"Whereas in Philosophy" he says, "free will has been pressed against the doctrine of providence almost as much as providence against that of free-will; yet when the parties take their stand upon scriptural ground, it is only the advocate for predestination that ever contends directly against the opinion of his adversary,the advocate for free-will never pretending to derogate from the fore-knowledge or the superintendance of God, but being charged only by his opponent with holding opinions that must draw that.. consequence after them." (Enquiry. p. 87.)

This position, Philalethes Cantabrigiensis, seems to consider deserving of some reconsideration. He observes, that "without expressly denying the Divine Prescience, men may so define and limit it, as in reality to do it away." This he conceives to be the case with those maintainers of a contingent foreknowledge, such as is described by Burnet, in his Exposition of the seventeenth Article: and he brings forward a passage from Dr. Hey's Lectures, which he thinks partly liable to the same objection. Dr. Copleston does not deny the force of his remark, as it applies to the advocates of Free-Will; but he considers that Philalethes has misapprehended his meaning, when he supposes that it was his intention to assert that these reasoners never denied the prescience of God. And we think, that in making this objection, Philalethes has not sufficiently attended to the full import of the Provost's language. If he had observed the stress which he evidently intended to lay upon the word $6 directly," by printing it in a different character; and the admission contained in the latter part of his sentence, that the advocates of Free-Will, were charged by their opponents with holding opinions that must draw that consequence after them; perhaps he would have allowed, that the meaning of his citation from Cicero, verbis ponentes re tollunt, had been virtually expressed by the Enquirer. Having thus vindicated his own words, Dr. Copleston candidly admits, that the reference to Dr. Hey's Lectures, gives an instance of a nearer approach to a direct denial, than he had supposed could have been produced from the writings of an English Divine. "We have no right" Dr. Hey says, "to ascribe to God a certain knowledge of our voluntary actions, if we have no such thing ourselves, nor any idea of such a thing; do we know that it is not an impossibility." This language Dr. Copleston allows to be incautious and incorrect.

"And I have little doubt" he adds, "that Dr. Hey himself would have admitted that contradiction was not only a more be

coming word than impossibility, but that it more completely expressed his own idea; for to say that any thing is impossible with God is an absurdity; but it frequently happens that men unintentionally propose a problem, which in the very terms of it involves a contradiction *. And certainly if men mean to include under the word voluntary, or the word contingent, that which cannot be known before-hand, the question is already determined. To know a thing that cannot be known, is a contradiction in terms, and is equivalent to saying nothing." (Copleston's Remarks, p. 5.)

Dr. Copleston's recommendation of Archbishop King's Sermon on Predestination, to the notice of the student," the intent of which is to shew that the great cause of confusion and perplexity, on this and other similar subjects, is the indistinctness of our notions respecting the Divine Attributes ;" induces Philalethes, while he admits the justice of the remark, to ask "is there, on the other hand, no indistinctness in our notions respecting human liberty? If it is unsafe. to build a system upon a principle which we so imperfectly comprehend, as the Divine Prescience, are we sure that it is not equally unsafe to erect one upon our notions of FreeWill?" (Letter of Philalethes Cantabrigiensis, p. 8.) These questions are introductory of an attempt to reconcile the Foreknowledge of God with the freedom of man, by inquiring whether the Divine Prescience is incompatible with that degree of freedom in man, which is necessary to render him a responsible agent. Philalethes argues, that the doctrine of Predestination does not necessarily suppose such a species of compulsion, as renders man no longer accountable for his actions he conceives that man's inclinations may still have a share in his actions, though they are all fixed in the counsels of God.

"Before a man has determined to commit a criminal act," he reasons, "while the struggle between conscience and evil inclination is still going on, the fact that all his actions are fixed, can have no influence upon his determination; because, as he has no insight into futurity, he cannot tell what is fixed. After he has committed it, he may say, that he was predestined to commit it; but is he therefore justified in contending that he contracted no guilt by committing it? Surely not. The guilt was contracted, when he yielded to the evil inclination; and we have seen, that in so yielding he could not be influenced by any considerations drawn from the doctrine of Predestination. So long as man is ignorant of futurity, whether his actions are fixed or not, his accountableness remains the same; he cannot say, that he does any

*See Enquiry, p. 54.

act because he is predestined to do it; for until he has done it, he cannot know that he was predestined to do it; it was inclination or appetite that determined his conduct; when he did the act, he never considered for a moment whether he was predestined to do it or not." (Letter of Phil. Cantab. p. 16.)

But it seems to have escaped the notice of Philalethes, that the Predestinarian hypothesis supposes the inclinations of man to be foreknown to God, and fixed in the divine counsels, as well as his actions. The distinction therefore which he endeavours to draw between inclinations and actions, considering the former not to be foreknown by God, though the latter are, does in fact, as Dr. Copleston observes, gives up the Predestinarian hypothesis altogether. "Deus" says Stapfa, "omnia in systemate mundi distincte cognoscit; præscit quid per animas hominum sit possibile, et integram seriem perceptionum et appetitionum earum, non minus decreta et cogitationes omnes novit." (Stapfa Inst. Theol. Polem. Tom. i. p. 88.) And Marckius observes of the Divine decrees, "Extenduntur hæc Dei Statuta ad omnia quæ fiunt in tempore sine sint res sive actiones, &c." (Marckii Compend. Theol. Christ. cap vi. 2.) Dr. Copleston then is fully justified in saying, " under that hypothesis, all the thoughts, and feelings, and inclinations of man, are just as much foreseen as his actions; and on that account are regarded as equally inevitable. If he is predestined to do evil, because we cannot otherwise conceive the prescience of God, he is also for the same reason predestined to think, and to be inclined to, and to prefer evil." (Remarks, p. 7.) On further consideration, we think that Philalethes will allow this: and the more he examines the Predestinarian hypothesis, the more convinced he will be of the delicate and artificial complexity of its construction, which will not admit of the slightest alteration, far less of the abstraction of any of its component parts which will inevitably be fatal to the whole.

The more we consider the subject, the more we are inclined to accede to Dr. Copleston's opinion, that the only, at least we will say to our minds, the only satisfactory resource is, not to admit the position as a necessary truth," that what is foreseen is fixed, and cannot be otherwise." To -this, the Calvinists themselves appear to approximate, when they reckon libera et contingentia under the subjects of the Divine decrees; and Calvin himself has recognized the principle, when he denies that God is the author of sin, and yet is wholly unable to reconcile with this opinion the foreseen necessity of all human actions. It is no part of our

province to make this admission accord with Calvin's system: but it may be consolatory to those who bow to Calvin's opinion, to know that he has made it; and, as Dr. Copleston remarks upon the fact, "If this reserve is made for the honour of God in the one case, why must we be precluded from employing the same principle in the other?" (Remarks, p. 8.)

Philalethes conceives, that the Enquirer has identified Austin with Calvin; and that he has thus furnished his opponents with a very plausible argument against himself. For, as the seventeenth article, as well as those on Original Sin and Free-Will, was added to the original manuscript sketch of the articles circulated among the Bishops, between the period in 1551, when that sketch was first submitted to their consideration, and 1552, when the articles were finally compiled *; supposing Austin and Calvin to be identified, Philalethes fears that some might argue from the admitted fact, that the article on Free-Will is manifestly taken from Austin," that, in the interval between the first draught and the final compilation, the framers of the articles acquired a greater fondness for the opinions which are now deemed Calvinistic." (Phil. Cantab. p. 22.) Few, we conceive, who are at all acquainted with the writings of Austin, and his numerous contradictions and inconsistencies, would allow that such an argument possessed much plausibility, even if Dr. Copleston had inadvertently given rise to it by identi fying the Bishop of Hippo, with the Genevan Reformer. But Dr. Copleston asks,

"Where have I identified Austin with Calvin? In the passage referred to, † after having represented the doctrine of absolute decrees as a metaphysical addition to the doctrines of the Gospel, "my words are, 'Let us not fear then to withdraw this stoical covering, this garb of human metaphysics, with which Austin first and Calvin afterwards overlaid the divine truths of Revelation.' This, I believe, is the only mention made of Austin throughout the volume; and from this incidental mention can it be inferred by any opponent that I have identified Austin with Calvin, or that the adoption of a single passage in the voluminous works of the former writer, implies an approbation of the doctrine of the latter

We presume of course that, by final compilation is meant the final compilation of the 42 articles framed in the reign of Edward VI. and agreed upon in the Convocation held in that year. It is well known that the 39 Articles, as we now have them, were first established in 1562, and received their last revision, 1571. REV.

"Page 171 of the Enquiry.

respecting absolute decrees? Surely Philalethes does not fall into the error of supposing, that because one leading doctrine of an author is rejected, therefore all his opinions and reasonings are to be regarded as erroneous. On the question before us more especially we may well expect to find incongruous statements in the writings of the same author; and it is a censure almost universally pronounced against Austin, that the opinions concerning prescience, free-will, and predestination, scattered throughout his works, are wholly irreconcileable with each other. One of the objects of my Enquiry is to shew why there must be apparent incongruity, if the whole truth is to be asserted-and why those writers who peremptorily maintain one proposition in such terms as to exclude the other, must either sacrifice a part of revealed truth, or contradict themselves. Austin has been repeatedly proved to be guilty of the latter of these faults; and it is one of the heavy charges alleged against Calvin that he is guilty of the former." (Remarks, p. 10.)

Some exceptions, it appears, have been taken against the first Discourse in the Enquiry, as if the author had not rightly estimated the probable effects of a belief in Necessity and Predestination, upon the conduct of mankind and it has been argued, and Philalethes seems to favour the idea, that history and experience furnish a sufficient refutation of the charge, that these opinions are unfriendly to morality. If the question must be considered as decided, when satisfactory proofs are alleged, that many professed believers in Necessity and Predestination have been eminently moral men, and zealous teachers of morality, the appeal to history and experience might indeed be triumphantly made. But this cannot be admitted. Dr. Copleston argues, that a belief in these doctrines, if allowed to have a practical influence, would produce effects injurious to morality: and he considers the acknowledged fact, that this influence has not been permitted them, to become a powerful argument against their truth. He contends, that those who are speculative believers, are practical unbelievers. And he infers their unbelief from their conduct; because, if really believed and -professed upon practical principles, these doctrines would have the same effect on us which is confessedly produced, whenever, in the business of life, we are convinced of the necessity under which an agent is placed.

If we are entirely convinced, that on some particular occasion it was impossible for a man to act otherwise than he did, we cannot blame him for his conduct. A belief, then, that all the actions of our lives are predetermined, if it were real, would at once be admitted to absolve us from all re