'Tis my fettled opinion, that divine prudence is, at leaft, often PHYSICS. concern'd, in a peculiar manner, about the actions of men, and the things that happen to them, or has a neceffary connexion with the one, the other, or both. And tho' I think it probable, that in the conduct of that far greatest part of the univerfe, which is merely corporeal, the wife author of it feldom manifeftly procures a recefs from the fettled courfe of the univerfe, and especially from the moft general laws of motion; yet, where men, who are creatures, that he is pleas'd to endow with free-will (at leaft with regard to things not fpiritual) are nearly and highly concern'd; he may, not only fometimes by thofe fignal and manifeft interpofitions we call miracles, acted in a fupernatural way; but, as the fovereign lord and governour of the world, frequently give, by the intervention of rational minds, as well united, as not united to human bodies, feveral fuch determinations to the motion of parts in thofe bodies, and of others, which may be affected by them, as by laws merely mechanical, thofe parts of matter would not have had and by motions fo determ in 'd, either falutary or fatal crifes, and many other things, conducive to the welfare or detriment of men, may be produced. The interpofition of divine providence, in cafes of life and death, might be easily fhewn to chriftians, from feveral paffages of fcripture. And, I think, it becomes a chriftian philofopher, to admit in general, that God fometimes in a peculiar, tho' fecret way, interpofes in the ordinary phenomena and events of crifes; but that this is done fo feldom, at least in a way that we can certainly difcern, that we are not haftily to have recourfe to an extraordinary providence, and much lefs to the ftrange care and skill of that queftion'd Being call'd nature, in a particular cafe, if it may be probably accounted for by mechanical laws, and the ordinary courfe of things. When we confider the world, and the phyfical changes that happen in it, with regard to the divine wisdom and providence; the arguments for the affirmative ought, in their kind, to have more force than thofe for the negative. For it seems more allowable, to argue a providence from the exquifite ftructure and fymmetry of the mundane bodies, and the apt fubordination and train of caufes, than to infer from fome phyfical irregularities, that things are not fram'd and adminiftred by a wife author and governour. For the characters and impreffions of wifdom, confpicuous in the curious fabric, and orderly train of things, can, with no probability, be referr'd to blind chance, but to a moft intelligent and defigning agent. Whereas, on the other hand, the irregularities we fpeak of, are incomparably fewer than thofe things which are regular, and produc'd in an orderly way; and the divine maker of the univerfe being a moft free agent, and having an intellect infinitely fuperiour to ours, may, in the production of feemingly irregular phenomena, have ends unknown to us, which even thefe irregularities may be very fit to compafs. SECT. PHYSICS. Axioms about nature, how far, and in what mitted. SECT. III. O proceed, the moft general and current axioms concerning nature, may fenfe to be ad given of them, agreeably to the doctrine hitherto propos'd; tho' fome of thefe axioms fuppofe, and others feem ftrongly to fupport the receiv'd notion of nature. But before I confider the particular maxims receiv'd concerning nature's actions, let us fee in what fenfe nature may, or may not, be faid to act at all, or to do this or that. For ought I can clearly difcern, whatfoever is perform'd in the merely material world, is really done by particular bodies, acting according to the laws of motion, &c. fettled and maintain'd by God, among things corporeal. In which hypothefis, nature feems rather a notional thing, than a true phyfical, diftinct efficient; fuch as would be, in cafe Ariftotle's do&trine were true, one of thofe intelligences he prefum'd to be the movers of the celeftial orbs. But men often exprefs them felves fo very ambiguoufly, or intricately, when they fay, that nature does this, or acts thus, that 'tis fcarce poffible intelligibly to tranflate their expreffions into any forms of fpeech, adequate to the originals. 1. In this axiom, every nature preferves it felf; by the word nature, I fuppofe, is understood a natural body, otherwife I know not what it means. Thus, then, it may either fignify, that no one body tends to its own deftruction, or that, in every body, there is a principle call'd nature, upon account whereof the body is vigilant and induftrious to preferve its ftate, and to defend itfelf from the violence and attempts of all other bodies that oppofe, or endeavour to deftroy or harm it. In the former fenfe, the axiom may be admitted, without any prejudice to our doctrine: according to which, inanimate bodies can have neither appetites, hatreds, nor defigns; fo that we may eafily grant, they have none to deftroy themfelves. But, according to the other fenfe of the axiom, 'twill import, that every body has within it felf a principle, whereby it defires, and with all its power endeavours to compafs its own prefervation; and both to do thofe things, that tend thereto, and oppofe all endeavours, that outward agents, or internal diftempers, may ufe to compafs the deftruction of it. And, as this is the moft vulgar fenfe of the axiom, fo 'tis chiefly in this, that I am concern'd to examine it. I conceive, then, that the moft wife creator of things at firft fo framed the world, and fettled fuch laws of motion between the bodies, which, as parts, compofe it; that by the affiftance of his general concourfe, the portions of the univerfe, are lodg'd in fuch places, and furnifh'd with fuch powers, that, by the help of his general providence, they may have their beings continued and maintained, as long as the courfe he thought fit to establish amongst things corporeal, requires. Upon Upon this fuppofition, which is but reafonable, there will appear no PHYSICS. neceffity to have any recourfe, for the prefervation of particular bodies, to fuch an internal appetite and in-bred knowledge in each of them, as the naturists prefume: fince, by virtue of the original frame of things, and established laws of motion, bodies are neceffarily determined to act on fuch occafions, after the manner they would, if they had really an aim at felf-prefervation. Thus, 'tis all one to a lump of dough, whether you make it into a round loaf, a long roll, or a flat cake: for in whatever figure the hands leave it, that it retains without having any appetite to return to the former. The mariner's needle, before it is excited, may have no particular propenfity to one part of the heavens more than another; but when it has been duly touch'd upon a load-ftone, the flower-de-luce will be determin'd to the north, and the oppofite extreme to the fouth. So that, if the lily be drawn afide, towards the east or the weft, as foon as the force that detain'd it, is remov'd, it will return to its former pofition, and never reft, till it regard the north. But, in fpite of this feeming affection of the lily to that point of the horizon, yet, if the needle be duly touch'd upon the contrary pole of a vigorous load-ftone, the lily will presently lofe its former inclination, and regard the fouth part of the heavens. ; 2. Another received axiom concerning nature, is, that she never fails of her end. This propofition is very ambiguous. However, if by nature we here understand the Being, that the fchool-men ftyle Natura naturans; I allow that nature never miffeth its end. For the omnifcient and almighty author of things having once framed the world, and establish'd in it the laws of motion, which he conftantly maintains, there can no irregularity happen, efpecially among the greater mundane bodies, that he did not from the beginning forefee and permit. And tho', on fome fpecial occafions, this inftituted order, either feemingly or really, has been violated yet these things happening but rarely, and for weighty ends and purposes, by the peculiar intervention of the firft caufe, either guiding or over-ruling the propenfities and motions of fecondary agents; it cannot be faid, that God is fruftrated of his ends by thefe exorbitances, whereby he most wifely and effectually accomplishes them. But, if by nature be meant fuch a fubordinate principle, as men ufually underftand by that name, I doubt the axiom is in many cafes falfe: for tho' the material world is fo conftituted, that, for the most part, things are brought to pafs by corporeal agents, as regularly, as if they defigned the effects they produce; yet there are feveral inftances wherein things happen quite otherwife. Thus when a woman is pregnant, the aim of nature is, to produce a perfect human fœtus; yet we often fee, nature widely miffing her mark, inftead of that, produces a monfter. Thus the fap, that nature raises with intent to feed the fruit of a white-thorn, for inftance, is by graffing brought to nourish a fruit of quite another kind. So, when the malfter makes barly to fprout, whence nature intends to produce ftalks and ears, 'tis perverted to a very different purpose. 3. Another PHYSICS. 3. Another celebrated axiom concerning nature, is, that fhe always acts by the forteft ways. But this rule, as well as feveral others, requires to be explained and limited, before it be admitted. 'Tis true, the omnifcient author of the univerfe has fo framed it, that moft of its parts act as regularly in order to the ends propofed, as if they did it with defign. But fince inanimate bodies have no knowledge, it cannot reafonably be fuppofed, that they moderate and vary their own actions, according to the exigency of particular circumftances, wherewith they muft of neceffity be unacquainted; it were therefore ftrange, if various occurrences did not determine them to act by other than the shortest ways, that lead to particular ends, if thofe other ways be more agreeable to the general laws or cuftoms established among things corporeal. This I prove by inftances taken from gravity itself, a quality perhaps very probably refer'd to an innate power and propenfion. For if a heavy body be let fall into the free air, 'twill take its courfe directly towards the centre of the earth; and, if it meet with an inclining plane, which puts it out of its way, it will not lofe its tendency towards the centre, but run along that plane, by which means its tendency downwards is profecuted, tho'not, as before, in a perpendicular line, yet in the shortest way it is permitted to take. Thefe obvious phenomena, I confefs, agree very well with the vulgar axiom, and poffibly were the chief things that induced men to frame it. But now let us fuppofe, that a little fphere of marble or fteel, after having long fallen thro' the air, lights upon a pavement of hard ftone, that lies horizontal; in this cafe, experience fhews, that the falling globe will rebound to a confiderable height, and falling down again, rebound again, and fo for several times fucceffively, before it approaches as near as is permitted it, to the centre of heavy bodies. But if nature acted in all cafes by the shortest ways, this fphere ought not to rebound at all. And having taken a good fea-compafs, and fuffer'd the magnetic needle to reft north and fouth; if I held the proper pole of a good load-ftone at a convenient diftance, on the right or left hand of the lily, this would be drawn afide from the north point towards the eaft or weft, as I pleased; and then the load-ftone being quite remov'd, the lily of the needle would indeed return northward, tho' not ftop in the magnetic meridian, but paffing on feveral degrees beyond it, "twould thence return without ftopping at the meridian line: and fo, by its vibrations, defcribe many arches ftill fhorter and fhorter, till at length it came to fettle on it, and recover that pofition, which, if nature always acted by the most compendious ways, it should have rested at the first time it had regain'd it. The truth is, that, at leaft, inanimate bodies, acting without knowledge or defign of their own, cannot ftop or moderate their own actions, but muft neceffarily move as they are determined by the general laws of motion; according to which, in one cafe, the impetus, that a body acquires by falling, is more powerful to carry it on beyond the line of direction, than the action of the caufes of gravity is to ftop it, as foon as it comes to the nearest place they can give it to the centre of the earth. And fomething like this happens in levity, as well as gravity; gravity; for if you take an oblong and conveniently shaped piece of light PHYSICS. wood, and having funk it to the bottom of deep ftagnant water, give it liberty to afcend, it will not only regain the furface of the water, where, by the laws of gravity, it ought to reft, and did reft before it was forc'd down; but rife far beyond that furface, and in part, as it were, fhoot itfelf up into the incumbent air, then fall down again, and rife a fecond time, and perhaps much oftner, and fall again, before it fettles in its due place, wherein it is in an equilibrium with the water, that endeavours to prefs it upwards. 4. Another maxim, generally receiv'd concerning nature, is, that she always does what is beft. But of this it will not be fafe to deliver an opinion, till I have remov'd the ambiguity of the words; for they easily admit of two different fenfes. They may fignify, that nature, in the whole univerfe, does always that which is beft for the preservation of it in its prefent ftate; or that, with regard to each body in particular, nature till does what moft conduces to the prefervation and welfare of that body. In the first of these fenfes, the axiom will be lefs liable to exception; but then, I fear, it will be difficult to be pofitively made out, by fuch inftances as prove that nature acts otherwife than neceffarily according to mechanical laws. And, therefore, till I meet with fuch proofs, I fhall proceed to the other fenfe; which, tho' the moft ufual, I cannot admit, without it be both explain'd and limited. I readily grant, as I have often occafion to repeat, that the all-wife author of things corporeal has fo framed the world, that moft things happen in it, as if the particular bodies that compofe it, were watchful both for their own welfare, and that of the univerfe. But I think, withal, that particular bodies, at least fuch as are inanimate, acting without either knowledge or defign, their actions tend not to what is beft for them in their private capacities, any further than fuits with the general laws of motion, and the important cuftoms establish'd among things corporeal: fo that, in conformity hereto, feveral things are done, that are neither the best, nor fo much as good, with regard to the welfare of particular bodies. We often fee, that fruit-trees, efpecially when they grow old, will, for one season, be fo overcharg'd with fruit, that they decay and die foon after; and even, whilft they flourish, the exceffive weight upon them, fometimes breaks off the branches, and thereby both hinders the maturity of the fruit, and haftens the death of the tree. Now this fatal profufion would have been prevented, if a wife nature, harbour'd in the plant, did, as is prefumed, follicitoufly watch for its welfare. We fee, alfo, in feveral diseases, and in the unfeasonable and hurtful crifes of fevers, how far, what men call nature, often is from doing that which is beft for the patient's prefervation. In many difeafes, a great part of the physician's work is to appease the fury, and to correct the errors of this pretended nature; which being, as 'twere, tranfported with a blind and impetuous paffion, unfeafonably produces thofe dangerous VOL. II. T dif |