame manner, that action must appear to deferve punishment, which appears to be the proper and approved object of that fentiment which moft immediately and directly prompts us to punish, or to inflict evil upon another.

The fentiment which moft immediately and directly prompts us to reward, is gratitude; that which moft immediately and directly prompts us to punifh, is refentment.

To us, therefore, that action must appear to deferve reward, which appears to be the proper and approved object of gratitude; as, on the other hand, that action must appear to deferve punifliment, which appears to be the proper and approved object of refentment.

To reward, is to recompenfe, to remunerate, to return good for good received. To punish,

too,