hinted at will flow solely from the new and rapid means of transit which we have described we do not pretend; but that they in combination with other causes will exert a most potent influence in shaping the character and destiny of many nations and modifying the condition of all, we think, must be evident.

ART. III.-THE IMPENDING REVOLUTION IN ANGLOSAXON THEOLOGY.

[SECOND ARTICLE.]

IN our former article we alluded to the revolution which has recently taken place in physics relative to the doctrine of matter, and predicted a corresponding revolution in the department of systematic theology, so far as those doctrines are concerned which in their current mode of treatment necessarily imply the truth of the old theory. To illustrate the necessity of a new treatment of these points we passed in review some of the customary arguments for the existence of God, the fact of his providence, and the spirituality of the soul, showing that their force and pertinency are gone the moment the old view of matter as naturally inert is given up. We concluded by presenting a few considerations going to show that the loss of the arguments in question is no very serious one, promising in the present number a fuller view of the modifications which the general adoption of the dynamic view of nature will probably occasion in the department of theology, and of the possible advantages which may accrue therefrom to our science. To the redemption of this promise we will now devote ourselves. As the modifications of which we are to speak will of course exhibit themselves with the greatest prominency in those fields of investigation which we successively surveyed in our last, we will pass them once more in review in the same order, and inquire as to the probable result in each case of an effort to reconstruct our argumentation independent of the old mechanical theory of matter.

I. NATURAL THEOLOGY.In this department, if we mistake not, the impending revolution will be more distinctly marked

and sooner acknowledged than in any other. The change we anticipate is nothing less than the entire supplanting of natural theology, in its old-fashioned sense, by a fresh, vigorous, and sound philosophy of religion.

What we mean by this will become clearer by a brief definition of terms. Natural theology, though properly signifying "the science which treats of the being, attributes, and will of God as evincible from the phenomena of created objects," has usually been restricted in English literature to treatises or parts of treatises aiming at nothing more than the mere demonstration of the existence of God by the use of premises and arguments "which the candid atheist must admit as fair and reasonable." The philosophy of religion on the other hand may. be defined as that science which, starting with the moral religious phenomena of the world, busies itself with the various theories which have been proposed for their explanation, collates, sifts, and tests them, exposing the false, discovering and establishing the true. Though both sciences have to do with the grounds of our faith in the being of a God, they differ in very important respects. They differ, for instance, in respect to their object; the one aiming to convict the atheist, the other to establish and confirm the theist. They differ also in their mode of procedure; the one starting with premises wholly outside of the realm of religion, and seeking from such premises to deduce the necessity of a God; the other starting with premises wholly within the realm of religion, and seeking to confirm all the doctrines and implications of theism by a philosophical interpretation of them.

The change we have suggested would, therefore, in effect be the frank and formal abandonment of all endeavors to logically demonstrate the existence of God on principles independent of the moral and religious nature and history of man, and the equally frank and formal substitution of a defense of religion, based upon itself and its own phenomena, supported by collateral evidence only so far as such evidence might incidentally accrue to it in the consistent carrying through of a theistic philosophy. This is the change we anticipate. It is already in process of realization. Our latest works in this department are all transitional. They possess all the merits and all the defects of such works. They have unconsciously abandoned the old

ground of their science without attaining a firm and reliable footing elsewhere. The terms and conditions of the problem have become so changed that even "Burnett Prizes" cannot call forth a work satisfactory to the awarders or to the theological public. Still all these works, manifold as are their imperfections when judged from the standpoint which they tempt one to take, are serving a good purpose. They suggest progress if they do not themselves make it. So far as they do advance beyond the old landmarks they approach the true ground. Some of them are already almost pure philosophies of religion published under a false title. The next that shall traverse this field will have little to do to win the honor of having ushered in a new and auspicious epoch in the development of this branch of theological science.

The positive desirableness of such a reconstruction of our traditional natural theology must be at once evident. Perhaps it may not be amiss, however, to briefly state a few considerations in view of which our estimate of its desirableness may be enhanced.

1. In the first place, then, the formal substitution of the philosophy of religion for natural theology, viewed as the scientific demonstration of the existence of God, would at once relieve the natural theologian from a false position, and enable him to meet the pretensions of his science.

At present it is expected of the natural theologian that he shall show himself able to establish the truth of theism by arguments admissible by "the candid atheist." He must be willing to meet the unbeliever on common ground. He must be able to say to him: "I am not going to silence you with the dicta of Scripture or ecclesiastical authority, nor with the testimonies of justly esteemed philosophers. I shall not demand your faith on any such grounds. No. We will simply reason together, and I will show you that there must be a God. I will not argue from revelation, for that presupposes a Revelator, whose existence it is that we have first to prove. I will not draw my arguments from the religious history of our race, or from the religious experiences of individuals, for the truth or falsehood of this history and of these experiences of course depends upon the correctness of this belief in the existence of a God. I will base all my reasonings upon facts which no sane mind can dream of questioning, and proceed according to the strictest FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XV.-37

rules of logic." The man, therefore, who undertakes to write a natural theology at the present day pledges himself to a certain extent to meet these expectations. Possibly at the beginning of his studies he may think it can be done.

First, perhaps, he takes the idea of God as a starting point. That men have the, idea of an absolutely perfect Being not even the atheist can pretend to deny. Cannot the actual existence of this Being be deduced from our possession of an idea of him? Our friend brings forth his Anselm Mendelssohn and Des Cartes, and under their guidance proceeds to the attempt. Perhaps with the good Archbishop of Canterbury he goes to work thus: "We possess the idea of an absolutely perfect Being. But reality or existence is a perfection. Therefore, this Being must be real-must exist." Or perhaps, with Des Cartes, he proposes to argue from the existence of this idea of God as the only rational way of accounting for its origination. Then his argument stands thus: "All our ideas are either adventitious or factitious or innate. But this idea of an absolutely perfect Being cannot be adventitious, for within the range of our empirical knowledge we have met with no such Being; factitious it cannot be, for the mind is conscious of not having freely originated it; consequently it is innate. But if implanted in the human mind it must have been by this Being himself, ergo there is such a Being." It may be that he finds at first view still greater force in the argument of the Jew-Christian metaphysician: "A Being most perfect must be independent. There is such a Being or there is not. If such a Being is not, there must exist some ground for his non-existence. But this ground must lie either without this independent God or within him. Without him it cannot lie, for then he would not be independent; within him it cannot lie, for no logical impossibility can lie in the conception of an absolutely independent Being. Hence there exists no ground of the non-existence of an absolutely perfect and independent Being, consequently there exists such a one." Whichever form of the ideological argument he may select, he scarcely succeeds in fairly developing it before he becomes himself suspicious of its validity in any form, and finds upon examination that it has long ago been abandoned by all reliable metaphysicians and divines as nothing better than an acute and plausible fallacy. The first part

of his treatise must be taken up, therefore, not with theistic argument, but with an exposure of the untenable reasonings of his predecessors in the field. Before he can encounter the atheist he must seek a new point of departure.

This time he takes the natural world as it lies before us. Not even the atheist can deny its existence. Very well; if something a real world now is, it follows that something must have been from all eternity, that is, God. But hold! cries the sober, critical faculty, supposing it granted that something, has existed from all eternity, who cannot see that it is a tremendous saltus from this eternal Something to the eternal Jehovah? This something from which you reason is material, and from its existence how can you ever deduce the existence of an unbeginning, ever-during Spirit? Ay, that is the rub. The books tell him that this is done by means of the argument from natural causation, thus: "This eternal Something must be spirit, for matter is absolutely inert, and even if eternal, could never have organized this vast universe and given its parts their rhythmic movements. These proofs of exerted power point us beyond passive matter to the only known seat and source of power-self-active mind." Or they give him the following: "This unoriginated Something must be spirit, because the tokens of design which we everywhere find in nature, these wise dispositions of matter for the attainment of definite ends, all attest the existence of the great Designer. He who invented the cunning mechanism of microscopic life on the one hand, and on the other intergeared the rolling worlds so wondrously-surely he cannot be less than God." Alas! these arguments, once so prized, replies our poor friend, I can no longer employ. It has too often been pointed out that they involve the fallacy of inferring an infinite Cause from finite effects. Furthermore the inherent passivity of matter can no longer be made the basis of such weighty reasonings. By scientific men it is regarded as an exploded dogma; few theologians even deny that attractive force resides in matter. And if I predicate of matter dynamic properties to account for attractional phenomena, and vital forces to explain its vital phenomena, why has not the atheist an equal right to predicate of it the property of intelligence to account for its manifestations of intelligence? To this question I have no answer.