PHYSICS. Corporeal Being, is of an order fuperior to mere matter. For, who can clearly conceive an order, or kind of Beings, that shall be real fubftances, and yet neither corporeal, nor immaterial? Nor do I fee, how the fuppofition of this unintelligible, at leaft unintelligent Being, tho' we fhould grant it to have a kind of life, or foul, will much affift us to folve phenomena. To draw, at length, towards a conclufion; what we have here deliver❜d upon this fubject, may, perhaps, do fome fervice both to natural philofophy, and to religion. vantages of this inquiry. The ufs and ad- We have attempted to diffuade philofophers from often employing, and without great need, a term, which, by reafon of its great ambiguity, and the little care taken by fuch as ufe it, to diftinguifh its different acceptions, occafions both a great deal of darkness, and confufion, in what men fay and write about things corporeal; and a multitude of controverfies, wherein really they wrangle about words. And this difcourfe may, poffibly, wean many from the fond conceit they cherish, that they understand, or explain a corporeal fubject, or a phenomenon, when they afcribe it to nature. For, to do that, one need not be a philofopher; fince a peasant may easily do the fame. man has never well perform'd the part of a true philofopher, till he circumftantially, or particularly, deduces the phenomenon he confiders, by intelligible ways, from intelligible principles; which he will be conftantly put in mind of doing, or difcover that he hath not done, if, by forbearing general and ambiguous terms, he endeavours to explain things, by expreffions that are clear to all attentive readers. And this perfpicuous way of philofophizing fhould be greatly recommended, by the valuable difcoveries which those who employ'd it, have happily made, in hydrostatics, optics, anatomy, botanics, and many other parts of real learning. Our doctrine may, alfo, be ferviceable to religion in three refpects. And, firft, it may keep many, who were inclined to have an exceffive veneration for what they call nature, from running into thofe extravagant and facrilegious errors, that have been, upon plaufible pretences, embraced, not only by many of the old heathen philofophers, but by feveral modern profeffors of christianity. Secondly, it may conduce to juftify fome remarkable proceedings of divine providence, against those who boldly cenfure it, upon the account of fome things they judge to be physical irregularities; fuch as monsters, earth-quakes, floods, eruptions of vulcano's, famines,. &c. For, according to us, 1. God is a moft free agent, and created the world, not out of neceffity, but voluntarily; having framed it as he pleafed, and thought fit, at the beginning of things; when there was no fubftance but himself, and, confequently, no creature, to which he could be obliged, or by which he could be limited. 2. God having an understanding infinitely fuperior to that of man, in extent, clearness, and other excellencies; he may, rationally, be fuppos'd to have framed fo great and admirable an automaton as the world, and the the fubordinate engines comprized in it for feveral ends and purposes; PHYSICS. fome of them relating chiefly to his corporeal, and others to his rational creatures of which ends, he hath vouchsafed to make fome difcoverable by our dim reafon; whilft others are, probably, not to be penetrated by it, but lie conceal'd in the deep abyfs of his unfearchable wisdom. 3. It seems probable, that this moft excellent and glorious Being thought fit to order things fo, that both his works and actions might bear fome marks of his attributes; and, efpecially, to ftamp upon his corporeal works fome tokens, or impreffes, of his divine wisdom, difcernible by the human mind. 4. Upon this fuppofition, it became the divine author of the universe to give it fuch a ftructure, and fuch powers, and to establish among its parts fuch general and conftant laws, as beft fuited his purposes in creating the world; and to give thefe univerfal laws, and particular parts, or bodies, fuch fubordinations to one another, and fuch references to the original fabric of the grand fyftem of the world, that, on all particular occafions, the welfare of inferior, or private portions of it, fhould be only fo far provided for, as their welfare is confiftent with the general laws by him fettled in the univerfe; and with fuch of thofe ends, that he d to himself in framing it, as are more confiderable than the welpropos fare of thofe particular creatures. ture. 5. The laft fervice that, I hope, our doctrine may do religion, is, to induce men to pay their admiration, their praifes, and their thanks, directly to God himself; who is the true and only creator of the fun, moon, earth, and thofe other creatures, that men call the works of naAnd in this way of expreffing their veneration of the true God, and their gratitude to him, they are warranted by the examples of the ancient people of God, the Ifraelites; and not only by the infpired perfons of the old teftament, but by the promulgators of the new, and even by the celeftial fpirits; who, in the Revelation of St. John, are introduced praifing and thanking God himself for his works; without taking any notice of his pretended vicegerent, nature. ΑΝ ΑΝ INQUIRY INTO THE FINAL CAUSES O F Natural Things. men ? I SECT. I. Here propofe to deliver my thoughts upon thefe four questions. 1. Whether, indefinitely fpeaking, there be any final caufes of things corporeal, knowable to men? 2. Whether, if that queftion be refolv'd in the affirmative, we may confider final caufes in all forts of bodies, or only in fuch as are peculiarly qualified? 3. Whether, or in what fenfe, the acting for ends may be afcribed to an unintelligent and inanimate body? 4. And laftly, how far, and with what cautions, arguments may be framed upon the fuppofition of final caufes ? Whether the fi- To begin with the firft queftion. Those who would exclude final caunal caufes of natural things fes from the confideration of the naturalift, feem to do it, either becaufe, ve knowable to with Epicurus, they think the world was produc'd by atoms and chance, without the intervention of a Deity; and, confequently, that 'tis in vain to feck for fuch caufes: or becaufe, with Des Cartes, they imagine, that God being omnifcient, 'tis rafh and prefumptuous for men to think they know, or can difcover what ends he propos'd to himfelf, in his creatures. The fuppofition on which the Epicureans have rejected final causes, has been difallow'd by the philofophers of almost all other fects; and fome have writ..ten fufficient confutations of it: I fhall, however, in the progress of our work, work, make fuch occafional obfervations, as may ferve to difcredit fo un- PHYSICS. reasonable an opinion. But the Cartefian argument having been fo prevalent among learned and ingenious men, I fhall beftow the more pains in the confideration of that. One thing, perhaps, that kept fo great a philofopher as Des Cartes, from allowing the confideration of final caufes in phyfics, was, that the fchoolphilofophers, and others, are apt to propofe it too unwarily; as if there were no creature in the world, that was not folely, or chiefly defign'd for the fervice of man. And, indeed, I have feen a body of divinity, publifh'd by a famous author, wherein he urges this argument for the annihilation of the world; "That fince the world was made for the fake of man, in his travelling capacity; when once man is poffefs'd of his everlafting state of happinefs, or mifery, there will be no further ufe of the "" world. The opinion that gives rife to fuch prefumptuous and unwarrantable expreffions, was, as I conjecture from his objection, very shocking to Des Cartes; but the indifcretion of men ought not to prejudice truth, which is not to be thrown away with the groundless conceits that fome people have pinn'd upon it. Since then, I cannot clofe in either with the doctrine of the Epicureans, or Cartefians, I fhall leave each party to maintain its refpective opinion, and proceed to declare my own: but, to clear the way, 'tis neceffary to premise a diftinction. what they may fignify. In fpeaking of the ends which the author of nature is faid to have in Final caufes, things corporeal, any of thefe four particulars may be fignified. Firft, Some grand and general ends of the univerfe; fuch as exercifing and difplaying the creator's wifdom; the communication of his goodness, and the admiration and thanks due to him from his intelligent creatures, c. And thefe ends, because they regard the whole creation, I call the univerfal ends of God, or nature. Secondly, In a more reftrain'd fenfe, the ends defign'd in the number, fabric, fituation, and motion of great maffes of matter, that make large parts of the world; fince 'tis very probable, that these bodies, fuch as the fun, moon, fix'd stars, and the terraqueous globe, were fo framed, and placed, as not only to perfevere in their own prefent ftate, but alfo to conduce to the univerfal ends of the creation, and the good of the whole, whereof they are confiderable parts. Upon which accounts, thefe ends may be call'd cofmical, or fyftematical; as they regard the fymmetry of the great fyftem of the world. Thirdly, ends that more peculiarly concern the parts of animals, and, perhaps, plants too; or thofe to which the particular parts of animals are deftined for the welfare of the whole creature, confider'd as an entire and distinct fyftem of organiz'd parts, defign'd to preferve himfelf, and propagate his fpecies, upon that ftage to which his ftructure, and circumstances determine him to act his part. And thefe ends, to diftinguish them from others, may be call'd animal ends. Laftly, 152 PHYSICS. Final Causes of Natural Things. Laftly, The fame expreffion may fignify another fort of ends, which, beaufe they relate particularly to man, may be called human ends and are thofe aimed at by nature, where fhe is laid to frame animals, vegetables, &c. for the use of man. And thefe ends may farther be diftinguith'd into mental and corporeal not only as man is an animal framed, like others, for his own prefervation, and the propagation of his fpecies; but alfo, as he is made to have dominion over other animals, and works of nature, and fitted To make them fubfervient to his purposes. This diftinction being thus fettled, I declare my diffent, as well from the vulgar notion of final causes, which allows of none but thofe we have call'd human ones; as from theirs who wholly reject them all. 'Tis an acknowledg'd principle of the Cartefian philofophy, that there is always the fame quantity of motion in the world; because, fay they, there is no reason why God, who is immutable, should, at the beginning of things, have given fuch a quantity of motion to matter, as fhould need to be afterwards augmented, or leffen'd. But do not those who employ this negative argument, take upon them to judge of the ends that God have propos'd to himself in natural things? For, without fuppofing that they know what God defign'd in fetting matter in motion, 'tis hard for them to fhew, that his defign could not be beft accomplish'd by fometimes adding to, and fometimes taking from the quantity of motion, he originally may when they are in a line perpendicular cay. For, bodies which are either ab"folutely hard, or fo foft as to be void "of clafticity, will not rebound from *Sir If. Newton makes it evident, that there 46 one another. Impenetrability makes them only ftop. If two equal bodies "meet directly in vacuo, they will, by "the laws of motion, ftop where they "meet, and lofe all their motion, and "remain at reft; untefs they be elaftic, "and receive new motion from their "fpring. If they have fo much elafticity 4, or, or of the force with which they come together, they will lofe oror of their motion And this may be tried by letting two equal "pendulums fall against one another from "equal heights. If the pendulums be of lead, or foft clay, they will lofe all, or almost all their motions; if of ela |