sponsibility. But it is answered, some men profess this belief without feeling this effect. The reply is evident; "We have, therefore, good grounds for thinking, that the belief, even when professed, is not real; and that men are drawn into the admission of a statement as true, which they do not really believe, because of the metaphysical difficulty they feel in refuting it."

"It will be observed, that throughout this argument I proceed on the supposition, that a belief in Necessity has, in point of fact, little influence in the world: and that my object is not so much to disprove the doctrine for fear of its evil consequences, as from the acknowledged fact, that it does not and cannot extensively prevail, to infer the improbability of the doctrine. It is not, therefore, by abstaining merely from imputations upon the professors of Necessity, which certainly tend to inflame the angry passions and to obstruct all candid consideration of the subject, that I seek to avoid giving offence; but the nature of my argument itself precludes that mode of reasoning; being built upon a supposition directly opposite, and deriving its main strength from that very circumstance.

"In following out the tendency of those opinions, which for the sake of compendious expression are called Fatalism and Calvinism, I have been careful to speak of them not as nominally professed, but only so far as they really operate on the mind, and that too in the absence of counteracting causes t. Under these limitations, the conclusion to which that investigation led me certainly was, that the Fatalist would be more likely to be careless about religion, and the Calvinist about morals. The case of Tiberius was adduced not so much on account of the value of one example, as because his biographer, naturally and without a view to any system, attributes his neglect of religion to that cause." (Copleston's Remarks, p. 18.)

His answer to the question of Philalethes, "How is this conclusion reconcileable with the fact, that among the ancient sects of philosophers, the Stoics were the stoutest maintainers both of the existence, and of the superintending providence of the Gods!" appears to us quite satisfactory. The belief in these points he considers to be wholly independent of a belief in fatalism. He admits, that the Stoics

"I must here observe, that the distinction sometimes drawn between Fatalism and Necessity, as if the former related only to events, and the latter to the acts and dispositions of the human mind, appears to me untenable. My argument at least considers them as inseparable. It is needless to enter into that question now: for with a Fatalism contined to such external events as are independent of man and of moral conduct I have no concern,”

"Discourse 1. p. 31."

"Quippe persuasionis plenus onmia fato agi. Suet. in Tib. c. 69,"

taught both; but he says they are not very intelligible in their endeavours to reconcile the two opinions together. Fatalism, as far as it goes, is adverse to religion; and when the Stoics taught the latter, they departed from the rigour of the former. Thus "Epictetus begins his treatise with that fundamental principle, for which Cudworth contends as essential to all true religion, viz. that some things are ' v, in our own power." (Remarks, p. 21.) And Seneca, when, in answer to the only reason he gives for discharging religious duties, namely, that they are confatalia, he is pressed with the objection, that, "if fated, there is no need of teaching and requiring us to perform them, as they do not depend upon our will;" has no refuge left, but "to say, that something may still depend upon the will of man." (Remarks, p. 22.)

"This solution is in fact giving up the point of absolute fatalism and it would be much more philosophical at once to admit that the things are apparently irreconcileable, though it is repugnant to human reason to reject either of them altogether, than thus to profess a peremptory and exclusive belief in one tenet, which is not only contradicted in practice, but which cannot even in words be consistently maintained." (Copleston's Remarks, p. 23.)

Dr. Copleston has availed himself of the information contained in Mr. Stewart's Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical Philosophy, to bring forward strong additional evidence of the tendency of Necessarian opinions. And we shall scarcely doubt of the effects which they would produce upon moral conduct, when we find Diderot arguing, that "Liberty is a word devoid of meaning;" and, that "if there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue, nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished:" and hear from Mr. Belsham, that "the fallacious feeling of Remorse is superseded by the doctrine of Necessity;" and that " Remorse supposes Free-Will it is of little or no use in moral discipline; in a degree it is pernicious+." (Remarks, pp. 24, 25. citing Stewart's Dissertation, pp. 81, 82.)

The objection from experience is thus met and answered by Dr. Copleston;

* Preface to Intellectual System.

+ We observe a slight error in the printing of the references, by which a passage is given to Diderot, which evidently belongs to Mr. Belsham, and is so noted by Mr. Stewart.

"It is however objected, that experience decides the other way that in the Church of Rome, for instance, the Jansenists, who maintained the doctrine of Predestination, were austere moralists, whilst their opponents the Jesuits were notorious for loose morals and compromising casuistry: in short, that wherever Calvinism has been the prevailing faith, as in Protestant Switzerland, in Holland, in Scotland, religious communities have been remarkable for rigid discipline and virtuous lives.

"To this I can only reply, that these communities have in general been remarkable also for diligent and zealous study of the holy Scriptures, whose spirit they have imbibed, and have carried it into the regulation of their lives. And as was observed in the case of human ethics, that a belief in Necessity would probably never prevail long over moral principle, nor prevail at all, where that principle is deeply seated and well exercised, so in considering the influence of the Gospel, if the mind be carefully trained in religious instruction, if the precepts, the promises, the exhortations, the examples of Scripture be early and habitually impressed upon it, and above all, if the lesson of divine love and mercy exhibited in the scheme of redemption be duly considered and received into the heart, the doctrine of absolute decrees will have little or no injurious effect; but a hatred of sin will be superadded to the ordinary moral principles of our nature, and will act as a powerful preservative against the evil effects which might otherwise arise from such a persuasion, when operating singly, or when possessing a strong ascendancy over other motives." (Copleston's Remarks, p. 27.)

Having thus, as it appears to us, satisfactorily vindicated his argument from the exceptions taken against it, by his -able and candid opponent, Philalethes Cantabrigiensis, Dr. Copleston proceeds to consider the remarks of Mr. Grinfield, in his "Vindicia Analogica," upon the doctrine maintained by him in his note upon Analogy.

In this note, Dr. Copleston has spoken with approbation of Archbishop King's Sermon on Predestination and Foreknowledge; and has recommended it to all students, who have been conscious to themselves of any confusion or perplexity upon these subjects. He gives a brief analysis of Archbishop King's argument, and an impartial statement of the objections which have been taken by controversialists, both Calvinistic and Arminian, against his Sermon. These objections the Archbishop himself had, in some measure, anticipated; and he had provided against them what, Dr. Copleston conceives might appear, to many readers, a sufficient answer. But, as he is impressed with the general excellence of the Archbishop's argument, and desirous of

freeing it from any defect in his mode of stating it which may impair its utility, he proceeds to examine the question more in detail; and particularly to settle the accurate meaning of the words "Analogy" and "Resemblance," which, he says, are used loosely and indiscriminately not only in popular discourse, but by philosophical and scientific writers of modern times, and even by the author himself are not employed with sufficient precision upon so nice a point. It is to the account thus given of analogy, and of the attributes of God, in their relation to our moral faculties," that Mr. Grinfield objects. He represents Dr. Copleston's opinion thus: "Analogy implies no similarity in the subjects which are compared; it signifies merely a sameness in their relations, but it includes no likeness originally subsisting in the subjects themselves." And from "this ordinary use of the word," to which "considered etymologically, and as it is commonly used by geometers," he professes, that he "can have no objection," he says, that Dr. Copleston "infers that mathematicians do not pre-suppose the existence of some common properties in all subjects of mathematical investigation." (Vindicia Anal. Part I. pp. 2, 3.)

We have not been able to discover the passage in which Dr. Copleston draws any such inference, though we have repeatedly read the whole of his note with great attention. But, in his quotation of that part of the Provost's statement, to which he chiefly objects, there is an unhappy omission which seems to deform the sense of the author; and may leave the reader of Mr. Grinfield's pamphlet only, but imperfectly acquainted with the scope and value of the argument. We shall, therefore, give the whole passage, inserting within brackets the words which we presume were unintentionally omitted by Mr. Grinfield, in the part of it which he has quoted; and adding, in italics, the remainder of the sentence, without which, we conceive, that the reader cannot form an adequate notion of the position which Dr. Copleston meant to establish.

"Analogy does not mean the similarity of two things, but the similarity, or sameness, of two relations. [There must be more than two things to give rise to two relations:] there must be at least three; and in most cases there are four. Thus A. may be like B. but there is no analogy between A. and B.: it is an abuse of the word to speak so, and it leads to much confusion of thought. If A. has the same relation to B. which C. has to D. then there is an analogy. If the first relation be well known, it may serve to explain the second, which is less known and the transfer of name from "one of the terms in the relation best known, to its corresponding term

in the other, causes no confusion, but on the contrary tends to remind us of the similarity that exists in these relations; and so assists the mind instead of misleading it." (Copleston's Enquiry, p. 122.)

In this statement Mr. Grinfield conceives, that "there is some truth mingled with an important fallacy." The truth which he admits is this: that, according to the strict meaning of the word analogy, there must be more than two things which are compared." The fallacy which he thinks he has discovered he shall state for himself.

"It is not true, that A. need only be like B., it must also have some common likeness to C., or there could be no analogy deducible between them. The ratio (λoyos) between A. and B. must be of that strict nature which does not admit of their reference to any third term; they are referred to each other exclusively in respect of dimension. But if there were no universal properties belonging to A., B., C., D., they would not be compared in any way as magnitudes; there could be no common properties predicated concerning them, and in that case there could be no avaλoyia subsisting amongst them." (Vind. Anal. Part I. p. 4.)

It is thus evident from the very outset of his argument, that Mr. Grinfield has not clearly understood the statement which he has judged it necessary to attack. He conceives that Dr. Copleston is speaking of mathematical analogies; and in his anxiety to serve the cause of truth, by detecting and exposing a presumed fallacy, he has submitted to much painful exercise of thought; and taken the trouble of writing largely on a subject of which he confesses that he did not possess the necessary previous knowledge. Being no mathematician, he takes up a mathematical question which has no real relation to Dr. Copleston's argument. And, by the assistance of what he calls "general logic," he has arrived at conclusions which he never could have reached, had not his first mistake thrown him at once out of his true course, to adopt the quotation used by the "Inquirer," upon a different occasion,

"Ten thousand leagues awry

Into the devious air."

Mr. Dalby, who we suspect is a mathematician, which Mr. Grinfield confessedly is not, has thus taught him the danger of venturing blindfold into Euclid's armoury in search of offensive weapons.

"Comparison," he observes, " has surely but two branches. The likenesses of things (which is similitude, or resemblance) must

+