other plan of doctrine, it seems to me we must lose our confidence in God entirely and for ever; yet, as objections are frequently offered, and that too with much zeal and spir it, and as I wish not to quit the present subject, without having given it a fair and thor ough examination, as far as I am able to do it ; I shall attend to some of the more common and considerable objections that are advanced against what I have been labouring to establish from the scriptures. If the ob jections, to which I shall attempt an answer, do actually seem to have weight with any of my hearers, I hope they will be enabled to give, at least, a candid ear to what may be proposed for their consideration, and that their attention will not be called to any thing captious or evasive. May it be our care to give every consideration all the weight it deserves. The present day's discourse I in. tend to devote entirely, to the examination of a single objection, of one which, as it is in the mouth of every objector to our doctrine, so it is conclusive against us, if it has that foundation in reason and truth, which the objector seems to suppose. It is this,

viz. that if men are but the instruments of Providence, the instruments, by which God works and fulfils his own plan of government, and, consequently, their actions are only the effect of a divine influence upon them, then their conduct is all necessary, which destroys their liberty and moral agency, and reduces them to the condition of

mere machines, which are incapable of either praise or blame.

I know of no objection against that theory of human dependance,which I have been laying before you, of which more is made than of the present one. The idea seems to be confidently taken, as if it were too intuitively evident to need an argument for its support,that a creature, who has no exercises but such as are immediately wrought in him by the power of God, can be no more of a moral agent, and no more liable to be called to an account, than the clock, which moves only by virtue of those mechanical powers, on which all its operations depend. It is true, indeed, that men cannot be the instruments of Providence, as we have endeavoured to prove that they are, without being as dependent for every exertion they put forth, as is the machinery and motion of the clock. Every thought, purpose, and external action, must be the effect of the divine will, mustbe a workmanship of the divine hand; or it cannot be viewed in the light in which we have viewed it, viz. as the means, by which the supreme governor carries his own purposes into effect. And whatever is an effect of the divine will, or the product of almighty power, must, we confess, be necessary, as necessary as is the will of God, which causes it. This is no more than to say, that cause and effect are necessarily connected, or that there can be no cause without an effect, any more than there can be an effect without a

cause.

We cannot say, that moral causes and effects are less necessarily connected, than natural ones are, without embracing the same absurdity in the one case, that evidently ap pears in the other. For instance, if the

conduct of Moses and Pharaoh were ef fects of divine power, it was as necessary that they should act, when that power was exerted, which was the cause of their actions; as it was, that a world should exist, when that power was put forth, which pro duced it.

And I may say further, that if their respective conduct was needful, in the great chain of providence, to effect the glory of God, as it appears that it was, then it was as necessary they should act as they did, as that the name of God should be glorified. No one will say, that it is necessary there should be a regular succession of day and night, while time lasts, and yet, that it is unnecessary, that the sun should periodically rise and set, as it has done from the beginning. Means must always be considered to be just as necessary, as the end, to which they lead. All the actions of men, which God employs to bring glory to himself, are as necessary, as that he should be glorified. It would be absurd to say, that there is a necessity of the latter; but not of the former. This necessity of acting is a subject of great grief to many, who are provoked by it to exclaim, How then can man be free! If he be thus held under the bonds of necesty, how can he be a moral agent ! how can

he be more a subject of moral right or wrong, than the vessel at sea, which is gent ly wafted by pleasant gales, or tossed about and violently driven by fierce winds! It is not my design to prove, that men's acting dependently on God, as the instruments of his government, is consistent with their being under no sort of necessity of acting as they do. I know of no possible medium, by which this could be effected, should the attempt be made. What I shall feel myself concerned to do, is only to prove, that the necessity they are under is not of such a nature, as to infringe their moral liberty, or, in any measure, to render it improper for them to be held accountable for their conduct, so as to be subject to either reward, or punishment. If a man may be a moral agent, or, as some would express it, a free agent, in his moral concerns, and yet be a mere dependent instrument in the hand of God, and, as such, necessarily yielding to a superior power, by which he is put forward; the present objection, I conclude, must vanish. For the only difficulty, here started against this idea of dependence, is, that it destroys moral agency; that men, while they thus act, cannot act freely. I conclude, no one will pretend, that a man may be a moral agent, and yet not be, properly, a subject of moral government, in its fullest extent; which implies subjection to authority, expressed in commands, prohibitions, and threatenings. That men are moral agents,

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in the most perfect sense, and at the same time dependent in the manner we have endeavoured to show, I shall aim to make evident, in the sequel of the present discourse, To do this effectually, and that we may see the objection fairly removed, I shall

First, Enquire what is necessary to constitute a moral agent. And then

Secondly, Whether such an one may not be dependent in the fullest sense or as much so, as any instrument is on him, who makes and uses it.

One is constituted a moral agent by being endowed with moral powers. By moral powers is meant those faculties, or proper ties, of mind, which relate to moral objects, And, by moral objects, right and wrong are pointed out, in distinction from natural things, in which there is no desert of praise, on the one hand, nor of dispraise, on the other. That there are such things, as right and wrong, which deserve to be commended, or condemned, it will be no presumption to assert without proof, since the belief of it is universal, and does not rest upon any train of reasoning whatever. Though men, sometimes, differ about rules of conduct; yet it is hardly credible, that any man should be found, who, in his senses, would dispense with all rule, that is, view all actions alike. It is as essential to the nature of man to make distinctions between actions; to approve of some and disapprove of others; as it is to a beast to seck his food where nature has pro

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