PHYSICS. and to refemble, in their manner of working, any of the agents, whofe nature we are acquainted with; and, laftly, thofe things which I have named unfociable, are fuch as have notions belonging to them; or have conclufions deducible from them, that appear either difagreeable to our primitive ideas, or, when driven home, inconfiftent with the manifeft rules we are furnifh'd with, to judge of true and falfe.

But, by forting things above reafon, into three kinds, I do not deny that 'tis poffible one object may, in different regards, be referr❜d to more than one of these forts; as may fufficiently appear in that nobleft of objects, God; who, when he made the world out of nothing; or, when he difcerns the moft fecret thoughts and intentions of the mind; or, when he unites an immaterial fpirit to a human body, and maintains, perhaps, for very many years, that matchlefs union, with all the wonderful conditions he has annex'd to it; he fupplies us with inftances of things that are inexplicable: for fuch operations are not reducible to any of the ways of working krown to us, fince our minds can but modify themfelves by various manners of thinking. And, as for things without us, all that one body can do to another, by acting on it, is to communicate motion to it; and thereby produce in it the natural confequences of fuch motion; in all which, there is no action like any of those I just now afcribed to God. And fince the prefcience of those future events, which we call contingent, being a perfection, is not to be deny'd to God; and fince this feems irreconcileable to the freedom of human actions, it will afford us an inftance of truths, whofe confiftency, and whofe fymmetry with the body of other truths, our reafon cannot difcern; and which, therefore, ought to be referr'd to that fort of things above reafon, which I call unfociable.

I come now to the third fort of these things, that mention'd under the name of incomprehenfible, or fupra-intellectual; which title, whether it belongs to any other object, or no, certainly belongs to God, whofe nature comprehending all perfections, in their utmoft poffible degrees, is not likely to be comprehenfible by our minds, who wholly want feveral of thofe perfections, and have but moderate fhares of the reft. We are, indeed, born with, or, at leaft, have a power, and feveral occafions to frame an idea of a Being infinitely perfect; and, by this idea, we may fufficiently difcriminate the origin of it, God, from all other objects whatfoever: but, when we come to confider attentively, and minutely, what is contain'd in the notion of omnipotence, omnifcience, eternity, and thofe other attributes that are all united in that great affluence of perfections, God; we may be fure to find, that our faculties are exceedingly furmounted by the vaftnefs and glory of that unlimited, and unparallel'd object; about which, as we can discover that it exifts, and that it poffeffes all the perfection we can conceive; fo we may, at the fame time, difcern, that it muft have degrees of perfection, which, becaufe of the inferiority of our nature, we are not able to comprehend. Yet this difcovery of God's incomprehen fibility, may be made, without fubtile inquiries, and without trains of confequences, tho' not without attention, by a direct view of the mind; which

finds itself, upon trial, as unable, fully to measure the divine perfections, PHYSICS. as the dimenfions of fpace, which we can conceive to be greater and greater, without ever being able to determine any extent beyond whofe limits they cannot reach.

'Tis indeed, therefore, arrogance to talk of infinite, or of privileg'd things, withthe fame confidence, or to pretend to do it with the fame clearnefs, wherewith knowing men may fpeak of things, unquestionably within the compafs of our understandings: but this need not hinder us, nor doth difable us from fpeaking rationally of privileg'd things themfelves. For all allowable notions, are not of the fame fort, or order; and if none were to be admitted but thofe that enable us to comprehend the object, that is, which give us a clear and diftinct knowledge of all that it contains, or that belongs to it; I must confefs, we have no good notions of privileg'd things in particular. I must add, that I fear we have few or none, even of many things, that we think ourfelves very knowing in. And when we fpeak of things, as being above reason, tho' we have no clear, diftinct, and adequate idea of them; yet we may have a general, confused, and inadequate notion of them; which may fuffice to make us diftinguifh their refpective objects from all elfe, and from one another; as may be obferv'd in feveral ideas that are negatively framed fuch as those we have of invifible, incomprehenfible; and in others, which I formerly call'd inferr'd, because they accompany the remote inferences whereby one truth is concluded from another; as when geometricians infer from fome propofitions in Euclid, that any ftrait line may be divided farther and farther, without ftop. For, of this, and fome other propofitions, about privileg'd things, we are not quite deftitute of allowable notions, as may appear by fome admirable fpeculations of mathematicians, about the affections of furd numbers, and incommenfurable magnitudes, of fome of which we have no fuch clear and fymmetrical conceptions, as we have of many other things that are of a nearer, and more intelligible order. I fhall not, therefore, fcruple to acknowledge, that by my own experience, the confeffions of others, and by their unfuccefsful attempts, I am induced to think, that God, who is a moft free agent, having been pleafed to make intelligent Beings, may, perhaps, have made them of different ranks, or orders, whereof men may not be the principal; and that, whether there be fuch orders, or no, he hath, at leaft, made us men of a limited nature, in general, and of a bounded capacity; and accordingly, hath furnifh'd man either with certain innate ideas, or models, and principles; or, with a faculty, or power, and difpofition, eafily to frame them, as it meets with occafions to excite them. But, becaufe God intended the mind of man of a limited capacity, his understanding is fo conftituted, that the in-bred, or eafily acquired ideas, and primitive axioms, wherewith it is furnish'd; and by relation, or analogy whereto, it judges of all other notions and propofitions, do not extend to all knowable objects whatsoever; but reach only to fuch as have a fufficient affinity, or bear fome proportion to those primary ideas, and rules of truth, which are fufficient, if duly improv'd, VOL. II.

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PHYSICS. to help us to attain, tho' not the perfect knowledge of truths of the higheft order, yet the competent knowledge of as much truth, as God thought fit to allow our minds, in their prefent ftate of union with our bodies.

And, indeed, I fee no reafon to repine at the limits which the author of nature affigns to human knowledge. For the number of privileg'd things, is altogether inconfiderable, in comparison of the multitude of others, to which our knowledge may be improv'd to reach; and which it far more concerns us well to know, than it doth to refolve puzzling queftions, about things incomprehenfible; there being, within the compafs of thofe truths, enough to employ, and reward our diligence, without ftraining and tiring our reafon about objects that tranfcend it. Yet, even about thefe, fome inquiries may be allowed; for an object that is, on account of fome of its properties, privileg'd, may have feveral others belonging to it, that do not furpass our reafon; and whofe knowledge may, therefore, be attain'd by the due employment of it. Thus we usefully study the nature of bodies, which make up the object of natural philofophy; tho' the true notion of body, in general, be a thing fo difficult to frame, that the best of our modern philofophers can, by no means, agree about it. This I do not wonder at, becaufe, if we purfue the notion of body to the utmost, 'twill lead us to the perplexing controverfy de compofitione continui; and there the understanding will be left in the dark. Thus furveyors, carpenters, architects, and many others, know feveral properties of the fquare figure, that are of great ufe to them in their refpective employments; tho' this, that its fide, and diagonal, are incommenfurable, be unknown to moft of them; and if they were told of it, and fhould profecute the fpeculation, 'twould involve them in exceeding great, and, probably, infuperable difficulties.

And, even about privileg'd things, our inquiries, if difcreetly manag'd, may not only be allowable, but, fometimes, profitable. For, of fuch fubjects, a ftudious fearch may bring us to know more than we did, tho' not fo much as we would, nor enough to be acquiefced in. This may, probably, teach us to know both the objects better, and ourfelves the better too; by giving us fuch a fenfible difcovery of the infufficiency of our underftandings, to comprehend all forts of things, as may be very useful, tho' not pleafing; and may richly reward the pains that ended in fo inftruEtive a difappointment. Thus in the nobleft inftance that can be given, the contemplation of God himself, tho' he has fo order'd all things, that 'tis fcarce poffible for us to be deftitute of an idea of him; yet when we come, with a fufficient application of mind, to pry into the wonderful attributes of this moft fingular, and adorable Being, we are fure to find ourselves unable to comprehend fo unbounded an object. This, however, ought not to difcourage us from fo noble a study, fince we are allowed the great contentment and honour to make further and further difcoveries of the most excellent of objects, by that very immenfity of his perfections that renders it impoffible for us to reach to the bounds of his excellency, or rather to difcover that it has any bounds at all.

SECT

SECT. II.

PHYSICS.

Rules for indg concerning ing of things

Proceed, in the next place, to offer fome grues and directions, whereby to regulate, and eftimate the reafonings we meet with, things above reafon.

above reajon.

we fhould The first rule.

And, firft, I would obferve, that as to privileg'd fubjects, not admit any affirmative affertion, without fuch proofs as are fufficient in their kind.

For, 'tis not reasonable to give affent to any thing, as a truth, without a fufficient ground for that affent. And tho' it may well be granted in the general, that a thing, which furpafles our reafon, may have belonging to it fome property that is also above reafon; yet we are not, in particular, to believe, that this, or that affection belongs to it, without particular and competent proof. For, fince about a privileg'd thing, as well as about any other, propofitions may be framed, and often are fo, contrary to one another; to affent to both, were certainly to believe one falfity, if not two. And if we will affent but to one, we muft either judge at adventures, or allow ourselves to examine the mediums of probation, employ'd on both fides; and thereupon judge why one of the propofitions is to be affented to, and the other rejected. This manly freedom must be allow'd; without which, our understandings were liable to be impos'd on, in matters of the highest concern: for, there fcarce ever did, or, I fear, ever will, want fome men, who, either out of ignorance, and paffive delufion, felf-confidence, or defign, take upon them, with great boldness, to affirm what they please about privileg'd fubjects: and, when they are oppofed in their extravagancies, by reafonings they cannot anfwer, they urge, that these things, being above reafon, are not to be judg'd of by it. But, of fuch men as thefe, I ufually demand, whether their own affent to the things they would have us believe, be grounded upon fome rational argument, or not. If they fay, 'tis not, they are fools to believe it themfelves; and I fhould add to the number, if, after this acknowledgment, I believ'd them. But, if they fay, it is, I defire them to produce their argument; for, fince 'tis framed by a human understanding, the force of it may, alfo, be comprehended, and judg'd of by a human understanding: and 'tis to no purpose to fay, the fubject furpaffes human reafon; for, if it do fo indeed, it will furpafs theirs, as well as mine, and fo leave us upon even terms. And, let the thing affented to, be what it will, the affent itfelf ought to be founded upon a fufficient reafon; and, confequently, upon one that is intelligible to the human understanding, that is wrought on by

it.

The pofitive proofs requir'd for an affertion, about a privileg'd thing, muft, we fay, be fufficient in their kind; but we are not to expect rigid demonftrations of fuch affertions: for, fince 'tis manifeft, that there are many truths, fuch as hiftorical and political ones, that, by the nature of the things, are not capable of mathematical, or metaphyfical demonftra

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PHYSICS. tions, yet, being really truths, have a juft title to our affent; it must be acknowledg'd, that a rational affent may be founded upon proofs that reach not to rigid demonftrations: it being fufficient, that they are ftrong enough to make a wife man acquiefce in them. And therefore, if any things can be made out to be reveal'd by God, concerning his own nature, actions, or decrees, we ought to receive them; becaufe, of fome of thofe things, as his prefcience, mercy, &c. we can have no better proofs; and of others, as, what he did before our world was made, and what he will do with us after we are dead, we can have no other confiderable proofs at all. There is no reafon to think, that because an object furpaffes the human understanding, it muft, therefore, furpafs the divine intellect itself. Even in the things that are tranfacted in the mind of man, I may learn from another, who is not my fuperior, what I can by no means attain to know, unless he be pleas'd to difcover it to me.

Intelligibility to the human understanding, feems no more neceffary to the truth, or exiftence of a thing, than that vifibility, to a human eye, fhould be neceffary to the existence of an atom, or of a corpufcle of air, or of the effluvia of a load-ftone, or the fragrant exhalations of amber-greece, or musk. The natural incapacity of a child, to understand the abftrufe properties of parabolas, hyperbolas, and the incommenfurable lines of a fquare, hinders not thofe figures from exifting, or their properties from being true and demonftrable. And, tho' we do admit fome privileg'd things, yet there is no neceffity that we should be debarr'd from all knowledge of thofe fublime objects, in which there are many things, whereof we must confefs ourselves ignorant. The ancient geometricians knew very well what a rectangular triangle was, when they conceiv'd it to be a figure confifting of three ftrait lines, two of which, comprize a right angle; tho' probably, for a great while, they did not know all its chief properties; fince, for ought appears, before Pythagoras, it was not known that the fquare of the hypothenufe, is equal to the fquares of both the other fides taken together; and much more likely it is, that they were not able to folve thofe difficulties which attend the endless divifibility of lines inferable from that equality.

But every thing hard to be understood, or contrary to the common rules of probability, has not a right to pafs for privileg'd; *for then, the paradoxes about furd quantities, the duplicate proportion, and feveral otherfurprizing doctrines, capable of mathematical demonftrations, would

be

For the body, on which the figure is to be feen, muft be opake by "the hypothefis, and the object placed

on the contrary fide to that whereon "'tis feen; fo that either the light muft "betranfmitted thro' this body, and then "'tis not opake, contrary to the fuppo"fition; or elfe the light muft not be "tranfmitted, and then no figure could

"be